Essays in macroeconomics and finance by Mohsenzadeh Kermani, Amir Reza
Essays in Macroeconomics and Finance
by
Amir Reza Mohsenzadeh Kermani
Submitted to the Department of Economics
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 2013
ARCHNES
MAssACHUSETS INSTl19E
OF TECHNOLOGY
JUN 0 6 2013
LIBRARIES
@ 2013 Amir Kermani. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and distribute publicly paper and
electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of A uthor ....................................... . .. .............. ............
Department of Economics
A May 15, 2013
C ertified by ..............................
Certified by .......
Elizabeth &
Elizabeth
Daron Acemoglu
James Killian Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor
-..................
Robert Townsend
James Kill n rofessor of Economics
r! Thesis Supervisor
Certified by .........................
Simon Johnsqn
Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by ..............
Michael Greenstone3M Professor of Environmental Economics
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Studies
1

Essays in Macroeconomics and Finance
by
Amir Reza Mohsnezadeh Kermani
Submitted to the Department of Economics
on May 15, 2013 in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Economics
ABSTRACT
The first chapter proposes a model of booms and busts in housing and non-housing consumption driven by
the interplay between relatively low interest rates and an expansion of credit, triggered by further decline
in interest rates and relaxing collateral requirements. When credit becomes available, households would
like to borrow in order to frontload consumption, and this increases demand for housing and non-housing
consumption. If the increase in the demand for housing translates into an increase in prices, then credit
is fueled further, this time endogenously, because of the role of housing as collateral. Because a lifetime
budget constraint still applies, even in the absence of a financial crisis, the initial expansion in housing and
non-housing consumption will be followed by a period of contraction, with declining consumption and house
prices. My mechanism clarifies that boom-bust dynamics will be accentuated in regions with inelastic supply
of housing and muted in elastic regions. In line with qualitative predictions of my model, I provide evidence
that differences in regions' elasticity of housing and initial relaxation of collateral constraints can explain
most of the 2000-2006 boom and the subsequent bust in house prices and consumption across US counties.
The second chapter (co-authored with Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James Kwak and Todd Mitton)
studies the value of political connections during turbulent times and shows the announcement of Tim Gei-
thner as President-elect Obamas nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008 produced a cumulative
abnormal return for financial firms with which he had a personal connection. This return was around 15
percent from day 0 through day 10, relative to other comparable financial firms. This result holds across a
range of robustness checks and regardless of whether we measure connections in terms of meetings he had in
2007-08, non-profit board memberships he shared with financial services executives, or firms with headquar-
ters in New York City. There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected firms when news
broke that Geithners conrmation might be derailed by tax issues. We argue that this value of connections
reflects the perceived impact of relying on the advice of a small network of financial sector executives during
a time of acute crisis and heightened policy discretion.
The third chapter (co-authored with Adam Ashcraft and Kunal Gooriah) studies the impact of skin-in-the-
game on the performance of securitized assets using evidence from conduit commercial mortgage backed
securities (CMBS) market. A unique feature of this market is that an informed investor purchases the
bottom 5 percent of the capital structure, known as the B-piece, conducting independent screening of loans
from which all other investors benefit. However, during the recent credit boom, a secondary market for
B-pieces developed, permitting these investors to significantly reduce their skin in the game. In this paper,
we document, that after controlling for all information available at issue, the percentage of the B-piece
that is sold by these investors has a significant adverse impact on the probability that more senior tranches
ultimately default. The result is robust to the use of an instrumental variables strategy which relies on the
greater ability of larger B-piece buyers to to sell these positions given the need for large pools of collateral.
Moreover we show the risk associated with this agency problem was not priced.
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Title: Elizabeth & James Killian Professor of Economics Title: Elizabeth & James Killian Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Cheap Credit, Collateral and the
Boom-Bust Cycle
1.1 Introduction'
During the period of 2000 to 2006, there was a decline in real interest rates followed by a rise of securitization
and an easing of collateral requirements (Figure 1.1a). The US flow of funds during this period shows that
in just seven years the stock of household mortgage liabilities more than doubled, increasing by 5.7 trillion
dollars.2 Despite a boom in housing construction, net investment of households in residential housing during
this period comprised merely 2.4 trillion dollars, the other 3.3 trillion dollars of this amount is money cashed
out from home equity.3 Interestingly, as Figure 1.1b shows, during this period the total valule of cash-outs
and the US current account deficit followed each other very closely. Turning to regional variations within
the US, regions that accumulated more debt during this period experienced a larger boom in house prices
and consumption which was followed by a larger bust in subsequent years (Figure 1.2).
This paper proposes an analysis of the economic boom and bust, where the bust is an inevitable con-
sequence of the boom and provides empirical evidence from US counties to support this explanation. At
the heart of the theory is the unsustainable increase in consumption driven by expanded credit and housing
price increases that relax credit constraints. Crucially, it is the nature of this sort of increase in consump-
tion that it must be reversed even in the absence of a financial crisis. My theory accounts not only for
1I am especially grateful to my advisors Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and Rob Townsend for their invaluable guidance,
encouragement and support. I also thank Marios Angelotos, David Autor, Abhijit Banerjee, Bengt Holmstrom, Nobu Kiyotaki,
Guido Lorenzoni,Michael Peters, Ali Shourideh and especially Adam Ashcraft, Veronica Guerrieri, Jim Poterba and Ivan
Werning as well as seminar participants at Berkeley, LSE, LBS, MIT,U of Michigan and U of Texas at Austin . All errors are
my own.
2 From 4.7 trillion dollars in 1999 to 10.5 trillion dollars in 2006.3 Greenspan and Kennedy (2008) shows that the process of home equity cash-out began in the early 80s and accelerated by
1998. They estimate that since 1990, home equity extraction accounts for four-fifths of the increase in mortgage liabilities and
for almost all the declIne in the US households savings rate. The fact that home equity cash outs are even more important in
their calculations partly springs from their definition of a cash-out which includes loans used for home improvement as well.
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the boom-bust dynamics of housing wealth and consumption, but also for a central fact that has received
insufficient attention: a significant fraction of the increase in consumption in many areas of the United
States was financed by borrowing on housing collateral.4 The theory thus links the decline in consumption
and housing wealth in many economic sub regions to the very increase in consumption and housing wealth
in the area and emphasizes that this cycle need not be driven by irrationality or exploitation by financial
intermediaries. Rather the cycle results naturally from the interplay between expanding credit, consumers
keen on frontloading their consumption, and the endogenous relaxation of credit constraints in a market
dominated by housing collateral.
To be more precise, I consider an open economy with two main ingredients: the interest rate is lower than
the discount rate of consumers, and households are subject to borrowing constraints with housing acting as
collateral (as well as providing housing services). These two ingredients together lead to a pattern in which
if it is possible to borrow, households borrow and increase their housing and non-housing consumption, and
the rise in demand for housing becomes partially self-reinforcing because it increases housing prices- creating
both a wealth effect and further relaxing credit constraints. However, because a lifetime budget constraint
still applies, these households must reduce their housing and non-housing consumption in the future (which
is anticipated), and when they do so, the dynamics play out in reverse. Given the low interest rate, they are
willing to endure this period of declining consumption in return for the early consumption.
My theoretical mechanism highlights the importance of three factors in shaping how pronounced these
dynamics will be. First is the expansion of credit, either because of further declines in interest rates or
declines in collateral requirements that precipitate the entire boom-bust cycle in the first place. Second,
is the difference between household time preference and the interest rate that determines the extent of
frontloading behavior. Therefore, the lower the interest rate, the larger the boom-bust pattern induced by
the same shocks. And third is the responsiveness of housing prices to the increase in demand for housing.
Empirically, this is related to the elasticity of the housing supply, already emphasized and empirically
exploited by Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008), Saiz (2010) and Mian and Sufi (2011).
I show that the theoretical mechanism is quantitatively and qualitatively very different when housing
supply is inelastic; an increase in housing demand leads to a rise in house prices, creating a wealth effect
and relaxed credit constraints in a way that either does not happen or does not happen to the same extent
with an elastic housing supply. In particular, a decline in interest rates reduces the user cost of housing,
which leads to an increase in housing demand in all regions. In regions with an inelastic supply of housing,
this raises the price of existing homes, which generates a wealth effect and relaxes the borrowing constraint.
Relaxed borrowing constraints enable households in these regions to frontload their consumption, which
results in a boom-bust cycle. On the other hand, in elastic regions, a decline in interest rates does not
change house prices and therefore the borrowing constraint of households in elastic regions remains binding.
4 The empirical work of Mian and Sufi (2011) is an exception which shows home-equity extraction due to rising home prices
is responsible for both a large fraction of increase in household debt during the boom years as well as a rise in default rates in
the years years following. However, they do not provide direct evidence on the relation between the rise in household debt and
the rise in consumption during the boom years.
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However, over time, households in these regions will use the resources freed from lower interest payments to
buy a larger house and increase their non-housing consumption. A decline in collateral requirements relaxes
the borrowing constraint in all regions, which increases the demand for housing and non-housing in the short
run. In regions with inelastic supply of housing, then, credit is further expanded, this time endogenously,
because of higher house prices. This will result in a boom-bust pattern that is amplified in inelastic regions.
In order to test the qualitative implications of my model at the reduced-form quantitative level, I build
on a series of studies by Mian and Sufi (2009, 2011, 2012) and Mian, Rao and Sufi (2012) and show that
the basic predictions of my model are borne out by the data. In particular, I find that during the period
2000-2006, regions with more inelastic supply of housing (as measured by Saiz (2010)), and regions that
experienced greater change in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs experienced a more rapid increase in
consumption and house prices and at least 70 percent of changes in house price growth and consumption
growth is attributed to these variables. These very same factors that explain the boom in house prices and
consumption during 2000 to 2006 also explain a significant fraction of decline in house prices and consumption
between 2006 and mid-2008. Moreover, I show regions with less elastic supply of housing and higher change
in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs experienced higher growth in their mortgage liabilities, not only
during the boom years of 2000 to 2006 but also during the downturn of mid-2006 to mid-2008. The fact
that mortgage liabilities in these regions continued to grow even after the downturn in house prices and
consumption suggest that a significant fraction of decline in house prices and consumption is not driven by
households reducing their debt, but instead, is driven by the reduction in the amount that households can
increase their debt holding. In terms of policy this is an important distinction because policies that allow
households to rollover their debt can only reduce the part of the downturn that is due to the deleveraging
of households.
My model also enables the analysis of the quantitative role different factors played in the boom-bust
cycle of 2000-2010 in the US economy. To this purpose, I calibrate key parameters of my model for regions
with different elasticities of housing and different changes in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs, based
on static characteristics of these regions and the time series of household mortgage liabilities of these regions
from 2000 to 2006. First, the parameters that results from this calibration shows a gradual decline in
collateral requirements during the boom years with the most rapid decline happening between 2003 and
2004. This relaxation of collateral requirements is more extreme the more inelastic the region, and the
higher the change in securitization rate in that region. These estimates resemble the findings of Lee, Mayer
and Tracy (2012) on the rise of the use of second lien loans." Second, I show that my model does a good
job of replicating the rise in house prices and consumption for the boom years and for the beginning of the
bust. Third, this exercise helps to estimate the contribution of different components to the boom and bust
dynamics. In particular, the model shows that whereas most of increase in house prices during the period
of 2000 to 2003 came from declining real interest rates, the boom in 2004 and 2005 was driven by declining
5 This is also similar to the time series and cross section of changes in securitization rate that happened during the boom
years.
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collateral requirements. However, the model implies that the same decline in collateral requirements would
have resulted in a significantly milder boom-bust in house prices and consumption if interest rates had been
at the level they were in 2000. This result is mainly because with higher interest rates households would
have less incentive to frontload their consumption.
In order to asses the contribution of the financial crisis to the downturn dynamics, I extend the calibration
of changes in collateral requirements for the period after 2007 based on changes in the actual time series of
household mortgage liabilities from 2007 to 2011 and compare the implied dynamics of housing prices and
non-housing consumption with the model without a reversal in initial relaxation of borrowing constraints.
First, estimated parameters show a steady decline in collateral requirements such that by 2011, most of the
initial decline in collateral requirements is reversed. Second, absent a financial crisis, the model does a fairly
good job at predicting the level of the decline in house prices and consumption during the bust, however, the
decline happens over a longer period of time. Adding the reversal in initial decline in collateral requirements
significantly helps the model predict the sharp decline in consumption and house prices. Moreover the model
predicts that the initial decline in house prices and consumption will be followed by a slight recovery, but
to a level that is close to the steady state of the economy without a reversal in initial relaxation of lending
standards which is well below the level of house prices and consumption in 2006 (the very top of the boom
years).
Finally, results of the quantitative exercise allow for the study of the impact of different policies on house
prices and household consumption in different regions. In particular I compare the impact of two different
policies: (i) further reductions in the real interest rate and (ii) loan modification. The policy experiment
shows that lowering interest rates is not effective in increasing consumption of households living in elastic
regions, whereas it does increase consumption a little in regions with an inelastic supply of housing. This
result is driven by the asymmetric impact of real interest rates on house prices. On the other hand, loan
modification increases consumption in all regions temporarily. However loan modification is just delaying
the recovery procedure and the initial increase in consumption is followed by a decline in consumption and
house prices in the years following. The effectiveness of policy in general is limited because the decline
in consumption is not only driven by some households deleveraging their debt holding - as is the case in
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2012) - but more importantly because the
level of consumption during the boom years itself was financed by the rapid growth in household liability.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next session briefly discusses the related literature.
Section 2 presents the theoretical model, which highlights the differential impact of decline in interest rates
and collateral requirements in regions with different elasticities of housing supply. I discuss the data in Section
3. Section 4 outlines the reduced-form empirical evidence and relates the boom-bust cycle to variations in
elasticity of housing supply as well as the rise of securitization. Section 5 extends the theoretical model to
a more general supply of housing, presents the result of the calibration of the model and perform policy
experiments. Section 6 concludes.
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1.1.1 Literature Review
On the theoretical dimension, this paper is most closely related to a number of recent studies on the housing
boom and bust in an incomplete-market framework in which houses, in addition to providing housing services,
provide a means of collateral for households. The importance of relaxation of borrowing constraints in
explaining the simultaneity in capital inflows and the rise of house prices during the boom years has been
raised in Ferrero (2012). Favilukis, Ludvigson and Nieuwerburgh (2012) also emphasizes the importance of
financial market liberalization and its reversal to explain the housing boom and bust, however, it argues that
most of the boom and bust would have happened even in the absence of capital inflows. The independent
work of Garriga, Manuelli and Peralta-Alva (2012) constructs a semi-open economy and shows a decline in
interest rates in addition to the relaxation of collateral requirements that is followed by a reversal in the
initial relaxation can account for the housing boom and bust.6 Midrigan and Philippon (2011) consider the
impact of a credit crunch in a cash-in-advance economy in which the main role of home equity borrowing is to
provide liquidity services and therefore monetary policy is very effective in reducing the recession driven by
decline in house prices. Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) studies a heterogeneous-agent model with durable
goods and argue an increase in credit spreads, and not a shock to credit limits, can lead to a decline in
demand for durable goods.7 The frontloading behavior of households and its interaction with the elasticity
of housing is what distinguishes the mechanism of this paper from other work. Also, in terms of the results,
in all of the above studies the downturn in consumption and asset prices is generated by the reversal in initial
credit expansion whereas in this paper the bust begins whenever there is not enough of a further decline in
interest rates or in collateral requirements. At least in terms of data, it seems that both the decline in house
prices and the decline in consumption predate any sign of shrinkage in the financial markets.8 Also being
written in continuous time makes this model tractable such that not only is the steady-state completely
characterized, but also the transition path.
This paper naturally builds on the seminal work of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The literature on sudden
stops also highlights the importance of collateral constraints in understanding output, asset prices and
capital flows during episodes of crisis (for example see Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2007), Caballero and
Krishnamurty (2001) Calvo, Coricelli and Ottonello (2012) and Mendoza (2010)). This paper complements
this strand of literature by assuming financial frictions on the household side of the economy instead of on
6Their semi-open economy or segmented-financial-markets assumption assumes that a representative agent is able to use
her housing stock as collateral to borrow from abroad at a rate that is lower than the marginal product of capital. Therefore a
decline in mortgage rates that is not followed by a decline in marginal product of capital or a decline in collateral requirements
increases the collateral value of houses.
7 There is a larger literature incorporating housing sector (usually with heterogeneous agents) in the general equilibrium
models. For example see Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), Iacoviello (2008), Jeske, Krueger and Mitman (2012) and Kiyotaki,
Michaelides and Nikolov (2011).
8 For example US securitization issuance and the S&P 500 kept increasing until mid-2007. Therefore in terms of timing it
seems more likely that the downturn in consumption and in house prices precipitated the financial crisis and not the other way
around.
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the firms side.9 , 10
Among empirical studies of the recent financial crisis, Mian and Sufi (2009) provides evidence of the
relation between an increase in securitization and the rise of household mortgage liabilities and the subsequent
surge in default rates. Dagher and Fu (2011) is another related study that shows the rise in the share of
independent lenders is associated with a similar pattern of mortgage liabilities and default rates." Mian
and Sufi (2011) estimate that increasing house prices resulted in a $1.25 trillion dollars increase in existing
homeowners liabilities from 2002 to 2006. Finally Mian and Sufi (2012) and Mian, Rao and Sufi (2012) show
a disproportionately larger decline in consumption and in employment in counties that had higher debt-to-
income ratios by 2006. This paper complements findings of these studies in a number of dimensions. First,
it shows that not only during the downturn but also during the boom years house prices and consumption
are closely associated with the factors that contributed to the expansion of credit, namely variations in the
elasticity of housing and changes in the securitization rate. Second, I show that regions with a less elastic
supply of housing and a higher change in securitization rate, despite having a larger decline in house prices and
consumption during 2006 to mid-2008, continued to have higher growth in their mortgage liabilities during
the period of 2006 to mid-2008. These two facts together show that it is true that in comparison to 2006 the
decline in demand and in employment is driven by indebted households reducing their consumption, however,
the level of consumption in 2006 itself was not sustainable and was financed by home-equity extraction by
existing households.1 2 In addition, this paper argues theoretically and empirically that changes in interest
rates and collateral requirements (proxied by changes in the securitization rate) move all the three variables
of house prices, consumption and household debt together and, depending on the elasticity of housing supply,
the dynamics implied by these shocks can be very different. Therefore using the elasticity of housing as an
instrument does not help one estimate the causal impact of house prices on household borrowing behavior
or consumption.
There is a larger literature on the relationship between housing wealth and consumption which usually
finds significant, but heterogeneous, effects on housing wealth (for example see Hurst and Stafford (2004),
9 In the case of the recent crisis in the US, Adrian, Colla and Shin (2012) shows much of the decline in banks'
lending to firms was compensated by bond financing such that by mid-2009 US non-financial corporate sector's liabili-
ties started to increase. On the other hand, the NY Fed Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Crdit (available at
HTTP://www.newyorkfed.org/research/national-economy/householdcredit/DistrictReportQ22012.pdf) shows a steady de-
cline in total household debt since the third quarter of 2008. The above evidences is suggestive that during the current crisis
financial frictions on the households are more important in explaining the economic downturn. Also as is argued by Midrigan
and Philippon (2011) models with financial frictions on firms have a hard time explaining the cross-section of regional variation
in the data on output.
1
oAnother recent strand of literature studies the impact of financial frictions when financial institutions, in addition to firms,
are facing the frictions. Among the others, see Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Rampini
and Viswanathan (2012). Compared to models like Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) which put the financial frictions
only on the firms, these papers show a more persistent and non-linear impact of financial frictions on the real side of economy.
1 1In general independent lenders,as compared to banks and thrifts, have always sold a much higher fraction of their loans
to non-GSEs. This is mainly driven by higher cost of capital for these lenders and their specialization in originating loans to
the lower tail of the market. In data there is a very high correlation between the change in fraction of securitized loans and
the share of independent lenders and it seems that the increase in the share of independent lenders was an effect of the rise of
securitization which lowered financing cost significantly for these independent investors.
12 1n terms of employment this means that by 2006 there was too much employment in the non-tradable and construction
sectors and, at some point this needed to be corrected, which can result in the long periods of adjustment associated with a
high unemployment rate.
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Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005), Campbell and Cocco (2007) and Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton and Leicester
(2009)). What this paper adds to that literature is that this relationship depends not only on individual
characteristics, but also on the level of interest rates, on elasticity of housing in the region' 3 and on the
nature of the shock that is driving the both variables; meaning whether the shock is an income shock, an
interest rate shock or a change in collateral requirements.
1.2 Theory
In this section I develop a model of a small, open economy with a representative household whose borrowing
is constrained by the collateralizable fraction of its housing wealth. I begin by characterizing the environment
and solving for the household's optimization problem, taking house prices dynamics as given. Next, I solve
for the equilibrium of elastic regions and inelastic regions by endogenizing house prices. Finally, I shock the
economy with surprise changes in interest rate and collateral requirements and characterize the transition
path of the economy.
1.2.1 Setup
Consider a continuous-time, small, open economy 4 consisting of regions differing only in the total supply of
land. Each region's population is normalized to one, and the representative household in region i lives there
forever, has a discount rate p and enjoys housing consumption (hit) as well as non-housing consumption
(cit). Region i's household preference is given by:15
f e-P [logcit + rjloghitj dt (1.1)
The non-housing consumption good is the numeraire. Each unit of housing in region i is traded at price qij
and, in order to keep the model simple, I assume that there is no rental market for housing.
Similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), I assume the only financial asset is the short term paper which has
return r,16 and the minimum holding of financial assets by the representative household (ait) is constrained
by fraction 64 (< 1) of household housing wealth:
ai > -Oigithit (1.2)
The representative household in region i receives a stream of endowment equal to wm and assumes there
13 Elasticity of housing determines whether the change in housing wealth is coming from the change in quantity or from the
change in prices.
14This assumption is justified with the fact that during the period of 2000 to 2007, changes in the US current account deficit
and changes in household mortgage liabilities follow each other closely. Interestingly, Ferrero (2012) shows this pattern has
been common among all countries that experienced a housing boom in this period.
15The Cobb-Douglas aggregator is rationalized by the fact that in a cross section, of data the share of housing cost in household
expenditure has only small variations.
16 As long as households assume the interest rate r is constant, this assumption is not restrictive, and any long-term contract
can be replicated with a short-term contract.
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is no change in r, 64 or w2 .
Houses are produced by a combination of land and capital according to a Leontief production function:1 7
hit = min(lit, ) (1.3)
Capital is produced using the numeraire good and its price is equal to one. The price of one unit of land
in region i at time t is q. Moreover I assume there is no adjustment cost for the capital used in a house. 18
Then as long as g/qi < r, 19 the Leontief production function implies that:
hit = li = kt/B (1.4)
qt = qi + B (1.5)
When a household is buying a house, it receives the title for the land that is used in that house as well as
the title for the house itself. Only the capital used in the house, and not the land, is subject to depreciation
rate 6 k, which can be compensated for with household investment iit in the house. Therefore the capital
used in the house evolves according to:
kit = -kkti + iit (1.6)
Given the Leontief production function for housing the amount of investment is:
iit = 5kkt (1.7)
Therefore the representative household budget constraint is:
ait + qithui = wi + rait - cit - SkBhit (1.8)
Finally, and most importantly, it is assumed that the interest rate is lower than the household's time
preference rate (r < p). This assumption can be rationalized by a global saving glut hypothesis (Bernanke
(2005)) or by the presence of a small fraction of the population who are more patient than others as in
Guvenen (2009). But more importantly, an extension of the present model that includes agents with an
income profile that is temporarily high (super stars) shows that r < p is the only equilibrium steady state
interest rate that arise in this economy with incomplete markets. In that framework higher income inequality
results in a further decline in the interest rate. 20
17 For the quantitative exercise, I extend the housing production function to CES and show analytically that the qualitative
results do not change.
IAThis is a relatively strong assumption that makes the model tractable. However, this helps to clarify the boom-bust cycle
purely driven by the frontloading motivation from the boom-bust cycle induced by a temporary increase in demand for housing
a la Mankiw and Weil (1989). Adding adjustment costs to this model results in larger boom-bust cycles.
9 t/qt > r is not possible because then even an investor who is not living in region i can invest in the land in region i and
make more profit than buying financial assets and, therefore, there will be no lending.
20In fact r < p is the general feature of most of the models with incomplete markets with shocks to the income profile of the
households. For example see (Ayigari (1994) , Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2009)).
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1.2.2 Household Problem
Region i's household problem can be written as:
00
Max e~pt [logcit + 77loght] dt
[cit,ajt,ht]0 Jo
s.t. dit + qithit = w - cit + rait - S6 Bhit
-ai !; 6;qithit
Defining the total wealth of the representative household as Wi qthit +at, and J e SB, we can rewrite
the representative household problem as:
r00
Max e~Pt [logcit + rjloght]j dt
[cjtWjtthjt]E. 0
s.t. Wi = w - cjt + r (Wi - qith) - Shit + it hit (1.9)
Wi (1 - O)qitkhs
Using an extension of the maximum principle for an optimal control problem with mixed constraints (see
Seierstad and Sydsmter (1987)), one can form the discounted Hamiltonian as:
N = [logcit + 27loghit] + pit [w - cit + r (Wit - gikit) - Shit + 4ithit] (1.10)
And associated Lagrangian is:
Z -$+ Ait [Wit - (1 - 6) qithit] (1.11)
First order conditions can be simplified to:
= (r - p) + (1.12)Cit pit
S(rqit + J - it) + (1 - 6i) qit] (1.13)
At > 0 (= if f Wi > (1 - 6O) qtht) (1.14)
Without the borrowing constraint, equation (1.12) is the usual Euler equation. pit is the marginal benefit
of one more unit of consumption and, therefore, At/pit is the relative marginal value of one more unit of
borrowing. This equation shows that the higher the relative marginal value of borrowing, the higher the
growth rate of consumption, which means the lower the ability of household to transfer resources from the
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future to now. In equation (1.13), (rqt + 6 - Qt) is the user cost of housing in a frictionless economy and,
therefore, without the borrowing constraint, consumption smoothing between non-housing goods and housing
implies (rqt + 6 - i) hit/r7 = ct. However, when the borrowing constraint is binding, the representative
household cannot afford the down payment for buying a house and the household's demand for housing
declines in comparison with the frictionless case. The higher the required down payment for each unit of
housing ((1 - 0) qt), the higher the decline in the demand for housing.
1.2.3 Equilibrium Characterization
So far we have characterized the differential equations governing the optimal behavior of the representative
household for a given path of prices. The final step is to add the supply side of the housing market and
to find the equilibrium house prices for the given behavior of the representative household. Let us define
Li as the aggregate supply of land in region i, hio initial housing stock of the representative agent and ajo
as the initial holding of financial assets by the representative household in region i . In order to reduce
the number of variables for the definition of the equilibrium I use the equilibrium relations (1.4) and (1.5)
(kit/B = lit = hit, qij = qit). Then one can define the equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1: Equilibrium in region i is a set of choices [citait,hiit*o by the representative household
and a set of house prices [qit] . such that
. The representative household takes [qit ] ' as given and maximizes its lifetime utility, i.e., solves prob-
lem (1.9) with the initial condition WiO = aio + qiOhiO.
* Total demand for land in region i does not exceed the total supply (hit 5 Li) with equality if and only
if qit > B.2
Now in order to show main insights of the model, I consider two extreme cases for the supply of housing:
. Inelastic Supply: The supply of land in this case is very limited, such that all the land in the region
has been used and the aggregate supply of housing is constant and equal to the total supply of land in
the region (hit = Li, i E {Inelastic Regions} ).2
. Elastic Supply: In this case there is plenty of unused land and therefore the price of land, qL is zero.
This results in a constant price for houses equal to the cost of capital used for building the house
(qit = B, i E {ElasticRegions}).
21This is equivalent to the price of land being zero (qg = 0)
2The necessary condition for this is:
(1+ 19) 6+ B [(1+ 17) Or + (1 - 0) p]
This means the demand for housing when house prices are equal to B, or in other words the price of land is zero, should be
greater than the total supply of land in region i.
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In characterizing the equilibrium for both regions, I use the following two lemmas that hold for both elastic
regions and inelastic regions.
Lemma 1: Suppose qit is finite for all t. Then, for any value of a.o, there exists t1 such that At, > 0.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Lemma 1 argues that independent of initial financial holdings of the representative household in region i
(ajo), there exists a time t1 at which the household borrowing constraint binds (At. > 0). Intuition for this
lemma is that since r-p < 0, when the household borrowing constraint does not bind, household consumption
has a negative growth rate. This means the household wants to transfer as many of the resources as it can
to today which results in the borrowing constraint becoming bindings.
Lemma 2: Suppose r and 6h are fixed. If there exists t1 such that At, > 0, then At > 0 for all t > t1.
Proof: see Appendix B.
Lemma 2 claims that in an economy without changes in r and Oj, whenever the borrowing constraint
binds, it remains binding forever. The intuition for this result is that in order for a constrained borrowing
constraint to become unconstrained, the representative household should either reduce its consumption or
its housing stock or the growth in house prices should increase. Because of the frontloading motivation, a
decline in consumption or in housing stock are not desirable for a household. The proof shows an increase
in growth of house prices that leads to a transition from a constrained borrowing constraint to a relaxed
borrowing constraint cannot be an equilibrium because it results in the demand for housing exceeding the
supply.
Lemmas 1 and 2 together show that in the steady-state the borrowing constraint is binding. Moreover
it shows that there is, at most, one point in time in which the borrowing constraint of the representative
household becomes binding. Therefore in order to solve for the entire equilibrium path, we must solve the
problem backwards. First, we solve for the steady-state equilibrium. Second, we characterize the transition
path while the household borrowing constraint is binding. Then we characterize the transition path when the
borrowing constraint does not bind. Finally, using the household's initial financial assets and the fact that
house prices are a continuous function of time, we find the point in time at which the borrowing constraint
becomes binding.
I now characterize the equilibrium of inelastic regions and then proceed to the equilibrium of elastic
regions.
1.2.3.1 Equilibrium Characterization for Inelastic Regions
In regions with an inelastic supply of housing, the total supply of housing is fixed and therefore the budget
constraint of the representative household reduces to:
dit = wi + rait - cit - SLj (1.15)
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When the borrowing constraint is binding, equations (1.12) to (1.14) in addition to (1.15) reduce to:
&it (r-p)+ (1 + O4) cit - (w - (1 - 6i)JLi)
- = (r -p)±+
cit 6i (1 - 64) Ligit
dit = rqi + - Bi
ait = -6;qitL;
(1.16)
(1.17)
(1.18)
Steady state can be derived by imposing &it = dit = 0 in equations (1.16) and (1.17).
Proposition 1: In the steady state of inelastic region i, the household housing wealth and non-housing
consumption are given by:
Inelastic
q 88*
(qaa)Inelastic
(1.19)
(1.20)
[Bir + (1 - 64) p] wi - S Li (1 - 64) p
(1 + 77) Oir + (1 - 61) p
Inelast'c L = wi - (1 + 1) 5Li1a" (1+t) Oir + (1 - 6i) p
Corollary 1: Comparative statics with respect to the interest rate r
Ocinelastic
88s 
< 0,
O (qa.h..)Inelastic
9r < 0
nelastic < (O6 (q..h,,)Inelastic
*(q sis < 0 , > 0
0 (qajjhall )Ieati 0 if and only if p - (1 +q) r 0
(1.21)
(1.22)
(1.23)
Equations (1.21) show that the lower the interest rate, the higher the housing wealth and non-housing
consumption of the household. Lower interest rates reduce the user cost of housing. Since the supply of
housing is fixed, house prices should increase enough to reduce demand and make it equal to supply. Taking
household debt as given, lower interest rates means lower interest payments for the household, which leaves
more resources for consumption. However, this effect is partly muted because in the steady-state household
debt is also increasing.
Equation (1.22) says that as a result of an increase in 0 (i.e. lower collateral requirement), the steady-
state consumption of the household declines. The intuition for this result is that a higher 0 enables the
representative household to borrow more. But after the household uses up this new borrowing capacity,
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and with respect to the maximum loan to value ratio (0i) are:
it cannot borrow any more, and the household ends up with a higher amount of debt which translates
into higher interest payments. But higher interest payments mean fewer resources remain for non-housing
consumption. The impact of an increase in 6 on housing wealth (equation (1.23)) is more interesting: on
one hand the increase in 6 means a lower down-payment is required for each unit of housing, which increases
demand for housing. On the other hand, because of the consumption smoothing between non-housing and
housing consumption, lower non-housing consumption in the steady state lowers the demand for housing.
Therefore the change in housing wealth depends on the relative importance of these two forces. The higher
77 is the stronger the consumption-smoothing force and, therefore, the more negative the change in housing
wealth. The higher is p - r the more important is the lower down payment in boosting the demand for
housing and therefore the more positive is the change in the housing wealth. However no matter whether
the steady state housing wealth increases or decreases, as a result of an increase in 6, the total borrowing
capacity (and therefore the total debt in the steady state)6, (qshas)Inelastic increases.
After characterizing the steady-state equilibrium, now we can characterize the transition path for the
representative household that begins with an initial condition (initial debt holding) that is different from the
steady-state.
The next lemma shows that in inelastic regions, whenever the borrowing constraint is binding, the
economy is in steady-state.
Lemma 3: For any region i with an inelastic supply of housing, if Ai > 0 then qit = qf"*e**i* and
-Cnelastic
Proof: From lemma 2 we see that once the borrowing constraint becomes binding it remains binding
forever and therefore the behavior of house prices and of consumption is fully characterized by equations
(1.16)-(1.18). Then from the (qit, cit) phase diagram in Figure 1.3 we see that this system of equations does
not have any stable path. And the steady-state point given by 4Constrained = 0, dConstrained = 0 is the only
stable point in this system of equations.
When the borrowing constraint is not binding (ait > -6jtqitLi), the household maximization problem
(equations (1.12) to (1.14)) and the household budget constraint (equation (1.8)) reduce to:
= r - p (1.24)
Cit
4it = rqit + 8 - 7-' (1.25)
Li
ost = wi - cit + rait - 8L (1.26)
As Figure 1.4 illustrates, among the paths described by equations (1.24) and (1.25), there is only one
path that crosses the steady state. In equilibrium the household consumption and home prices move along
this path until the borrowing constraint becomes binding. Moreover, initial point (qio, cio) should be such
that exactly at the time the agent is reaching the steady state point (q,,, c,,), the borrowing constraint
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should become binding. Let us define T as the time it takes the economy in region i to reach its steady
state. Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium path for inelastic region i, with initial level of debt holding
aio.
Preposition 2: In the inelastic region i, starting from an initial level of debt holding ao > -6, (q..h..)Inelastic:
" The representative household borrowing constraint does not bind throughout the transition until the
economy reaches its steady state characterized by (1.19), (1.20) and a.,*e**** = -64 (q.,h,)neIa~tic
" The economy in inelastic region i reaches its steady state in a finite time (T < 00).
" The representative household non-housing consumption, house prices and representative household debt-
holding during the transition (i.e. t E [0, T] ) are given by:
Cit = c Inelastice(r-p)(t-Ti) (1.27)
6 77 Inelastic 'rp(-)+ Inelastic + -!Lcnelastic\ er(t-Ti)
git = -- + -- c ," c**e(r~p)(~1Ts+ in,8 i lc**** '*i (1.28)
= r pLi \. ±r pLi
a = ajoe ' + (7 r2) (er -t1) + * e(r-p)(tT) (1 - ePt) (1.29)
where T is the solution to:
-o (q.,Ha,) Inelastic = aioerT + (erT - 1) + ** (1 - ePTi) (1.30)
r Jp
Proof: The fact that representative consumer borrowing constraint does not bind throughout the transi-
tion is because the only stable point of the constrained regime is the steady state (lemma 3). Equations (1.27)
to (1.29) are solutions to the first-order differential equations that result from the household maximization
problem, assuming the borrowing constraint is relaxed ((1.24)-(1.26)) plus imposing the following boundary
conditions:
c iT = cnera tic Inelatic
ajo : given
Finally equation (1.30) arises from the fact that once the household reaches the steady state the borrowing
constraint should become binding: air = -6; (qH,,) Inelastic.
Defining BCo = ao + Bi (qshs)Inelastic as the initial unused borrowing capacity, we have the following
comparative statics:
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Corollary 2: Comparative statics with respect to unused borrowing capacity are:
____ Ocjo Oqio> 0 >0 >05BC0 'OBCio ' BCio
Proof: The right hand side of (1.30) is a decreasing function of T. Therefore an increase in ago results
in an increase in Ti. Then from (1.27) and (1.28) one can see that cio and qo are increasing in Ti.
Corollary 3 shows that the larger the unused borrowing capacity, the longer it takes the economy to reach
the steady state, and therefore, the economy starts from a point that is further away from the steady state.
This means household consumption and house prices are initially higher. This corollary is very useful when
we introduce unexpected changes to the interest rate and the maximum loan-to-value ratio into the economy.
1.2.3.2 Equilibrium Characterization for Elastic Regions
The main difference between elastic regions and inelastic regions is that house prices are constant in elastic
regions. Since lemmas 1 and 2 hold for elastic regions as well, we follow the same steps as before and
characterize the equilibrium backward : solving for the steady-state, characterizing transition while the
borrowing constraint is binding, and finally solving for the whole equilibrium by characterizing the transition
path when the borrowing constraint is relaxed.
The representative household utility maximization (given by equations (1.12) to (1.14)) when its borrow-
ing constraint is binding (A2 t > 0) in addition to house prices being constant (qit = B) result in:
(1 - 1) B C = - [6;rB + (1 - 6;) pB + 5]+ "c (1.31)
cit hit
(1 - 6i) Bhit = w; - cit - (6;rB +6) hit (1.32)
Imposing steady state conditions & = 0 and h = 0 leads to the solution for the steady state:
Proposition 3: In the steady state of elastic region i, the household housing wealth and non-housing
consumption are given by:
cElastic - [Oir + (1 - Oi) p + S/B] w0(1+ 1) (6er + J/B)+ (1 - 64) p
(q,h,,)Elastic = BhElatic = 7w(1.34)
's (1 + ) (ir + S/B) + (1 - i) p
Corollary 3: Comparative statics with respect to the interest rate r
(cElastic 0 (qs.h.s) Elastica < 0, < 0 (1.35)Or Or
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and with respect to the maximum loan to value ratio (6) are:
OcElastic < (oi (qs.hes)Elastic)
"i <0, (0(
0 (q%,h.)Elastic > 2f a
00 ifandonly if p-(1+r)r 0 (1.37)
Equation 1.35 shows that the lower the interest rate, the higher the housing wealth. However, the impact
of lower interest rates on housing wealth in the steady-state is smaller for elastic regions (in compare to
its impact in inelastic regions). This is because lower interest rates reduce the user cost of housing, and
households in elastic regions build larger houses. However having a larger house results in higher depreciation
costs which dampens the effect of lower interest rates on housing wealth. As before, lower interest rates
increase the steady-state consumption. Higher 62 (i.e. lower collateral requirement) reduces the steady state
consumption and its impact on housing wealth depends on the balance between front-loading motivation
(or the importance of lower down-payments) and consumption smoothing between housing and non-housing
consumption. 23
The following lemma characterizes the transition path of an elastic region i when the representative
household borrowing constraint is binding.
Lemma 4: In elastic region i, if Ai > 0 then the solution to household maximization problem (equations
(1.31) and (1.32)) is a saddle path for (hit,cit) described by
cjt = f (hit) (1.38)
where f (.) is a strictly increasing function and c.lastic = f(hEastic).
Proof: Again from lemma 2 we use the fact that once the borrowing constraint becomes binding it
remains binding forever and therefore the behavior of house prices and of consumption is fully characterized
by equations (1.31) and (1.32). Then from the (qit, cij) phase diagram in Figure 1.5 we see that this system
2 3 0ne observation is that if the depreciation cost is Sqh instead of 6h, the relation between the steady state housing wealth
and consumption in both regions is the same and equal to:
qh,, = 1) (ro +6) + (1 - 0) p
8+ro+(1-O)p
c., = (1) (6 + rB) + (1 - 0) p
One example in which the depreciation cost can be written as 6qh is when housing is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas
production function using capital and land. It seems that the real world is not a Leontief case since with better-quality facilities
on the land the consumer can enjoy his or her housing more. On the other hand the study of Davis and Heathcote (2007) shows
the share of land in the value of house is an an increasing function of house prices which is inconsistent with the Cobb-Douglas
case but is consistent with a CES production function for housing in which there is complementarity between land and capital.
Assuming h = [ "k + (1 - Wk)" I with 0 < a < 1, depreciation cost can be written as Sq'h which is in
between Leontief case (a =0) and Cobb-Douglas case (a = 1). In the calibration exercise, I use a CES characterization. It is
shown that much of the intuition from the Leontief case holds for the CES case as well.
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of equations has one saddle path that passes through the steady-state.
In elastic region i, when the borrowing constraint is not binding, the household maximization problem
reduces to:
&i = r-p (1.39)
cit
rB + c
cit = hit (1.40)
hit W - ( cit + rai (1.41)
Using equation (1.40), we can see that the point (hth, Cth) is defined as a solution to this system of
equations:
Cth = f(hth)
cth = h
is the only point at which the borrowing constraint can go from being relaxed to being binding.24 Finally
let us also define at =- -64Bhth and Wo= ajo + Bhio as the initial wealth of the representative household
in region i. Now we can characterize the full equilibrium path as follows:
Proposition 4:
e If Wo ; (1 - 6h) Bhth, the household borrowing constraint is binding throughout the transition, and
(hit, cit) is the solution to equations (1.31) and (1.32) with the initial conditions:
Wi0ho= (1- O) B cio = f (hio)
and throughout the transition cit = f(hit).
" If Wo > (1 - Gi) Bhth, the household borrowing constraint does not bind initially and in finite time
(T) the borrowing constraint becomes binding and remains binding. The equilibrium (hit, cit) is char-
acterized by:
- for t E [0, Ti the borrowing constraint does not bind, and the equilibrium is the solution to equa-
24 In other word at this point the shadow value of the borrowing constraint A is equal to zero.
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tions (1.39) to (1.41) with boundary-condition equations hiT hth, ciT = Cth and aiT ath:
Cit = Cthe
hit = hthe(r-p)(-T,)
at= atherT) +w~ (e~@ ~ - +h( + ~~e()T (1 - et
And T is computed with the additional boundary condition that Wo(= ao + Bhio) is given.
- for t > T, the borrowing constraint is binding and the equilibrium (hit, cit) is characterized by
the solution to equations (1.31) and (1.32) with the boundary conditions hiT = hth, ciT = cth and
aiT = ath. and cit = f (Hit)
Figure 1.6 shows the equilibrium transition path in the elastic region. If the household initial wealth
is high enough, the household borrowing constraint is relaxed for awhile, and along the transition cit =
(rB + 8) Hit/9. As the representative household exhausts its borrowing capacity, its demand for housing
and for consumption declines until it reaches the point (hth, cth). From that point forward the borrowing
constraint remains binding, and it is moving on the saddle path characterized by cit = f (Hit) until the
household reaches the steady state.
1.2.4 Impacts of Unexpected Permanent Changes in the Interest Rate and Col-
lateral Requirements
So far I have assumed that the interest rate (r) and the maximum loan-to-value ratio in each region (0) do
not change. In this section I study the impact of unexpected permanent changes in r and 0 for elastic and
inelastic regions. I maintain the assumption that households in different regions assume r and 0 are fixed and,
therefore, any change in r and 9 is a surprise for them.25 First, I consider the impact of a permanent decline
in the interest rate and a permanent increase in the maximum loan-to-value ratio and show endogenous
boom-busts arise from these shocks by themselves. Then, I consider the impact of a permanent increase in
the interest rate or a permanent decline in the maximum loan-to-value ratio and show this may result in fast
decline in consumption and house prices that is partly recovered after the initial decline. Finally in order to
keep the text short, I assume the economy is in the steady-state before the shocks happen. The extension
of results to an arbitrary initial condition is straight-forward.
2 5This is a strong assumption and perhaps a more realistic assumption would be that households assume a stochastic process
for r and 0. However this assumption not only makes the model tractable, but also helps to differentiate between the main
mechanism of this paper (interaction between frontloading behavior and endogenous asset prices) and the precautionary saving
motivation that exists in incomplete market settings such as those described in Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2012).
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1.2.4.1 Permanent Decline in the Interest Rate or Increase in the Maximum Loan-to-Value
Ratio
Proposition 5: Following an unexpected permanent decline in the interest rate r or increase in the max-
imum loan-to-value ratio Oi in an inelastic region i, house prices qit and non-housing consumption of the
representative household in the region i ,cit, increase discretely and the representative household borrowing
constraint becomes relaxed. The initial increase in house prices and consumption is followed by a steady
decline in both of them (qit, cit) until the economy reaches the new steady state. Throughout the transition
and before reaching the steady state the borrowing constraint remains relaxed.
The intuition for this result can be derived from equations (1.21) and (1.22). As a result of an unexpected
permanent decline in the interest rate or of an increase in 0, in the new steady-state the household can rollover
more debt. However, a household's level of debt holding before the shock and just after the shock are the
same. This means that the household has some unused borrowing capacity and can therefore finance a
higher level of consumption during the transition. But higher consumption also means more demand for
housing which, in equilibrium, translates to higher home prices. As the representative household uses up its
borrowing capacity, its consumption falls and therefore its demand for housing also declines, which results
in a decline in home prices.
Figure 1.7 depicts the impact of a decline in interest rates. As a result of a decline in the interest rate,
curves characterized by gonstrained = 0 and &Constrained = 0 shift to the right, and the new steady-state
consumption and home prices are both higher than before.2 In Figure 1.7 point a represents the steady-
state equilibrium consumption as well as home prices for an inelastic region before a decline in the interest
rate. After the interest rate decline, as a result of the wealth effect of the interest rate on home prices, the
household borrowing constraint relaxes and the household can now finance a higher level of consumption by
borrowing more. Therefore household consumption and home prices jump to a point on the new transition
path (a') such that when the household reaches the new steady state it has used up all of its borrowing
capacity.
Proposition 6: In elastic region i, an unexpected, permanent decline in the interest rate results in a gradual
increase in housing (hit) and non-housing consumption (cit) until the economy reaches the new steady-state.
Throughout the transition the borrowing constraint remains binding.
Figure 1.9 shows the impact of an unexpected decline in the interest rate in the (hit, cii) phase diagram.
In contrast to inelastic regions, an interest rate shock does not generate a boom-bust pattern in the elastic
regions. This is due to the fact that since home prices are constant, a decline in the interest rate does
not lead to an immediate change in the wealth of households (in contrast to inelastic regions), and the
household's borrowing constraint remains binding even after the shock. However as a result of the decline,
interest payments of households decline and the freed-up resources are used to purchase a larger house as
2 8This results from equation (1.21).
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well as to increase non-housing consumption. In terms of the figure, following the decline in interest rate a
constrained household housing (hit) remains constant and its non-housing consumption changes discretely,
which is shown as a jump from a to a' and moves along the saddle path until it reaches the new steady state.
Proposition 7: In elastic region i, an unexpected permanent increase in the maximum loan-to-value results
in a discrete increase in housing (hit) and in non-housing consumption (cit). The initial increase in housing
and in non-housing consumption is followed by a steady decline in both of them (hit, cit) until the economy
reaches the new steady state.
An increase in the maximum loan-to-value ratio enables households in elastic regions to extract more
equity from the current houses that they have and to use the extra resources towards the purchase of a larger
house and an increase in consumption. However as they use up their borrowing capacity their housing and
non-housing consumption both decline until the economy reaches the steady state. Therefore a permanent
increase in the maximum loan-to-value ratio in an elastic region generates a boom-bust cycle in housing and
non-housing consumption (Figure 1.10).
1.2.4.2 Permanent Increase in the Interest Rate or Decline in the Maximum Loan-to-Value
Ratio
So far I have characterized the responses of different regions to a permanent decline in interest rates or
collateral requirements that are not reversed, and I show that these shocks by themselves generate a boom-
bust cycle. This subsection considers the response of different regions to a permanent surprise increase in
the interest rate or the collateral requirements assuming the economy is in steady-state before the shocks
hit.
Proposition 5': In inelastic region i, an unexpected permanent increase in the interest rate r or a decrease
in the maximum loan-to-value ratio (0i) results in a discrete decline in house prices (qit), housing consumption
(hit) and non-housing consumption (cit). The initial decline in house prices, housing and non-housing
consumption is followed by a steady increase in all of them (qit, hit, cit) until the economy reaches its new
steady state. Throughout the transition the borrowing constraint remains binding, and house prices grow at
rate r.
For the proof and a full characterization of the transition path see Appendix C.
Following an unexpected increase in the interest rate or collateral requirements house prices in inelastic
regions will decline. Because the household borrowing constraint was binding before the shock hit the
economy, the representative household should sell part of its stock of housing in order to reduce its debt
and meet the collateral constraint. However, this reduces house prices furthermore and the household
needs to sell even a higher fraction of its housing stock to meet the collateral constraint. After house prices
27 A decline in consumption by itself cannot help a household meet its borrowing constraints because that will not change the
stock of debt immediately, whereas house prices drop immediately after a shock hits the economy.
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decline enough, investors who are not benefiting from the housing services of the house itself buy part of
the land in the inelastic region i from the representative household. This is because of their anticipation of
future growth of the price of land in the region i. Because of the consumption smoothing between housing
services and non-housing consumption, the representative household consumption also declines. The initial
decline in consumption and housing stock increases household saving rate which enables household to buy a
larger house and increase its consumption throughout the transition. In the steady state the representative
household buys back all the lands that was sold to the investors and therefore h,, = Li. steady state house
prices and consumption are also given by equations (1.19) and (1.20).
Proposition 6': In elastic region i, an unexpected permanent increase in the interest rate results in a
gradual decrease in both housing (hit) and non-housing consumption (cit) until the economy reaches the new
steady-state.
In elastic regions, house prices are constant. Therefore changes in the interest rate do not have any
immediate impact on the household's housing wealth. However, because higher interest rates increase the
user cost of housing, households decrease their stock of housing gradually until they arrive at the new steady
state.
Proposition 7': In elastic region i, an unexpected permanent decrease in the maximum loan-to-value ratio
results in a discrete decline in both housing (hit) and non-housing consumption (cit). The initial decline in
housing and non-housing consumption are followed by a gradual increase in both of them (hit, cit) until the
economy reaches the new steady state.
In the elastic region, as a result of an increase in collateral requirements households will need to sell a
fraction of their housing stock in order to meet the new borrowing constraint. Because of the complementarity
between housing and non-housing, their non-housing consumption also declines. However they gradually use
the extra resources released from lower consumption to buy a larger house until the economy reaches the
new steady state.
1.3 Data
In order to test implications of the model for the impacts of a decline in interest rates and an increase in the
maximum loan-to-value ratio, I exploit the fact that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the elasticity
of the housing supply in different regions of US. In the reduced-form analysis of the next section, each
county in US with a population of over 150,000 in 2000 comprises a single observation. The main reason
for choosing the county as the level of aggregation (instead of MSA) is that Census contains many detailed
information about the characteristics of counties. Aggregating at the state level not only reduces the number
of observations considerably, but also reduces the variation of elasticity and changes in securitization rate
by more than one half. The postal ZIP code level is also not a good option since much regional information
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is not available at the ZIP code level or its accuracy is questionable. Moreover, there are other important
factors that affect the housing market at the ZIP code level such as gentrification that are not included in
my model.28
In what follows I briefly discuss data the sources used for the empirical portion of this paper as well as
their limitations.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel (FRBNY CCP) The FRBNY
Consumer Credit Panel consists of the credit reports of anonymous and nationally-representative 5% random
sample of all individuals in the US with a credit file which is released on a quarterly basis. The data begins
in the first quarter of 1999.29 FRBNY CCP contains information on the total debt holdings of individuals
with its breakdown into mortgage and home equity loans, auto loans, student loans and credit cards. In
order to test the predictions of the model about the dynamics of households debt in different regions and
its co-movement with home prices and consumption, I have aggregated the data on the total mortgage and
home equity holdings of individuals at the county level.ao
Another challenge is to come up with a measure of consumption at the county level. Since I could
not find any direct measure of consumption at the county level, I construct a measure of car sales at the
county level using the data on auto loans of individuals. The idea here is that whenever the auto-loan
holding of an individual increases by an amount larger than a threshold between two consecutive quarters,3 1
it is assumed the individual has bought a new car, with the value of the car set at a constant times the
change in the total auto-loan holding. Given the low interest rates car companies are charging for financing
new cars, this assumption does not seem implausible when considering the sale of new cars.32 However,
using this measure as a measure of consumption presents a number of limitations. Most importantly, as is
documented by Mian, Sufi and Rao (2012) and Berger and Vavra (2012), car sales response to the financial
crisis has been significantly larger than other components of consumption. Therefore the differential response
of consumption in regions with different supply of housing and different changes in securitization rate during
the boom period and the bust period may be overestimated. For this reason, I check the robustness of
results on consumption by using employment in food services and in the retail trade sector as proxies for
consumption. 33
2sGuerrieri, Hartley and Hurst (2012) presents evidence in support of gentrification channel at the zip code level.
2In addition to this 5% primary sample, credit reports of all the other members of the family of these individuals are also
available. However in order to keep the calculations straight simple, I am just using the primary sample. More information on
FRBNY CCP can be find in Lee and van der Klaauw (2010). Aggregation of this data at the county level has recently been
made available at: http://www.newyorkfed.org/householdcredit/
3
oUsing total debt instead of mortgage debt did not really affect the results. This is partly because mortgage loan counts for
almost 80% of the consumer debt. The other reason for using mortgage debt instead of total debt is that my model is silent
about other forms of debt like student loan and credit cards.
3 1 I used $5000 as the threshold. But the result are robust to changes in this threshold.
3 2 Of course this may underestimate the volume of cars sold on the secondary market. But on the other hand unless used cars
are sold from one region to another region, we are double counting the volume of cars that are bought within a county.
3 3 The result for changes in employment in food services and retail trade sectors are presented in Appendix F.
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CoreLogic Home Price Index (HPI) For data on counties home prices, CoreLogic Home Price Index
(HPI) is used. CoreLogic HPI has number of advantages over other indices that makes it a very good match
for the purpose of my model: First of all unlike the Case-Shiller home price index it is available at the
county level for most US counties on a monthly basis. Secondly, HPI is a price index constructed by the
repeat-sales. Therefore one need not have concerns about the change in the characteristics of houses that are
traded. Finally the fact that HPI is using the distribution of houses in its entirety for constructing the index
gives HPI an advantage over the FHFA price index, which is limited to transactions involving conforming,
conventional mortgages purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. The conforming loan limit
especially biases the results in the case of the large cities with many houses carrying a mortgage above the
conforming-loan limit.
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) The HMDA, which was enacted in 1975, requires most
mortgage lenders to record a number of important details about each loan applicant, such as the final
decision of the lender, the loan amount, the purpose of the loan, and most importantly whether the loan
has been kept on the bank balance sheet, sold to a government-sponsored enterprise (like Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac) or has been sold on the secondary market. The data is publicly available at the individual
applicant level.
One of the main parameters of the model discussed in the previous part is the maximum loan-to-value
ratio 0. But since I do not have a direct measure of 0," I use changes in the fraction of purchase loans within
the conforming loan-size limit3 5 that were sold into non-government sponsored organizations (non-GSEs) as
a proxy for the change inO. The idea here is that since GSEs have an explicit subsidy from the government,
if there is a loan within the conforming loan limit and it is sold to non-GSEs (instead of GSEs) this is
most likely because the loan had a loan-to-value ratio that is not within the criteria imposed by GSEs.
Therefore the change in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs can be a measure of the extent to which
lending standards has become more relaxed. In the empirical part, I show that the change in the fraction of
loans sold to non-GSEs goes a long way towards explaining the debt accumulation of households. For more
evidence on the relation between the increase in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs and the relaxation
of lending standards, see Mian and Sufi (2009).
Of course, there are a number of limitations in using changes in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs
as a proxy for 0. First of all even if there was no change in the lending standards to households, the
34As it is documented in Keys, Piskorski, Seru and Vig (2012) most of the increase in the loan-to-value ratio during the
boom period comes from the usage of second and third lien loans and not the first lien by itself. Therefore one needs to have a
comprehensive measure of all the loans that home buyers took out to purchase or refinance a house. Another equally important
point is that one must control for the quality of borrowers and their characteristics. For example it could be the case that
individual LTVs are not changing, but rather, lending standards are getting relaxed. For example as it is well documented,
there was a rise in number of loans with low or no documentation such that at the pick they were counting for half of the
issued loans. In terms of the model this means that some households can borrow more than before, which one can think of as
an increase in 0.35This is a limit set by Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and changes based on the October-
to-October changes in median home price. More information on the historical limits can be find at:
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/860/loanlimitshistory07.pdf
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fact that rating agencies began to give higher ratings to mortgage backed securitized assets (see Ashcraft,
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Vickery (2010)) induces lenders to sell a higher fraction of their loans to non-GSEs
and therefore this fraction may increase without an increase in 0. Another shortcoming of this measure is
that it mostly captures the extensive margin of financial liberalization. For example, if the loan-to-value
ratio of the pool of loans sold to non-GSEs also increases, this measure underestimates the change in 0. As
long as the extensive margin of financial liberalization and the intensive margin are not perfectly correlated,
this results in an underestimation of the importance of relaxed credit standards.
Another measure that I construct using the HMDA dataset is the share of investors in the housing market
of each county. This is measured as a fraction of purchase loans that the mortgage applicant's occupancy is
non-owner-occupied. Misreporting the occupancy status of applicants may result in underestimation of this
measure.
Local Housing Elasticity and Land Share In the Value of House The main implication of the
model is the differential response of various regions with inelastic supply of housing versus regions with
elastic supply to interest rates shocks and to shocks to the maximum loan-to-value ratio. In order to test
the implications of the model, I use the measure of elasticity provided by Saiz (2010). Saiz (2010)'s measure
of elasticity is based on the availability of land as well as on regulatory restrictions on building new houses.
Since the Saiz (2010) measure is estimated for MSAs, I match MSAs with counties and use the average
elasticity of matched MSAs for each county." Finally in order to construct a measure of inelasticity, I take
minus logarithm of Saiz (2010) measure and normalize it such that it has a mean of zero and a variance
equal to one.
Davis and Heathcote (2007) also provides an estimate of the time series of the average share of land in
the value of houses for 46 large US MSAs. In the calibration part, I use both the cross section and the time
series of this data in order to estimate the supply of housing for different regions in the US.
Census Data on the income and population of each county on a yearly basis comes from USA Counties,"
which contains a collection of data at the county level from the U.S. Census Bureau and other Federal
agencies such as the IRS. Data on the aggregate value of owner-occupied homes is taken the American
Community Surveys of 2000, 2005 and 2008.38
Anti-Predatory Lending Law Measure In order to curtail predatory lending practices, Congress en-
acted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) in 1994. This legislation places some
restrictions on refinance mortgages or on home equity lines with excessively high interest rates or fees. Fol-
lowing a rise in predatory practices, some states began to add restrictions to HOEPA usually referred to
as mini-HOEPA. One of the main amendments to HOEPA was the addition of home purchase loans with
seFor most MSAs each MSA is matched with only one county.
3 7 Available at http://www.census.gov/support/USACdata.html
38Available at http://factfinder2.census.gov
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high rate or high fees into the regulation. In particular according to Choi (2011) as of 2005, nineteen states
included home purchase loans into anti-predatory lending legislation. For a measure of the restrictiveness
of anti-predatory law, I have constructed a dummy variable that is equal to one if the state added purchase
loans under the coverage of its anti-predatory lending laws and zero if the state's law regulates only refinance
and equity mortgages.
1.4 Empirical Model
1.4.1 Motivation
As Figure 1.11 shows, a motivating fact in the data is that regions that experienced a greater boom in home
prices and in consumption during the interval of 2000 to 2006 suffered from a more severe bust during the
period of 2006 to 2009. The main prediction of the model in the previous section is that this boom-bust
pattern in consumption and house prices should occur in regions with a less elastic supply of housing and in
regions that experienced a greater easing of collateral constraints.
Indeed, Figure 1.12 shows that regions with an inelastic supply of housing on average experienced a larger
boom and bust in house prices and consumption. The figure also shows that among inelastic regions, the
boom-bust pattern is magnified in regions that experienced a larger change in the fraction of loans sold to
non-GSEs from 2003 to 2006. The bottom graph in Figure 1.12 also indicates that total mortgage liability
per capita in inelastic regions and regions with higher changes in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs
grow faster during the period of 2000 to 2008. What is more important for the purpose of this paper is
the fact that a significant fraction of the decline in house prices and in car sales occured between 2006 and
mid-2008, a period during which households continued to increase their mortgage liabilities. This suggests
that a significant fraction of the decline in house prices and consumption is not driven by the inability of
households to rollover their debt, but instead, is driven by the reduction in the amount that households
could increase their debt holding.
Motivated by these figures, the next subsection addresses the relation between inelasticity of housing
supply and changes in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs and house prices, consumption and debt
accumulation in a reduced-form regression framework.
1.4.2 The Main Results
The model in the previous section shows that a decline in interest rates leads to a boom in house prices
and in consumption in regions with less elastic supply of housing which is then followed by a bust in those
regions. A decline in collateral requirements (i.e. increase in 6) also results in a boom-bust in consumption
and in house prices that is more extreme in regions with more inelastic supply of housing.
In what follows I divide the sample into the period of the boom from 2000 to 2006, and the period of
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bust from 2006 to mid-2008.39 And I run the following regression:
Alog (Yit) = a + #1Inelasticityi + # 2ASecuritization Rate; (1.42)
+83 (Inelasticityi x ASecuritization Rate) + XitI'+ e
where Yit is a dependent variable of interest which represents either house prices," or a measure of car
sales in county i at time t, or total mortgage liabilities. Inelasticity is based on Saiz (2010) measure of
elasticity of housing supply. ASecuritization Rate is the change in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs
in county i from 2003 to 2006. I chose this period because the aggregate changes in the fraction of loans
sold to non-GSEs has the fastest growth rate during this period.41 The baseline controls include the growth
in average income42 of county residents during the associated period and its interaction with inelasticity,
population growth and the change in fraction of homes purchased by investors.43 The interaction terms
are averaged out and, therefore, #1 and #2 capture the average impact of housing supply and of changes
in the securitization rate on the variables of interest. In general because both personal income and the
fraction of investors are influenced by the change in house prices, controlling for these two factors may result
in an underestimation of the impact of changes in interest rates and the maximum loan-to-value ratio on
house prices and consumption. Therefore, one would expect that estimated coefficients of #1, 132 and #3
in regressions that controls for characteristics of counties would be closer to zero than their estimates in
regressions without controls. In order to compute the aggregate implications of changes in interest rates
and securitization rate on the growth rate of variable Y, I use estimates of #1,#62 and 63 from estimation
of equation (1.42) and compute in-sample difference between Alog(Yit) - Auog(Yit) for each county i, where
I is the average predicted value for counties in the lowest 10 percent of inelasticity measure and the lowest
10 percent of the change in securitization rate. Then I take the average of these differences weighted by
the population of the county in 2000. It is worth to mention that this procedure may underestimate the
aggregate impact of securitization. This is due to the fact that during the period of 2003 to 2006, even
"sThe reason for choosing mid-2008 is to make sure we are not capturing the impact of events that followed the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers. This period is also prior to the period when households start to deleverage their debt-holding and therefore
is more useful for the purpose of differentiating between inability to borrow more and inability to rollover the debt. Extending
the period of bust to 2009 or afterward results in a larger bust and gives greater significance to the result.
4 0 Since I use the same deflator (CPI deflator) for all regions, the coefficients are the same for both nominal and real house
prices.
4 1 The results are robust to using changes in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs between 2003 and 2005 or the in maximum
change in fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs that the regions experienced during the period of 2003 to 2006.4 2 This is based on aggregation of IRS data on ZIP codes income at the county level.
4 3 Recent studies like Bayer, Geissler and Roberts (2011) and Haughwout, Lee, 'Tracy, van der Klaauw and Wilbert (2011)
provide evidence on the role of speculators and investors in destabilizing house prices and, therefore,I control for the share
of investors to make sure the result is robust to controlling for them. However, in general there are two problems with
addressing the role of investors: First, because of data availability, it is hard to distinguish between those who buy leisure
homes and speculators (investors) in the housing market. Therefore one should be cautious in interpreting the results on the
role of investors. In terms of the model, buying a leisure house is like increasing the housing consumption, which is a direct
consequence of lower interest rates and collateral requirements. Moreover, introduction of news shocks to the model shows that
investors may jump in the markets they expect house prices to grow in the future. Therefore the rise of their share can be a
symptom of expectations about future house prices and not its driver.
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regions in the lowest 10 percent of the change in securitization rates experienced a more than five percent
increase in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs. On top of this, we would also expect that the aggregate
impact of changes in interest rates on mortgage liabilities growth to be underestimated. This is due to the
fact that a decline in interest rates occured in all places which induces even households in elastic regions
to buy a larger house and increase their debt holding. Therefore we should expect that the actual and the
estimated in-sample differences for mortgage liabilities to be smaller than the aggregate changes.
1.4.2.1 The Boom Period of 2000 to 2006
From Figure (1.1a) one can see that during the period of 2000 to mid-2003, there was a steady decline of
more than two percent in the long-term real interest rates, followed by more than a 20 percent increase in the
fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs in the interval 2003-2006. Table 1.1 shows that during the boom years,
house prices, consumption and mortgage liabilities of more inelastic regions and of regions that experienced
a larger increase in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs grew faster than other regions. Not controlling
for the investor shares and changes in average income, the implied aggregate impact of the interest rate
and changes in securitization rate explains about 75 percent of the growth in house prices, 95 percent of
the growth in car sales per capita, and 20 percent of total mortgage growth. Controlling for the share of
investors and average income growth reduce the number for house prices to 70 percent and the number for
consumption to 85 percent. The fact that during the boom years, the estimated in-sample difference explains
a lower fraction of the change in total mortgages is consistent with the model. This is because here a decline
in interest rates does not change house prices in the elastic regions, but it reduces the user cost of housing
and induces households in those regions to build larger houses, thereby increasing their mortgage liabilities
over time. In fact focusing on the actual in-sample differences in total mortgage growth, the estimated
coefficients predict all the difference in mortgage liability growth between the most elastic regions which
experienced the lowest change in securitization rate and the rest of the regions.
1.4.2.2 The Bust Period of 2006 to 2008
As we saw in Figure 1.11, most of the decline in house prices and in consumption happened in the places
that experienced a boom during the period 2000-2006. In the previous section I show that most of the
boom portion of the cycle can be explained by variations in the elasticity of housing and in variations in
the change in securitization rate. In this part I examine to what extent the decline in house prices and in
consumption can be attributed to the very same factors that created the boom: changes in fraction of loans
sold to non-GSEs during the boom years and differences in the elasticity of housing supply.
The results in Table 1.2, shows that more inelastic regions and regions that experienced greater changes
in securitization rates in the years preceding the bust years, experienced larger declines in house prices and in
consumption. Interestingly, even during the bust years the total mortgage liability in these regions increased
faster than other regions. In terms of the model and in line with the evidence depicted by Figure 1.12,
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this is due to the fact that households in inelastic regions and in regions that experienced a large change
in securitization rates do not use up all of their borrowing capacity during the boom years, rather their
borrowing capacity is exhausted over time. Table 1.2 also shows that on average about 35 percent of the
decline in aggregate house prices and in consumption can be explained by the variations in the inelasticity
measure and by changes in securitization rates during the boom years. These variables explain about 50
percent of the growth in aggregate mortgage liability, which is considerably higher than the fraction that
is explained by these factors during the boom years. In terms of the model this is explained by the fact
that households in elastic regions exhaust their borrowing capacity faster than their counterparts in inelastic
regions. This is because decline in interest rates or in collateral requirements do not have a wealth effect in
those regions and house prices remain constant. Therefore households in these regions experienced less of
an expansion in their borrowing capacities.
1.4.3 Instrumental Variable Approach
So far we have seen that 75 percent of the variation in consumption and in house prices during the boom
period and about 40 percent of the variation in consumption and in house prices during the bust is associated
with variations in the elasticity of housing supply and variations in the change in securitization rate. However
one concern that arises is that variations in changes in the securitization rate may not be exogenous and,
in particular, increasing house prices or expectations of future growth in house prices, can induce financial
institutions to relax borrowing standards and make investors of securitized assets more willing to buy these
assets.
In order to address this problem, I use two sources of variations in different regions as an instrument for
changes in the securitization rate: (i) variations in population characteristics of counties and (ii) variations
of different states in adopting anti-predatory lending laws. In particular let us assume there is a "national
securitization" shock that increases the supply of loan contracts with relaxed terms in all regions. This
change in the supply has a larger impact in regions where there is a higher demand for these products. The
demand for loans with more relaxed terms can be higher when the fraction of the population whose income
barely covers below the required down-payment is higher. In line with this prediction and motivated by
Ouazad and Ranciere (2011), that shows the volume of mortgage origination to Hispanics almost doubled
between 2003 and 2005 (compared to less than 40 percent increase for whites during the same period)," I find
that the percentage of Hispanic population in a county in 2000 is positively correlated with the subsequent
changes in the securitization rate.45 As another source of variation for the changes in securitization rate,
I use the fact that by the end of 2004 many states adopted new anti-predatory lending regulations which
slowed down the increase in the securitization rate between 2003 and 2006. In fact Anti-predatory lending
44 See Figure 1.18 for the time series of volume of mortgage originations among different races.
4 5State of California is among the states with the highest fraction of Hispanic population and one may concern the result are
driven with observations in that state. However the following results were robust to the exclusion of counties in the state of
California.
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laws have been in effect since 1994 however only refinance loans were included in those laws. After the rise
of predatory practices during the securitization boom, some states began to include purchase loans into the
loans subject to anti-predatory lending laws. By the early 2005, nineteen states amended home purchase
loans into anti-predatory lending laws. I construct an Anti-Predatory dummy that is equal to one for states
that included purchase loans in their Anti-Predatory lending laws. The first column of Table 1.3 shows
that on average states that included purchase loans in the law, experienced four percent fewer increase in
securitization rates.46
Columns three to eight of Table 1.3 show the results of the same regressions as in the previous part
when changes in the securitization rate are instrumented by the percentage of Hispanic population in each
county. Qualitatively, the impact of the changes in securitization on house prices, on consumption and on
total mortgage liability during the boom period and the bust period are the same as before: more extreme
change in securitization rates result in more accumulation of mortgage debt and a larger boom in house
prices and in consumption followed by a larger bust. However the estimated coefficients for the impact
of the change in securitization rate on house prices, on consumption and on total mortgage liability are
significantly larger than the OLS estimates. One possible reason for this result is that IV is capturing the
local average treatment effect of change in securitization, which is larger for borrowers with incomes just
below the required down-payment.
1.4.4 Long Run Results
Table 1.4 shows OLS estimates relating house-price growth, car sales growth and total mortgage liability
growth during the period of 2000 to mid-2008 to the Inelasticity measure and the change in the securitization
rates during the period of 2003 to 2006. From the coefficients of Inelasticity in Table 1.4, one can see that
even after the bust, house-price growth in inelastic regions is still higher than that for elastic regions which,
in terms of the model, this is because steady-state house prices in inelastic regions is a decreasing function of
interest rates. Therefore, lower interest rates results in permanently higher house prices in regions with less
elastic supply of housing. The table also shows that inelastic regions and regions that experienced a greater
changes in securitization rates accumulated greater amount of mortgage liability. In terms of aggregate
impact, variations in securitization rates and in the elasticity measure can accounts for about 75 percent
of the total change in household mortgage liabilities. It is interesting to see that the appreciation of home
prices that occured due to the rise in securitization during the period of 2003 to 2006 is all gone by mid-2008.
1.5 Calibration
The reduced form evidence presented in the previous section has some important limitations. First of all
it cannot distinguish between the bust that is driven purely by front-loading behavior of households and
4 61nteraction of instruments with inelasticity is also used to instrument for the interaction term of inelasticity times changes
in securitization rate.
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the bust resulted from the reversal of the initial decline in collateral requirements. Additionally the model
reveals that the impact of a decline in collateral requirements on house prices and consumption is a function
of real interest rate. Therefore the reduced-form results cannot inform us about what would have happened
in the case in which there was the same decline in collateral requirements but the real interest rates differed.
In the sub-section that follows, I first extend the model to allow for a more flexible supply of housing.
Then, in order to analyze implications of the extended model, I calibrate the model for three types of
regions: (i) inelastic regions that experienced high change in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs, (ii)
inelastic regions that experienced low change in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs and (iii) elastic
regions.4 7 The calibration is based on data on actual changes in the mortgage liabilities of households in
these regions and on other static characteristics of these regions. Then I compare the predictions of the model
with and without a reversal in the decline in collateral requirements on house prices and on consumption.
Finally the model is used to consider two sets of counterfactuals. The first set considers the counterfactuals
related to past events: what would have happened if there were the same decline in the interest rate but no
change in collateral requirements and what would have happened if there were the same change in collateral
requirements but no change in interest rates. The second set considers two different policy choices following
the tightening of credit: (i) further reduction in real interest rates and (ii) loan modification.
1.5.1 Extension of Housing Supply
One problem with the basic model is that assuming a fixed supply of housing in inelastic regions results an
overestimation ofthe impact of a decline in interest rates and in collateral requirements on house prices and
on consumption. The other problem with a fixed supply of housing is that during the boom period there
was a rapid rise in activity in the construction sector even in the most inelastic regions (see Charles, Hurst,
and Notowidigdo (2012)). In order to tackle this problem, I extend the model by replacing the Leontief
production function for the housing sector (equation (1.3)) with the following CES function:
h k ± (1 - Wk),. '
Here k and I are the capital and the land used in building a home, wk is the weight of capital in the
housing aggregator, and a is the elasticity of substitution between land and capital. As before I assume
that there is no adjustment cost in building (or destroying) a house. Additionally I assume house producers
maximize their instantaneous profit. This pins down the relation between house prices and aggregate stock
of housing in region i:
1-o /-0)
Hi = (1 - wi)/_ Li (1.43)
Now, equilibrium consumption, house prices and house quantities are obtained by adding equation (1.43)
47 These regions are the same as those we used in constructing Figure 1.12.
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to the first-order conditions of the household-maximization problem, given by equations (1.12)-(1.14).48 One
interesting result from the solution of the CES case is that there is a critical threshold price qc, given by:
1 -6 1/(1-G)
qe = a-CWk + Wk) (1.44)
that if the steady state price of a home falls above this threshold, the dynamics of house prices and of
consumption resemble the dynamics of an inelastic region in the basic model: As a result of a decline in in-
terest rates, household borrowing constraint becomes relaxed and remains relaxed throughout the transition,
and there is a boom-bust pattern in consumption and in house prices. On the other hand if the steady-state
price falls below this threshold, the economy has a saddle path similar to that of elastic regions in the basic
model.
With lower interest rates, steady-state house prices increase, which leads to more regions experiencing
a boom-bust cycle in response to interest rate shocks. This result is in line with the finding of Glaeser,
Gottlieb and Gyourko (2012) which finds that even for elastic regions, the impact of a change in interest
rates is larger when interest rates are relatively low. But more interestingly, qc, is a decreasing function
of 0, the collateralizable fraction of housing wealth. This means that as a result of declines in collateral
requirements more regions will experience cyclical behavior in response to an interest rate or a collateral-
requirement shock.
1.5.2 Calibrating Parameters
In order to analyze the main insights of the model, I calibrate the model for three different types of regions:
Inelastic regions that experienced high change in securitization rates, Inelastic regions that experienced low
change in securitization rates and elastic regions. Inelastic and elastic regions are defined as regions in the
top and bottom quintiles of the inelasticity measure. High (low) change in securitization rates is defined as
being above (below) the median level of change in securitization rates for inelastic regions.
1.5.2.1 Static Parameters
For estimating a and wk, I use the database on the home prices and the share of land provided by Davis and
Heathcote (2007). In particular with the CES production function for housing one can see that the relation
between the share of capital (structure) and house prices is:
109 (k ) = log (wk) + (0'- 1) log (qit) (1.45)qithit
Using land shares and house prices data in Davis and Heathcote (2007), I run a panel regression of the
time series of average structure share in the value of house on house prices with a fixed effect for each city,
4 8For the full characterization of the equilibrium in the CES case see Appendix D.
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and the coefficient of house prices in this regression is equal to a - 1.49 This results in a = 0.5 which is
in between a Cobb-Douglas production for housing (a = 1) and the Leontief case (a = 0). Moreover from
equation (1.45), one can see that if we normalize the price of a reference year (say, year 2000) to one, then
Wk is equal to the share of structure in the value of house in that year. This pins down w inelatic = 0.3 and
welastic = 0.8. p is chosen equal to 6 percent in order to capture the idea that households are relatively
impatient. The wage rate, w is assumed to be constant and is normalized to one. 1?, 8 and L for each region
are chosen to match the share of mortgage payments and other housing costs in household income.s0 Using
data from the American Community Survey in the year 2000, median mortgage expenditure in inelastic
regions is about 12 percent of the household income. This figure is equal to 8 percent for elastic regions.
The median expenditure of households without a mortgage on housing is relatively constant among different
regions and it is around 10 percent. This results in:
77lnelastic = 0.38, 5 lnelastic = 0.078, LInelastic = 6.12
27Elastic = 0.28, SElastic = 0.044 , LElastic = 14.29
gInelastic > Elastic is a direct consequence of the fact that in the data the share of mortgage expenditures
in inelastic regions, on average, is four percent more than this share for elastic regions.
1.5.2.2 Dynamic Parameters (rt, Ot)
Based on the yields rate on Ten-year treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS), the real interest rate, r,
is chosen to be equal to 4.3 percent in the year 2000 and gradually declining to 2.1 percent by mid-2003.
For the model without a financial crisis (i.e. reversal in the initial decline in collateral requirements), I
assume the interest rate remains constant from that point afterward. For the model with a financial crisis,
I incorporate the fact that in response to the financial crisis real interest rates declined further (see Figure
1.1a) and I assume that from 2008 to 2011 real interest rates declined further by one more percentage point
to 1.1 percent.
Using data from the NY Fed Consumer Credit Panel on total mortgage liability for households in different
regions, I compute the time series of changes in total mortgage liability per capita for different regions. For
the model without a financial crisis I use the time series of household mortgage liabilities from 2000 to 2006
to calibrate the time series of Oit for each region and I assume from 2006 onward that the maximum loan-
to-value ratio in that region (Oit) remains at its 2006 level. For the model with a financial crisis, I extend
the calibration of Oit in order to match changes in household mortgage liability in the period 2007-2010. It
is important to mention that no information about the time series of house prices or consumption is used in
calibrating the parameters of the model and therefore the performance of the model can be evaluated upon
matching those time series.
49I used the period of 1995 to 2005 in the panel regression.
50In terms of the model, here I assume all the expenses other than mortgage payments is the depreciation cost of capital (6k).
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Finally it is assumed whenever there is a change in the interest rate or in the maximum loan-to-value
ratio households are surprised.51
1.5.3 Calibration Results
In this section, I compare the performance of the model with a financial crisis and without a financial crisis
with the actual data. It should be mentioned that the parameters of the model without a financial crisis and
with a financial crisis are the same for the time period before the year 2007 and therefore, by construction,
the predictions of the two models for this period are the same.
Figure 1.13 shows the results of the calibration of the model for inelastic regions that experienced high
change in securitization rates. In order to match the time series of total mortgage liability between 2000
and 2006, BI"*l**tic,Highsec remained constant at 0.6 until 2003, when it began to steadily increase to 0.97
by 2006.52 The model without a financial crisis predicts slightly more than a 60 percent increase in house
prices for these regions compared to about an 85 percent appreciation that occured in the data. Non-housing
consumption in the model also replicates the time series of car sales during the boom years. However, since
car sales have been more volatile than other components of consumption, the model perhaps overestimates the
consumption boom.53 Even in the model without any reversal of the initial decline in collateral requirements,
house prices and consumption begin to decline by the time that decline in the interest rate or collateral
requirements slows down. The decline in house prices and in non-housing consumption predicted by the
model without a financial crisis is smoother than what is revealed in the data. This is due to the fact that
in the model without a surprise, during the transitional period, the borrowing constraints of households
in inelastic regions are unconstrained and therefore non-housing consumption declines at the rate p - r,
which is about 4 percent in the model. As the time series of mortgage liabilities shows, it is important to
notice that the decline in consumption is not happening because of households inability to roll-over their
debt. This decline happens because the level of consumption during the boom is financed by borrowing
more, and households realize they cannot increase their debt holding forever. Therefore as they see their
untapped borrowing capacity decline, they reduce their consumption-which also leads to lower house prices.
Extending the calibration of the model to match changes in mortgage liability from 2007 to 2010 significantly
improves the performance of the model in predicting the rapid decline in house prices and in consumption
that one observes in the data. The model also predicts that as a result of the financial crisis maximum the
loan-to-value ratio in inelastic regions with high change in securitization rate declined by 0.3 to 0.67 which
51 At least for interest rates this does not seem unreasonable. This is because the baseline interest rate used for calibration
is the yield on 10-year TIPS, which its movements are usually assumed to be a surprise for the market. On the other hand,
the assumption that households assume interest rates and collateral requirements remain constant forever is a relatively strong
assumption. In general the role of expectations about interest rates, growth rates and collateral requirements is an important
dimension that in the future work it ought to be incorporated into the model.52 Since for each region in the model there is only one representative household, one should think of changes in 0 as capturing
both the extensive margin of adjustment(people who have been excluded from the lending market are now able to borrow) and
the intensive margin (controlling for the quality of the borrower loans have more relaxed terms).5 3 Replacing the Cobb-Douglas assumption for housing and non-housing consumption with a CES function with comple-
mentarities between housing and non-housing can magnify the boom-bust in house prices and can dampen the boom-bust in
non-housing consumption.
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is close to its level in 2000. There are two reasons for the impact of an increase in collateral requirements
on house prices and on consumption. First, as a result of decline in 6, the total amount that households can
borrow throughout their lifetime declines. This is both because of the direct impact of lower loan-to-value
ratios and because of the indirect impact of a lower 0 on house prices. This induces households to reduce
their consumption in order to smooth their consumption for the rest of their lives. Second, if the increase
in collateral requirements is high enough, the current debt holding of the household may well exceed the
maximum amount that a household can borrow. In this case, on top of consumption smoothing motivation,
the household should give up a higher fraction of its housing stock to meet the new borrowing constraint.
Only in this case, households deleverage their debt holding. Moreover in the cases that households are forced
to deleverage their debt holdings, part of the decline in consumption and in house prices will be recovered in
the following years.' This is because households' deleveraging results in a "fire sale" of houses. But after
they reduce their debt, households begin to increase their housing stock and consumption.
Calibration of the model for inelastic regions with changes in the securitization rate that are lower than
the median for inelastic regions, results in a time path for 6nelastic,tLowSec that starts out at 0.6, and, by
2003, it increases only slightly to 0.65. From 2003 to 2006, 0 nelastic,LowSec increases by another 0.17 units.
The time paths of house prices and of consumption are similar to the previous case except that for these
regions the model correctly predicts both the timing of increase in house prices and the level of house prices
growth (see Figure 1.14).
Calibration of the model for the most elastic regions results in lower estimates of changes in collateral
requirements in comparison with changes in collateral requirements in inelastic regions (Figure 1.15). In
elastic regions, a decline in interest rates does not lead to a boom in consumption. This is because house-
price change is insignificant and therefore household borrowing constraint remains binding. The model
predicts that the impact of a financial crisis on consumption and house prices in elastic regions is less severe
than this impact for inelastic regions. In fact the model fails in capturing the level of decline in consumption
and house prices that happened for elastic regions in the data. This is, partly, due to an assumption of
the model that is more problematic for elastic regions: The model assumes that households can disinvest
the capital used in their house and pay back their debt. This assumption is less problematic for the model
without a financial crisis since the adjustment in housing stock is happening slowly. But for the model with
a financial crisis, it is more realistic to assume the stock of existing houses cannot decline, and instead of
house quantities, house prices should adjust. This can help the model to predict the sharp decline in house
prices and in consumption even in elastic regions.
1.5.4 Past Events Counterfactual
After testing the performance of the model, in this section I want to consider two informative counterfactuals
about past events: first, what was happening for the house prices and consumption if there was the same
5 4This is related to proposition 5' in the model.
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decline in the real interest rate but there has been no change in collateral requirements. 55 Second, what
was the impact of the same decline in collateral requirements if there was not a decline in the real interest
rate during the period of 2000 to 2003.56 In order to simplify the comparison, in the following graphs I just
show the time path of consumption and of house prices for inelastic regions that experienced high change in
securitization rate and for elastic regions.
The model predicts only 30 percent increase in house prices of inelastic regions if there was not a decline
in collateral requirements compared to more than 60 percent increase when decline in interest rates was
followed by decline in collateral requirements. The growth in consumption would have been 60 percent less
if there was no decline in collateral requirements. The model predicts that absent a decline in collateral
requirements, decline in house prices and consumption would have started by mid-2003. In terms of the
model, decline in consumption and house prices were postponed to mid-2006 as a result of a continuous
decline in collateral requirements, which led to a gradual increase in the steady-state borrowing capacity of
households. Finally as is emphasized before, decline in interest rates, by itself, does not generate a boom-bust
in elastic regions.
The model shows that if there was not a decline in interest rates, the impact of the same decline in
collateral requirements on house prices and consumption was significantly milder. The reason for this is that
with interest rates closer to the rate of time preference p, households have less motivation to frontload and
distribute the new borrowing capacity more evenly over their life time. The other channel through which
the real interest rate influences the impact of a decline in collateral requirements is through its impact on
the steady-state house prices. Lower collateral requirements results in larger debt holding in the steady
state and therefore a larger interest payments. This reduces demand for consumption and housing services.
On the other hand lower collateral requirements makes housing more affordable and increases demand for
housing. Whether house prices in the steady-state increase or decrease depends on the interest rate. The
main message from this experiment is that the impact of collateral requirements on consumption and house
prices depends crucially on the level of interest rates.
1.5.5 Policy Experiment: Interest Rate Cuts versus Loan Modification
The next step is to compare the prediction of the model with a financial crisis with two scenarios: First, in
response to the financial shock, there is an even stronger monetary policy that reduces real interest rates
by another 50 basis points. Second, households are given more time to deleverage and the decline in the
maximum loan-to-value ratio occurs over a longer period of time. In particular I assume the same decline
that occured in 0 during the period of 2008 to 2011 to occur during the period of 2008 to 2013. Of course the
5 5In models with endogenous collateral requirements like Rampini and Viswanathan (2012) decline in real interest rates,
themselves, results in a decline in collateral requirements. Therefore the way one should think about this policy is that in
contrast to market forces, financial regulation is preventing banks from relaxing their standards. For example in the early 90s,
in response to rising house prices, Hong Kong Commissioner of Banking restricted loan-to-value ratios.5 6 Perhaps the main reason that collateral requirements get relaxed was the fast appreciation of house prices which was fueled
by declining interest rates. Therefore one should think of this experiment as an "upper bound" on the impact of changes in
collateral requirements by themselves
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model abstracts from monetary policy or a micro-foundation for collateral requirements and, therefore, one
should think of these policy experiments as qualitative exercises that can highlight some of the mechanisms
of the model.
The policy experiment (Figure 1.17) shows that lower interest rates is not effective in increasing consump-
tion of households living in elastic regions, whereas it does increase consumption in regions with inelastic
supply of housing. This result is driven by the asymmetric impact of real interest rates on house prices
in regions with elastic supply of housing and regions with inelastic supply of housing. On the other hand,
loan modification increases the consumption in all regions temporarily. However loan modification delays
the recovery procedure and the initial increase in consumption is followed by a decline in consumption and
house prices in the following years. The main reason that in this framework effectiveness of policy is limited
is because the decline in consumption is not only driven by some households deleveraging their debt holding,
but more importantly because the level of consumption during the boom years, itself, was financed by the
fast growth in household liabilities.
1.6 Conclusion
During the period from 2000 to mid-2008 the stock of US household liabilities more than doubled. During
the same period house prices and consumption experienced a boom-bust pattern that is magnified in regions
with a more inelastic supply of housing and in regions with higher change is securitization rate during the
boom years.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an economic framework that can help in understanding the
increase in liabilities of households as well as the swing in house prices and in consumption. At the heart
of the theory is an unsustainable increase in consumption driven both by expanded access to credit and the
endogenous increase in house prices that relax credit constraints. My theoretical mechanism highlights the
importance of low interest rates and of elasticity of housing supply to explain how pronounced the dynamics
implied by a credit expansion will be. Reduced-form empirical evidence supports the predictions of the
model and shows that variations in the elasticity of the supply of housing and changes in securitization
rates during the boom years can explain most of the increases and declines in house prices and consumption
during the boom years (2000-2006) and bust years (2006-mid-2008). The quantitative exercise illustrates
the importance of the reversal in the initial relaxation of credit standards to explain the precipitous decline
in consumption and house prices. However, the model constructed in this paper shows that even without a
reversal in credit standards, most of the decline would have taken place, but over a longer period of time.
From a broader perspective, this paper is also related to two recent strands of literature. First, this paper
is related to the literature on macroprudential policy (see Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011)) and shows
the interaction between interest rates and collateral constraints for the macroeconomy. The model shows
that this interaction is more pronounced during periods of low interest rates. The model is also suggestive
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that an impatient policy maker has more incentives for financial deregulation which can results in excessive
fluctuations in the economy. This paper is also related to the recent literature on the distributional impacts
of monetary policy like Piazzesi and Schneider (2012), Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng and Silvia (2012)
and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012). In particular the model implies that impacts of lower interest rates
and financial deregulation can be very different for households in different regions.
There are a number of important theoretical dimensions that are currently beyond the scope of this paper.
First, one can study the role of expectations about future interest rates, collateral requirements and growth
rates in this economy.57 Second, the model abstract from savers in the economy. My preliminary results of
the inclusion of households with temporary high incomes shows that income inequality can be an important
factor in explaining the decline in real interest rates and the boom-bust in house prices and consumption."s
Third, any welfare implications of the boom-bust cycles within this framework needs a further study.59
Fourth, understanding the micro-foundation of changes in collateral requirements contributes to a better
understanding of the boom-bust cycles caused by an expansion of credit.
Also from the empirical point of view, there are a number of extensions that I should conduct. First of all
the logic of the model is applicable to the European countries that experienced a surge in capital inflows and
a housing boom and bust (like Spain and Ireland). The boom-bust cycle of housing market in US coastal
areas in mid-80s to mid-90s is another related episode that can be used for testing the model.60 Secondly, a
better measure of changes in lending standards and a better measure of consumption can be very useful for
a better testing of the model. Also for the quantitative exercise, addition of adjustment costs for housing
seems to be of a first order of importance.
57 My preliminary result shows expectations about future growth can also generate very long-lasting periods of boom followed
by a bust.
58The relation between rise in inequality and higher household leverages is also discussed in Kumhof and Ranciere (2010).
sIIn particular the framework of this paper is similar to the ones in Jeane and Korinek (2010). However in contrast to their
framework, during the transition periods the borrowing constraint of households in inelastic regions is relaxed and therefore
Pigouvian taxation is not necessarily welfare improving.
6oInterestingly, during this period on one hand there was a decline in real interest rates and deregulation of financial institutions
in the US. On the other hand this period also experienced a rise in household mortgage liabilities and in the US current account
deficit.
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Table 1.1: The Boom Period of 2000 to 2006
House Prices Growth between Car Sales Growth between 2000
2000 and 2006 and 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Mortgage Liabilities Growth
between 2000 and 2006
(7) (8) (9)
Inelasticity
Change in Securitization
Fraction 03_06
Inelasticity X Change in
Securitization Fraction 03_06
Implied Aggregate Impact
Percentage of Total
Controls
State Fixed Effect
Regression Type
Observations
R-sauared
0.18*** 0.16*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
1.94*** 1.63*** 0.64*** 0.74*** 0.68** 0.78**
(0.29) (0.26) (0.24) (0.28) (0.28) (0.37)
0.99*** 0.72*** 0.08
(0.21) (0.21) (0.19)
0.44
76
0.4
69
N Y
N N
OLS OLS
0.18
31
Y
Y
OLS
323 323 323
0.43 0.55 0.84
0.13 0.09 0.02
(0.25) (0.24) (0.29)
0.2
95
0.18 0.18
86 86
N Y Y
N N Y
OLS OLS OLS
323 323 323
0.18 0.19 0.40
0.10*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02)
1.22*** 0.95*** 0.64*
(0.29) (0.27) (0.36)
0.75*** 0.54** 0.18
(0.27) (0.27) (0.31)
0.23 0.19 0.09
22 18 8
N Y Y
N N Y
OLS OLS OLS
323 323 323
0.29 0.37 0.51
Notes: This table presents estimates of the impact of variations in the elasticity of housing supply and changes in the securitization rate on house
prices, car sales and total mortgage growth during the years of 2000 to 2006. Inelasticity is based on Saiz (2010) measure of the elasticity of housing.
The Securitization Praction is computed as the fraction of purchase loans sold to non-GSEs. Baseline controls include the growth of average income
between 2000 and 2006 and its interaction with inelasticity measures, population growth during this period, and the change in the fraction of homes
purchased by investors in this period. Each county with a population greater than 150,000 in 2000 is one unit of observation. Robust standard errors
are below coefficients in parentheses, and asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
0.02
(0.03)
Table 1.2: The Bust Period of 2006 to 2008
House Prices Growth between Car Sales Growth between
2006 and mid-2008 2006 and mid-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Mortgage Liabilities Growth
between 2006 and mid-2008
(7) (8) (9)
Inelasticity
Change in Securitization
Fraction 03_06
Inelasticity X Change in
Securitization Fraction 03_06
Implied Aggregate Impact
Percentage of Total
Controls
State Fixed Effect
Regression Type
Observations
R-squared
-0.02*** -0.01** -0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
-0.71*** -0.61*** -0.38***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
-0.37*** -0.28*** -0.11
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
-0.08
42
-0.07 -0.05
37 26
N Y Y
N N Y
OLS OLS OLS
323 323 323
0.32 0.44 0.78
-0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03** 0.02** 0.03*** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.33** -0.36** -0.07
(0.15) (0.15) (0.17)
-0.29** -0.35*** 0.07
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
-0.09 -0.08 -0.08
38 33 33
N Y Y
N N Y
OLS OLS OLS
323 323 323
0.10 0.13 0.39
0.57*** 0.61*** 0.41***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
0.17* 0.18* 0.04
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
0.1
43
0.12 0.11
52 48
N Y
N N
OLS OLS
323 323
0.33 0.42
Y
Y
OLS
323
0.57
Notes: This table presents estimates of the impact of variations in the elasticity of housing supply and changes in the securitization rate on house prices,
car sales and total mortgage growth during the years of 2006 to mid-2008. Inelasticity is based on Saiz (2010) measure of the elasticity of housing.
The Securitization Pmction is computed as fraction of purchase loans sold to non-GSEs. Baseline controls include the growth in average income
between 2006 and 2008 and its interaction with inelasticity measure, population growth during this period and the fraction of homes purchased by
investors in 2006. Each county with a population greater than 150000 in 2000 is one unit of observation. Robust standard errors are below coefficients
in parentheses, and asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
Table 1.3: Instrumental Variable Approach
Change in Inelasticity X House Car Sales Total Mortgage House Car Sales Total Mortgage
Securitization Change in Prices Liabilities Prices Liabilities
Fraction 03_06 SecuritizationFraction 03_06 Growth between 2000 and 2006 Growth between 2006 and mid-2008
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Percentage Hispanics 0.17*** 0.05*
(0.03) (0.03)
Percentage Hispancs X Inelasticity -0.01 0.24***
(0.02) (0.03)
Anti-Predatory Dummy -0.04*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Anti-Pred X Inelasticity -0.00 -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
Inelasticity 0.02*** -0.01 0.13*** 0.02 0.06* 0.00 -0.04*** -0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Change in Securitization Fraction 2.73*** 2.27*** 1.37 -1.26** -0.46 1.68*"
03_06
(0.67) (0.70) (0.95) (0.25) (0.35) (0.36)
Inelasticity X Change in Securitization 0.83* 0.32 -0.70 -0.29 -0.69** 0.20
Fraction 0306
(0.50) (0.60) (0.59) (0.20) (0.30) (0.22)
Controls Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
State Fixed Effect N N N N N N N N
Regression Type OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323 323 323
R-squared 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.34
Notes: This table replicates the regressions of column (2), (5) , (8) in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 by using the fraction of Hispanic population and an Anti-
Predatory Lending Laws dummy and their interactions with Inelasticity as instruments for the changes in securitization rate and its interaction with
Inelasticity. Here, the Anti-Predatory dummy is equal to one for states that include purchase loans in Anti-Predatory Lending laws. Inelasticity is
based on Saiz (2010) measure of elasticity of housing. Securitization Fraction is computed as fraction of purchase loans sold to non-GSEs. The change
in securitization rate for the years of 2003 to 2006 is computed. The baseline controls include the growth of the average income and its interaction
with inelasticity measure, population growth and the fraction of homes purchased by investors in the corresponding period. Each county with the
population greater than 150000 in 2000 is a unit of observation. Robust standard errors are below coefficients in parentheses, and asterisks denote
significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
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Table 1.4: Long Differences: 2000 to mid-2008
House Prices Growth between Car Sales Growth between 2000
2000 and mid-2008 and mid-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inelasticity
Change in Securitization
Fraction 03_06
Inelasticity X Change In
Securitization Fraction 03_06
Implied Aggregate Impact
Percentage of Total
Controls
State Fixed Effect
Regression Type
Observations
R-squared
0.13*** 0.12*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.26 0.16 -0.17
(0.20) (0.16) (0.16)
0.05 -0.04 -0.16
(0.16) (0.13) (0.16)
0.29
116
0.27 0.12
108 48
N Y Y
N N Y
OLS OLS OLS
323 323 323
0.25 0.45 0.80
-0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Total Mortgage Uabilities Growth
between 2000 and mid-2008
(7) (8) (9)
0.15*** 0.14*** 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
0.18 0.19 0.53** 2.76*** 2.49*** 1.70***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.24) (0.43) (0.37) (0.45)
-0.40* -0.36* -0.02
(0.21) (0.19) (0.22)
0.09 0.07 0.06
-64 -50 -43
N Y Y
N N Y
OLS OLS OLS
323 323 323
0.14 0.18 0.41
1.37*** 1.11*** 0.37
(0.37) (0.32) (0.38)
0.51 0.48 0.33
31 29 20
N Y
N N
OLS OLS
323 323
0.41 0.52
Y
Y
OLS
323
0.65
Notes: This table presents estimates of the impact of variations in the elasticity of housing supply and changes in the securitization rates on house
prices, car sales and total mortgage growth during the years of 2000 to mid-2008. Inelasticity is based on Saiz (2010) measure of elasticity of housing.
The Securitization Prction is computed as fraction of purchase loans sold to non-GSEs. Baseline controls include the growth of average income
between 2000 and 2008 and its interaction with the inelasticity measure, population growth during this period and the fraction of homes purchased by
investors in 2006. Each county with population greater than 150,000 in 2000 is one unit of observation. Robust standard errors are below coefficients
in parentheses, and asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
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(a) Decline in Interest Rates and the Rise of Securitization
Net Home Equity Extraction vs. US Current Account Deficit (in Billions of $)
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Figure 1.1: Expansion of Credit During 2000 to 2006
Notes: In Figure 1.1a,10-Year TIPS contains quarterly yields on treasury-inflation-protected securities
(TIPS). Data are obtained from J. Huston McCulloch, http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jhm/ts/ts.html. HP
filter with A = 400 is used for the calculation of the interest rate trend. Fraction of Loans sold to non-
GSEs are fraction of purchase loans that mortgage originators sold to an institution other than government
sponsored organizations like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In Figure 1.1b, Net Home Equity Extraction is
defined as the change in the total mortgage liabilities of household minus the net investment of households
in residential housing. Data are obtained from US Flow of Funds.
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Real House Prices
Car Sales per capita
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Total Mortgage Liabilities per capita
1
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Figure 1.2: High Debt Growth versus Low Debt Growth Regions Dynamics
Notes: This figure shows the differential dynamics of house prices and car sales per capita for regions that
experienced high and low growth in mortgage liabilities. In the above figures, high and low debt counties are
defined to be the top and bottom quintile of counties (with more than 150,000 population in 2000) based on
the growth in mortgage liabilities per capita between 2000 and mid-2008, and, the graphs show the average
for each region as well as the average for all counties with a population of more than 150,000 in 2000. House
prices are based on CoreLogic HPI. Car Sales per capita and Total Mortgage Liabilities are based on FRBNY
CCP data.
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Figure 1.3: The phase diagram of (qij, cit) for an inelastic region when the borrowing constraint is binding.
This graph is based on equations (1.16) and (1.17).
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Figure 1.4: The equilibrium transition path for an inelastic region.
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Figure 1.5: The phase diagram for (hit, cu) in elastic region when the borrowing constraint is binding. The
saddle path is the solution to equations 1.31 and 1.32.
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Figure 1.6: Equilibrium transition path for the elastic region
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Figure 1.7: The Impact of an unexpected permanent decline in the interest rate in an inelastic region
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Figure 1.8: The Impact of an unexpected permanent increase in the maximum loan-to-value ratio in an
inelastic region
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Figure 1.9: The impact of decline in interest rate in an elastic region
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Figure 1.10: The impact of an increase in the maximum loan-to-value ratio in an elastic region
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Figure 1.11: The Boom-Bust in House Prices and Consumption
Note: The graph in the top panel shows the correlation between house prices growth between 2000 and 2006
and house prices growth between 2006 and 2009 for counties with more than 150,000 population in 2000.
The size of circles is proportional to the population of the corresponding county in 2000. The graph in the
bottom panel replicates the same graph for car sales growth. The solid line represents the OLS regression
line
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Figure 1.12: Differential Dynamics of House Prices, Consumption and Total Mortgage Liabilities in Different
Regions
Notes: This figure shows the differential dynamics of house prices and car sales per capita for regions with
different elasticities of housing and with different changes in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs. In
the above figures, Inelastic (Elastic) regions are counties in the top (bottom) 20 percent distribution of
inelasticity measure based on Saiz (2010). "Inelastic/Low Sec" ("Inelastic/High Sec") are inelastic counties
in which the change in the fraction of loans sold to non-GSEs during 2003 to 2006 is less (more) than the
median for Inelastic regions.
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Figure 1.13: Inelastic Regions with High Change in Securitization Rate
Notes: This figure presents results of the calibration of the model without a financial crisis and the model
with a financial crisis for inelastic regions that experienced high change in securitization rate and compares
it with the time series of actual data on the average of house prices, total mortgage liabilities per capita
and car sales per capita (as a proxy for consumption) in those regions. Inelastic Regions with High Change
in Securitization Rate refers to regions in the top quintile of Inelasticity measured for which the change
in securitization rate during the period of 2003 to 2006 has been more than the median of the change in
securitization rate for inelastic regions.
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Figure 1.14: Inelastic Regions with Low Change in Securitization Rate
Notes: This figure presents the results of the calibration of the model without a financial crisis and the
model with a financial crisis for inelastic regions that experienced low change in securitization rate and
compares it with the time series of actual data on the average of house prices, total mortgage liabilities
per capita and car sales per capita (as a proxy for consumption) in those regions. Inelastic Regions with
Low Change in Securitization Rate refers to regions in the top quintile of Inelasticity measure for which the
change in securitization rate during the period of 2003 to 2006 has been less than the median of the change
in securitization rate for inelastic regions.
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Figure 1.15: Elastic Regions
Notes: This figure presents the results of the calibration of the model without a financial crisis and the model
with a financial crisis for Elastic regions and compares it with the time series of actual data on the average
of house prices, total mortgage liabilities per capita and car sales per capita (as a proxy for consumption)
in those regions. Elastic Regions refers to regions in the bottom quintile of Inelasticity measure.
59
O.D
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.
--- data.
-- model Wo fin. shock
- model w/ fin. shock
~l0 2018
- -- -- - - - - - - - =
11
0.
n
0
1I
House Prices - Inelastic
House Prices - Elastic
1 1
1.12F
Consumption - Elastic
1.1-
1.02
1.08-
1 /
1.06 -
.................. ................... 0.98 -:*
1.04-
0.96
1 0.94
0.& 2 204 2008 2008 2010 2012 2002N2004 2006 2010
Figure 1.16: Counterfactual of Past Policies
Notes: This figure compares the predictions of the model without a financial crisis (baseline model) with
two hypothetical scenarios; first, the interest rate remains at its level in 2000 but the decline in collateral
requirements is the same as in the baseline model. Second, there is no decline in collateral requirements but
decline in inters rates is the same is in the baseline model. Results are presented for inelastic regions that
experienced high change in securitization rate and for elastic regions.
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Figure 1.17: Policy Experiment
Notes: This figure compares the predictions of the model with a financial crisis with two scenarios; (i) during
the period of 2008 to 2011, the interest rate declines by 1.5 percent as opposed to 1 percent in the baseline
model with a financial crisis. (ii) Increase in collateral requirements is happening over a longer period of
time. The result are presented for inelastic regions that experienced high change in securitization rate and
for elastic regions.
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Figure 1.18: Volume of Mortgage Originations by Race
Notes: The volume of 1995 mortgage originations for each race is normalized to one.
on the HMDA dataset. Source:Ouazad and Ranciere (2011)
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Appendix
A: Proof of Lemma 1
First I show in elastic regions (qit = B), there cannot be an equilibrium in which the borrowing constraint
never binds.
Proof by contradiction: Let assume there is an equilibrium in which the borrowing constraint is always
relaxed. Imposing At = 0 in the first order conditions, leads to:
d = (r - p)cit
= rB+ 
1
cit
And the wealth dynamics can be written as:
lit = w - cit + r (Wit - Bht) - hit
= w +rWt - cit - (rB +6) hit
= w + rWt - (1+ q) cit
This has the solution:
Wi = (e( - 1) + 1+ 7) cio (e(r-p)t _e- ) + Woert
imposing transversality condition lim [e-PtpitWit] = '.W' 0  = 0, pins down cio:t-00 40
p /W
ci0 = I- + WioJ
Using this in the relation for Wit, results in:
Wi= =- + - +W) e(r~p)t
r r
Therefore lim Wi = -- < 0. But this is violating the collateral constraint Wit > (1 - 63) Bhit.
Therefore in elastic regions, independent of the initial wealth of the representative household, there is no
equilibrium in which the borrowing constraint does not become binding.
Now for inelastic region, if the borrowing constraint never binds (independent of the time path for house
prices) we have:
&it = (r - p) cit
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Then we show as long as there is no bubble in house prices, at some point land prices become zero and
therefore at that point afterward the economy is characterized with the equations of the elastic economy.
This is because as long as the borrowing constraint is not binding and housing supply is fixed, house prices
are characterized by:
4i = rqit + 6 - --L
Since cit is declining and lim cit = 0 we have urn m = r which is inconsistent with no-bubble condition
t-+oo iso q
in house prices.
Therefore at some time (T) land prices becomes zero and house prices are qij = B, from that point
afterward (Vt > T). Since from that point afterward the economy is exactly the same as an economy with
elastic housing supply, we have shown that independent of the WiT, there cannot be any equilibrium in
which borrowing constraint never becomes binding.
B: Proof of Lemma 2
Extended Lagrangian of the representative household in an inelastic region can be written as:
N =[loget + nloght]+ i [w - et + r (Wt - geht) - 8Bht + 4tHt]+ At [W - (1 - 0) gtht} (1.46)
Imposing the fixed supply of housing (ht = L) after taking the first order conditions results in:
c- = 0 (1.47)
WH : -p(rqt + 6 - Q -At(1 - )qt =0 (1.48)
pW : tr + At = Pt -At (1.49)
[Wt - (1 - 0) qtL] At = 0 (1.50)
At > 0 (1.51)
An extended Maximum principle (see Seierstad and Sydsmter (1987)) makes sure At is piecewise contin-
uous. Now I want to prove that if 3tIAt > 0 => At, > 0,Vt' > t.
The proof is by contradiction: let assume there is a point of discontinuity in At for which At+ = 0 but
At- > 0. (t- < t+)
As long as qt is continuous 6' and ct is finite, from equation 1.48 we can see At is finite. finite At in addition
61 A negative jump in q is inconsistent with households maximization problem and cannot be an equilibrium. A positive
jump in q also can be ruled out by assuming international investors do not benefit from housing services but can hold a piece
of land and resell it in the future. This assumption do not change any other result in the model because as long as there is
no change in r and 0, 4 < r and therefore these agents never invest in housing. This assumption just excludes possibility of
positive jump in q from the expectation of households and makes the equilibrium unique.
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to equation 1.49 results in it being finite and therefore it is continuous. continuous lt plus equation 1.47
leads to ct being continuous. Therefore without loss of generality we can write:
pt- = pt+ = t
Pt- = /1k4 = 1k
Now taking the difference of 1.48 for t- and t+, results in:
dt- - d>+ = (1 - 6) g1 A + > 0 (1.52)
Pt
Equation 1.52, says for the borrowing constraint to become relaxed, it should be the case that there is
a decline in house prices growth. This decline, increases the user cost of housing and reduces households
demand for housing to a point that even they become unconstrained they do not demand more housing.
Now I show this condition contradicts with the borrowing constraint when household budget constraint is
added.
From the budget constraint we have:
Wt = w - c +r (W - qtL) - &BL + qtL
We can also define borrowing capacity as Ct = W - (1 - 0) qL and the derivative of borrowing capacity
w.r.t time is:
Ot = Wt - (1 - 0) 4tL
Then taking the difference for t- and t+,
= (4t+-qt-)L<0
But because the borrowing constraint is binding for t = t- (or Ct- = 0),this result in Ct+ < 0 which
contradicts with the borrowing constraint becoming relaxed.
C: Proof of Proposition 5' and Characterization of "Fire Sales" in Inelastic Re-
gions
If ao < -O(q 8 .H..)
households should sell enough land to investors to make sure they are satisfying the borrowing constraint.
let us call ao- debt holding before the shock.
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then ao+ = ao- + qO+ (ho- - ho+)
Also the borrowing constraint will be binding:
ao+ = -6qo+ho+
the economy goes directly to the steady state.
Characterizing the transition:
=r
qi
(1 - O6) qit hit
(1 - O6) qit
ci
Let assume the economy reaches the steady state at T. During the transition, house prices are charac-
terized by
q~i = q?'(t - T) = q.,er(-T),t E [0, T (1.56)
Substituting 1.56, in 1.54 and 1.55, and using hiT = h, = Li, shows the solution to 1.54 and 1.55, is a
unique saddle path characterized by cit = c?'(t - T) and h = hi'(t - T), in which:
h"8  > O,tE[O,T]
h'> 0, t E [0, T]
The only remained unknown is the time it takes the economy to reach the steady state (T).
This is pinned down by the boundary condition at t = 0+.
q':" (-T) [(1 - 0) hi' (-T) - Li] = ao-
D: Characterization of the Model with Extended Housing Supply
The extended Lagrangian in this case has the form:
L = [logct + rqlogHt] + pt [w - ct + r (W - qht) - SWkqoght + ght] + At [W - (1 - 0) qtht] (1.57)
so the system of equations for A = 0 is:
=w - cit - hit
-it + (1 - 0j) git (r - p) - Jhit
(1.53)
(1.54)
(1.55)
{ct [rqt + Sqkq" ] Ht (1.58)
=(1 - wk)-1/(1-") L 4 -" /(-)[rgt + Swkgta - dt]
and if A> 0
1 (1 - 0) qht j =7rc - [rqt + (1 - 6) pq + wkqg - 4(] ht
(1 - 6) qtht - the = w - et - r6qtht - Wkqht(
Adding the relation between q and h given by (1.43), (1.59) reduces to:
(1 -6) qthtj = r7ct - [orqt + (1 -0) pqt + &wkqg" - 1] h(.
(1-0)1", -60) 4th =w -ct -rqtht -Swkqth -
This system of equations has a stable saddle path if q,, < qc,. given by equation (1.44), and do not have
any stable point other than the steady state if q, > qc,.
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F: Employment in Food Services and Retail Trade Sectors
Table 1.5
Food Services and Retial Trade Growth between
2000 and 2006
(1) (2)
Inelasticity
Change in Securitization
Fraction 03_06
Inelasticity X Change in
Securitization Fraction 0306
Controls
State Fixed Effect
Regression Type
Observations
R-squared
2006 and 2009
(4) (5) (6)(3)
0.01 0.01** 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
0.23** 0.10* -0.05
(0.10) (0.05) (0.07)
0.11 -0.01 -0.02
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
N Y Y
N N Y
OLS OLS OLS
321
0.02
321 321
0.63 0.72
0.00 0.00 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.14** -0.03 -0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
-0.08 -0.03 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
N Y Y
N N Y
OLS OLS OLS
323
0.01
323 323
0.20 0.36
2000 to 2009
(7) (8) (9)
0.01 0.02** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.03 0.04 -0.17*
(0.12) (0.08) (0.10)
-0.03 -0.08 0.03
(0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
N Y Y
N N Y
OLS OLS OLS
321 321 321
0.00 0.64 0.70
Notes: This tables presents estimates of the impact of variations in the elasticity of housing supply and changes in securitization rate on growth in
employment in food services and retail trade sectors during the years of 2000 to 2006, 2006 to 2009 and 2000 to 2009. Baseline controls include the
growth of the average income and its interaction with inelasticity measure and population growth during the associated years and the fraction of
houses purchased by investors in 2004. Each county with population greater than 150000 in the year 2000 is one uint of observation. Robust standard
errors are below coefficients in parentheses, and asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
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Chapter 2
The Value of Connections In
Turbulent Times: Evidence from the
United States
With Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James Kwak and Todd Mitton
2.1 Introduction1
On Friday, November 21, 2008, the news leaked that Timothy Geithner - then president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York - would be nominated by President-elect Barack Obama to become Treasury
Secretary. Over the next 10 days, financial firms with a personal connection to Geithner experienced a
cumulative abnormal return of about 15 percent (relative to other financial sector firms). When Geithner's
nomination ran into trouble in January 2009, due to unexpected tax issues, there was a fall in the value of
Geithner-connected firms, although this effect was smaller than the increases that were observed in November.
How should we interpret these results?
This pattern seems unlikely to be a fluke of the data or the result of mismeasurement. We use three
different ways of identifying personal connections between financial institutions and Geithner: (i) people
who had meetings with Geithner during 2007-08; (ii) people who belonged to the same nonprofit boards as
Geithner; and (iii) firms located in New York City, which are under the jurisdiction of the New York Fed.
Our results are essentially the same across all three measures of personal connections, and they are robust
across a wide range of checks, including various size controls and dropping outliers.
lFor helpful comments we thank seminar participants at MIT, Harvard Business School, the International Monetary Fund,
the University of Alberta, BYU, and the 2012 Econometric Society meetings. We are also grateful for very constructive
comments from some former policymakers.
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Perhaps firms with abnormal returns were simply those most affected by the crisis and therefore most
likely to benefit from the appointment of a competent Treasury Secretary? But our results are also robust
when we control for how intensely firms were affected in the most severe phase of the crisis in September-
October 2008.
It is also plausible that Geithner's nomination was expected to benefit firms that were "too big to fail" and
that these firms were more likely than others to have connections to the incoming Secretary. For example,
Geithner had numerous connections to Citigroup, at the time the largest bank holding company in the
country. To complicate matters, shortly after news of Geithner's nomination leaked, Citigroup received a
bailout arranged by the outgoing George W. Bush administration (with Geithner's involvement).2 Therefore,
in addition to controlling for firm size and other measurable financial variables directly, we drop Citigroup
from many of our regressions and also drop the other very large bank holding companies from our base
sample (although they are included in our extended sample and in the full range of robustness checks). We
also employ a matching estimator that allows us to establish a control sample (without Geithner connections)
that has characteristics very similar to those in our treatment sample (with Geithner connections). In all
cases our results remain robust: the market considered there to be value in being personally connected to
Geithner, quite aside from any "too big to fail" issues. 3
There are at least three reasons why market participants may have held this belief. First, they may
have expected that some form of explicit corruption could take place. In some countries, such as Indonesia,
Malaysia or Pakistan, potential corruption is a reasonable interpretation of stock price movements for con-
nected firms, but it is highly unlikely to explain what happened in the United States. Political connections
are valuable in countries with weak institutions: when formal property rights are weak, transparency is
limited, and politicians have a great deal of discretion or not much accountability, personal ties to the people
in power are worth a great deal.4 However, it is implausible to suggest that the United States under Obama
is anything like Indonesia under Suharto.5 Studies of policy-making under the Obama administration by
Suskind (2011) and Scheiber (2011) and first-hand accounts by Bair (2012) and Barofsky (2012) (none of
which are particularly sympathetic to Geithner) contain no suggestion of corruption. Geithner has never
2 Geithner was closely involved in the terms of rescuing Citigroup in fall 2008. However, on the Friday prior to the November
Citigroup bailout, news of the nomination leaked. According to Sheila Bair (2012, p. 124), chair of the FDIC, Geithner ceased
communications with Citigroup but "continued to advocate strongly for Citi in our internal discussions."
3We also examine evidence on the market-perceived probability of bankruptcy from credit default swap spreads, although
the available sample for these data is smaller than for equities. In theory, investors might have expected that all financial firm
debt would be "protected" from default by government action in fall 2008, while also believing that shareholders in favored
firms would receive advantages relative to shareholders in other firms. In our data, we find the same pattern in CDS spread
data as in equity data - i.e., there was a perceived benefit to creditors (in the form of lower implied default risk) when the
firms' executives knew Geithner.
4For example, in a seminal study, Fisman (2001) found that being connected to President Suharto accounted for 23 percent
of firms' value on average in the mid-1990s (where the events were rumors about the president's health). For Malaysia in the
late 1990s, Johnson and Mitton (2003) found that connections to Prime Minister Mahathir accounted for around 20 percent of
firms' total stock market value in a crisis, where the event was the fall from power of Anwar Ibrahim, the Minister of Finance.5By most measures and at most times, the US has strong institutions (see Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)). The established
results that show large effects for political connections are based on data from countries with much weaker institutions than the
modern United States. For example, in Pakistan there are strong personal connections between the people who run firms and
the directors of banks (Khwaja and Mian (2005)); Ding (2005) has related cross-country findings. In Weimar Germany during
the late 1920s, corporate executives shifted allegiances as the political winds changed (Ferguson and Voth (2008)).
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run for public office and seems unlikely to ever do so, making political contributions irrelevant. 6
Second, market participants may have believed that Geithner's policy preferences were generally consis-
tent with the interests of the financial institutions with which he was connected. On this theory, instead
of favoring firms because he had connections with them, Geithner's prior personal connections had already
shaped his perspectives on the financial sector and financial crisis. In particular, his close connections to
large, complex, Wall Street banks had persuaded him that broader economic prosperity required rescuing
those banks on relatively generous terms (for shareholders, as well as executives and creditors). Our results,
however, are not based on a comparison of financial to non-financial firms or of large to small financial firms.
Rather, they are driven by a comparison of connected to non-connected firms of a similar size - the results
hold when we drop all firms that were plausibly of systemic importance. Even if Geithner had adopted the
worldview that Wall Street was "too big to fail", this cannot directly account for our results.
Third, the market may have subscribed to the "social connections meets the crisis" hypothesis: that
personal connections would matter during a time of crisis and increased policy discretion. It was reasonable
to suppose that immediate action with limited oversight would have to be taken, and that officials would
rely on their small network of confidantes for advice and assistance.
Powerful government officials are no different from the rest of us; they know and trust a limited number of
private sector people. It is therefore natural to tap these people for their expertise when needed - including
asking them for advice and hiring them into government positions. Even with the best intentions, beliefs are
presumably shaped by self-interest, particularly when the people involved were, are, or will be executives
with fiduciary responsibility to shareholders. These tendencies can be checked to some degree during regular
times by institutional constraints and oversight, but during times of crisis and urgency, social connections
might become particularly powerful.
At the time of his nomination, Geithner knew some prominent individuals in the financial sector very well.
He is a long-time proteg6 of Robert Rubin, who was Treasury Secretary under President Bill Clinton, former
co-chair of Goldman Sachs, and more recently a leading board member at Citigroup (he resigned from the
latter position in January 2009). Most notably, from November 2003, Geithner was president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York - an institution that has traditionally served as the eyes and ears of the Federal
Reserve on Wall Street, but which is sometimes considered to have become too much influenced by the
thinking at large financial institutions. 7 We document below that, in line with this hypothesis, as Treasury
Secretary, Geithner hired people from a few financial institutions that he knew well. These appointees and
Geithner apparently shared the view that their specific financial institutions are essential to the wellbeing
of the economy.
6 Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find that politically connected firms were more likely to receive TARP funds, and also that such
firms performed worse than unconnected firms. However, they measure connections to Congress, not to Secretary Geithner.
7Formal responsibility for supervision rests with the Board of Governors in Washington D.C., but the New York Fed is
very much engaged in collecting information and interpreting what is going on. By tradition, the president of the New York
Fed plays a particularly important role in managing relationships between the official sector and financial services executives
who are based in New York ("Wall Street", broadly defined). He is also, ex officio, vice chair of the Federal Open Market
Committee, which sets monetary policy. (All presidents of the New York Fed to date have been men.)
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Our findings find a stronger effect of relationships compared with the standard results in seemingly
related studies for the United States. In part, previous studies have examined different kinds of connections,
focusing on the legislature, where the impact of a single individual is likely to be limited. For example, the
so-called Jeffords Effect - named after a Senator who switched parties unexpectedly, causing a change of
control in the U.S. Senate - is worth around 1 percent of firm value (Jayachandran (2006)). Roberts (1990)
found significant but small effects on connected firms from the unexpected death of a U.S. Senator.
Also, the crisis conditions of 2008 are likely quite different from what happens in non-crisis episodes. Fis-
man, Fisman, Galef, and Khurana (2006) conducted a comprehensive assessment of the value of connections
to former Vice President Dick Cheney, measured using the impact on connected firms' stock prices of events
such as his heart attacks, surprise news about his political career, the original Bush-Cheney "hanging chad"
presidential election victory, and Iraq war developments. They look carefully for evidence that his connec-
tions matter, but do not find significant effects.8 Repeating our analysis for the nomination of Secretary
Hank Paulson during regular times also leads to no connection premium.
Geithner ascended to the highest level of power at an unusual moment, with many ideas in flux and
great differences in opinion between otherwise well-informed and experienced people. Specifically, opinions
about responsible policy dealing with the financial sector have often been convergent in recent decades in the
United States - as a practical matter, this meant that deregulation continued, irrespective of who became
Treasury Secretary.9 But during the intense crisis of 2008 there was a wide range of opinions among policy
experts - and potential Treasury Secretaries - regarding what should be done, with significant potential
implications for shareholders.
During such an episode where immediate action was or was thought to be necessary, it is plausible that the
usual institutional checks may not work and social connections may become more important both as sources
of ideas and sources of manpower. 10 This interpretation is also consistent with recent work by Querubin
and Snyder (2011); using a regression discontinuity approach, they find that American politicians were not
able to enrich themselves before or after the U.S. Civil War, but during the war, there were substantial
opportunities for corruption - either because there was more government spending or because the media
were distracted or both.
Section 2 reviews the historical context and why market participants may have expected Geithner to
5Fisman et al. (2006) write, "Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that in all cases the value of ties to Cheney is
precisely estimated as zero. We interpret this as evidence that U.S. institutions are effective in controlling rent-seeking through
personal ties with high-level government officials?'
Lower down the official hierarchy, there may be more issues. For example, Dube, Kaplan and Naidu (2011) find that (leaked)
credible private information on coup attempts backed by the United States does move stock prices.
9 Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2011) find that lobbying of legislators by lenders was associated with more risk-taking before
the crisis and worse outcomes in 2008, while Igan and Mishra (2012) examine how the political influence of the financial sector
affected deregulation. Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2010) establish that members of Congress were more likely to support the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 when they received higher contributions from the financial services industry.
1
oFaccio (2006) finds connections exist everywhere, but does not establish their relative value in various settings. Faccio,
Masulis, and McConnell (2006) show connected firms are more likely to receive bailouts across a wide range of countries. But
the probability of bailout is much lower in richer countries, and the size of bailouts as a percent of GDP - at least until recently
- must have been lower in rich industrialized democracies (although this is not the focus of their study.) See also Chiu and
Joh (2004) and Ding (2005).
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have the opportunity and inclination to favor certain firms. Section 3 explains our coding of connections and
discusses the other variables we use. Section 4 presents our basic results and a range of robustness checks.
Section 5 discusses the effects on firms with connections to other candidates for the post of Treasury Secretary.
Section 6 analyzes the effects of Geithner's tax issues, which temporarily jeopardized his nomination in
January 2009. Section 7 discusses the design and implementation of bailout policy and financial reform
under the Geithner Treasury. Section 8 concludes.
2.2 The Context and Event
2.2.1 Context
The financial crisis first became clearly evident in mid-2007, when problems with subprime mortgages began
causing major losses at specific hedge funds or structured investment vehicles with large exposures to secu-
rities backed by subprime debt. However, the crisis grew rapidly in severity over the spring and summer of
2008 - culminating in the collapse of Lehman Brothers and a full-blown ginancial panic.
These developments prompted Paulson and Bernanke to propose the bill that eventually became the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), whose centerpiece was the $700 billion Troubled Assets
Relief Program (TARP).11 On October 14, Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) announced two measures that finally began to calm the markets. The first measure
was that $250 billion of TARP money was available to recapitalize financial institutions, and $125 billior
had already been accepted by nine major banks. The second was a program under which the FDIC would
guarantee new debt issued by banks." By mid-November, when President-elect Obama was selecting his
Treasury Secretary, the crisis was far from over.
2.2.2 Channels of Influence
Why might market participants have believed that the nomination of Tim Geithner as Treasury Secretary
would be good for Geithner-connected firms relative to unconnected firms? This inquiry can be separated
into two more specific questions. First, in this subsection we discuss how being connected to powerful officials
can benefit a firm in general. In the next subsection, we ask why people might think that such connections
would be particularly beneficial in the case of Geithner at Treasury. In evaluating both questions, it is
lOn Thursday, September 18, Paulson and Bernanke provided a dramatic briefing to congressional leaders. Ac-
cording to Chris Dodd, then chair of the Senate Banking Committee, they were told "that we're literally maybe
days away from a complete meltdown of our financial system, with all the implications here at home and globally."
(http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/washington/19cnd-cong.html)
The initial Treasury proposal, published on September 20, was only three pages long and did not specify any independent
oversight mechanisms. "Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan," The New York Times, September 20, 2008. The initial
legislative proposal was rejected by the House of Representatives on September 29. An amended version passed and was signed
into law on October 3, 2008.
'
2
"Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC," 'reasury Department Press Release, October 14, 2008, available
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp206.htm.
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important to bear in mind that market reaction requires only some set of plausible expectations on the part
of market participants, not any actual favoritism on the part of the person in question.
There are several potential channels of influence that we believe do not operate here - that is, there was
probably not even a significant perception that they might have mattered in Geithner's case. These include:
(a) outright corruption, where firms (or their lobbyists) pay officials directly for favors; (b) campaign financ-
ing, where elected officials know which firms contribute to their campaigns and what issues are important
to them (Geithner, of course, was unelected); and (c) the revolving door, where government officials can
maximize their expected income by being friendly with the firms they oversee and later securing lucrative
jobs with them. (Before the Treasury nomination, Geithner already had ample opportunity to land jobs
with seven- or eight-figure expected annual incomes.)
There are two remaining channels of influence that market participants in November 2008 could reason-
ably have expected to apply. One is the power of connections. This is the same currency that lobbyists trade
in legally. When powerful people make decisions, they are going to be influenced by the people they talk to;
and the people they talk to will be the people they know (Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011), and
Blanes-i-Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2012)). By November 2008, Geithner knew the leaders of the New
York financial community very well, and it could reasonably be expected that he would continue to take
their calls, and listen to them seriously, as Treasury Secretary.' 3
In addition to the simplest form of access through social connections - the fact that any official is
more likely to take a phone call from and listen to someone he knows than someone he does not know -
another form of access is provided by hiring. Any new administration must fill a large number of important
positions, and personal connections are a main factor in hiring decisions. It would be expected that firms
that were connected to Geithner would be more likely to place employees or alumni at Treasury and in
related administration jobs than firms that lacked such connections. This was certainly the case for the
Paulson Treasury, which brought on a seemingly disproportionate number of people with connections to
Goldman Sachs. Even if Geithner were not to favor connected firms directly, they could still benefit through
the influence of their alumni.
The second plausible channel of influence is the convergence of perspectives and interests that can occur
through immersion in a certain social or institutional context. People's beliefs about the world tend to be
shaped by the people and organizations that they spend time with. If a government official previously spent
years regularly interacting with the executives of one set of firms and not with the executives of another set
of firms, it is plausible that his policy preferences will be closer to those of the former group than the latter.
Once in office, this could lead him to make decisions that favor connected over unconnected firms, even were
he to provide equal access to all firms. We refer to this type of influence as "cultural capture" because it
can lead to outcomes similar to those produced by traditional regulatory capture.
MWe should emphasize that drawing on pre-existing relationships on Wall Street is well established practice for a Treasury
Secretary, and did not begin with Geithner. For example, Henry Paulson brought in more and more Goldman Sachs "experts"
as the crisis deepened, including Neel Kashkari, who was charged with running the original Troubled Asset Relief Program.
Because of his expertise, Kashkari was initially kept on by Geithner.
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In recent decades, the financial sector - particularly the large New York investment banks (Goldman
Sachs, Morgan Stanley) and universal banks (Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase) - occupied an increasingly
prominent position not only in the U.S. economy, but in Americans' perceptions of society.14 The belief
that financial innovation and large financial institutions are good for society became increasingly widespread
and was largely adopted by the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations., Geithner, as a product
of the Clinton Treasury Department and the New York Fed, seemed to share this attitude, and his years at
the New York Fed had required him to pay particular attention to the views of a specific set of banks.
It is important to note that under the "access" hypothesis, market participants would expect Secretary
Geithner to favor financial institutions based on actual connections; under the "cultural capture" hypothesis,
by contrast, he would be expected to favor institutions based on how similar they were to the institutions
he was connected to - not based on actual connections. Empirically, these two expectations would produce
different results. If, controlling for firm type, it is only connected firms that enjoy abnormal returns in the
post-announcement period, that implies that market participants believed the "access" hypothesis rather
than the "cultural capture" hypothesis.
2.2.3 Expectations in November 2008
The Treasury Secretary has considerable influence over the fate of the banking industry under any circum-
stances, with significant responsibility for economic policy and financial regulation. 16 By November 2008,
however, Treasury was also intervening much more directly in the banking system than had been previously
thought possible. That intervention took two main forms: emergency bailouts (or not) of major financial
institutions; and TARP, which was intended as support for the financial sector more broadly.
TARP explicitly granted broad powers to Treasury to intervene in the financial sector, and Paulson had
used them to pressure nine major banks into accepting $125 billion of new government capital. 17 TARP
was especially significant because it gave the Treasury Department a direct role in determining which banks
succeeded or failed. Although the Capital Purchase Program distributed capital on relatively generous terms,
access to capital was controlled by Treasury. In late October, for example, National City was acquired by
PNC after learning that its application might not be approved.18 At the time, there was little transparency
about how applications were being reviewed and what criteria were being used to determine which banks
received capital. Because the Capital Purchase Program appeared to convey a government seal of approval
14 Bhagwati (1998) makes this point in the context of arguing that Wall Street pushed Washington to lobby for capital market
liberalization around the world.
i5 For a history of financial sector lobbying and regulatory capture by financial sector interests in the United States, see
Johnson and Kwak (2011), chapters 3 through 6.
16 Two of the major banking regulators, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), were part of the department, although with some degree of independence. Treasury works closely with the
other major banking regulators. OTS was abolished by the Dodd-Frank reforms.
17 Damian Paletta, Jon Hilsenrath, and Deborah Solomon, "At Moment of Truth, U.S. Forced Big Bankers to Blink," The
Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2008.
1iDan Fitzpatrick, David Enrich, and Damian Paletta, "PNC Buys National City in Bank Shakeout," The Wall Street
Journal, October 25, 2008.
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while providing capital on relatively favorable terms,' 9 it provided an example of how the government could
provide benefits to financial institutions - with the Treasury Department determining who received those
benefits (Veronesi and Zingales, 2010).
In addition, the Capital Purchase Program placed significant holdings of preferred stock in the hands
of the Treasury Department, as well as warrants on common stock. Although the preferred stock was non-
voting and Treasury committed not to vote its shares of common stock, this still left open the prospect of
increased government influence; participating institutions were also subject to executive compensation and
corporate governance requirements. The mechanics of implementing TARP were housed within Treasury,
and managed by people appointed by the Treasury Secretary - initially, largely by people whom Secretary
Paulson knew from his tenure at Goldman Sachs, vividly demonstrating the potential importance of personal
relationships. 2' Because there was considerable uncertainty about how and to what degree Treasury would
attempt to exercise influence over banks that had received TARP money, knowing the Treasury Secretary
could easily be seen as a major advantage for a bank.
Geithner was known to have personal connections to several major New York banks. He had worked
for then-Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin during the Clinton administration; Rubin, the former co-chair
of Goldman Sachs, later served as chair of the executive committee of Citigroup's board of directors. As
president of the New York Fed, he met frequently, and in private, with the heads of all of the major New
York banks, and was even approached by Sanford Weill as a potential CEO of Citigroup."
In addition to these personal connections, Geithner's record as head of the New York Fed and his stated
policy positions were generally thought to be favorable to the large, sophisticated institutions that often
showed up on his schedule. For example, he argued for the adoption of the Basel II standards for capital
adequacy, which allowed large banks to use their own risk management models to determine their capital
requirements.2
19 The investment terms were considerably more favorable than those available from the private sector, such as in Warren
Buffett's investment in Goldman Sachs. According to Bloomberg, the government received warrants worth $13.8 billion in
connection with its 25 largest equity injections; under the terms Buffett got from Goldman, those warrants would have been
worth $130.8 billion. In addition, TARP received a lower interest rate (5%) on its preferred stock investments than did Buffett
(10%). Nobel prize-winner economist Joseph Stiglitz said, "Paulson said he had to make it attractive to banks, which is code
for 'I'm going to give money away." Mark Pittman, "Paulson Bank Bailout in 'Great Stress' Misses Terms Buffett Won,"
Bloomberg, January 10, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aAvhtiFdLyaQ. The
TARP Congressional Oversight Panel had similar findings. TARP Congressional Oversight Panel, "February Oversight Report:
Valuing Treasury's Acquisitions," available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-020609-report.pdf. Although there were
justifications for this subsidy - in particular, Treasury wanted broad participation in order to avoid stigmatizing particular
banks - it still constituted potential expected value that the government was willing and able to transfer to specific financial
institutions.
2 0
"TARP Capital Purchase Program: Senior Preferred Stock and Warrants," available at http://
www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/document5hpl207.pdf.2 1Neel Kashkari, a Goldman Sachs alumnus, was named as interim head of TARP. Reuben Jeffrey, another Goldman
alumnus, was named as interim chief investment officer, and several other ex-Goldman executives played important roles
in the Paulson Treasury, as profiled in contemporaneous articles in both The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal.
Julie Creswell and Ben White, "The Guys from 'Government Sachs'," The New York Times, October 17, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/business/19gold.html; Deborah Solomon, "The Financial Crisis: Amid Turmoil, Tireless
Team Of Advisers Backed Paulson," The Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2008.22 Jo Becker and Gretchen Morgenson, "Geithner, Member and Overseer of Finance Club," The New York Times, April 26,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/business/27geithner.html.
23 Jo Becker and Gretchen Morgenson, "Geithner, Member and Overseer of Finance Club," The New York Times, April 26,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/business/27geithner.html.
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The New York Fed-supported sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan Chase was seen at the time as a very
good deal for the acquirer, which was one of the largest New York banks and whose CEO, Jamie Dimon,
was then a director of the New York Fed. Geithner supported using government funds to purchase troubled
assets from banks directly, which would benefit the banks with the largest portfolios of those assets. 24
Market participants reacted to news of Geithner's impending nomination by evaluating his likely future
behavior relative to that of other plausible alternatives. As of November 15, 2008, the top candidates for the
job, according to Intrade's prediction market, were Geithner (45% chance), Lawrence Summers (26%), Jon
Corzine (10%), Paul Volcker (9%), and Sheila Bair (8%).25 In comparing Geithner to these other possibilities,
market participants would have been interested in three distinct issues: what policies they were likely to
follow; the set of firms to which they were connected; and the degree to which they might be influenced
(through any channel) by those firms.
There are reasons why people might have expected some other candidates to follow different policies as
Treasury Secretary - policies that might have been less favorable to the types of banks that Geithner was
connected to. For example, Corzine, despite having served as chair of Goldman Sachs in the 1990s, was
now the favored candidate of at least part of the labor movement. 26 Bair favored a narrower loan guarantee
program than Geithner and eventually supported the sale of Wachovia to Wells Fargo rather than Citigroup;
she also advocated for relatively more assistance for homeowners and relatively less for financial institutions.
Geithner's nomination would then have been seen as a good thing for some of the banks to which he was
connected (e.g., Citigroup); but it could also have been seen as a good thing for other, similar banks to
which he was less connected (e.g., Bank of America).
For connections to have positive value in and of themselves, two other factors could be at work. First,
Geithner could have a different set of connections than the other candidates. This was generally the case,
although there was considerable overlap between his and Summers's networks. Second, connections could
be thought to have different value for different potential Treasury Secretaries. For example, Summers had a
reputation as a brilliant, independent-minded academic economist and as a controversial figure; this could
have reduced the perceived value of access to him. Volcker's primary reputational attribute was the idea that
he was willing to make hard choices for the good of the country, including inflicting pain when necessary,
a reputation earned in combating high inflation in the early 1980s. Although he had worked for Chase
Manhattan in the 1950s and 1960s, and had been president of the New York Fed in the 1970s, by 2008 he
was considered highly independent of any influence.27 So if a banking executive had connections to both
Geithner and Volcker, he might have expected the connection to Geithner to be more valuable.
24 According to Jeffrey Lacker, president of the Richmond Fed, Geithner in 2007 discussed an upcoming reduction in the
Federal Reserve's discount rate (a rate at which banks can borrow directly from the Fed) with a few large banks; although
Lacker's allegation was not made public until 2013, if true, it would certainly have been known by executives at the banks in
question. Alister Bull, "Fed Official Alleges Geithner May Have Alerted Banks to Rate Cut," Reuters, January 19, 2013.
25 James Pethokoukis, "Geithner Tops Odds for Next Treasury Secretary," U.S. News & World Report, November 15, 2008
(online).
26 Elizabeth Holmes, "Corzine Emerges as a Candidate for Treasury Secretary," The Wall Street Journal, November 13, 2008.
27"[Politicians] certainly will not accuse Mr. Volcker of doing Wall Street's bidding at the expense of Main Street." Joe
Nocera, "Paul Volcker for Treasury Secretary," The New York Times, October 17, 2008.
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2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of all firms that trade on the NYSE or NASDAQ that are categorized as banks or
financial services firms in the Datastream database. Of these 678 firms we exclude firms that lack sufficient
stock return data in the Datastream or TAQ databases to calculate abnormal returns for our Geithner
announcement event. The remaining sample of 603 firms we refer to as the "full sample".
A potential complication is Citigroup's bailout which occurred between the news leak of Geithner's
expected nomination on November 21 and the official announcement on November 24. On Sunday, November
23, the U.S. government entered into a bailout agreement with Citigroup that provided Citigroup with a $20
billion capital infusion through TARP, as well as guarantees on a pool of $306 billion of troubled assets.2
Because the bailout occurred in the middle of the event window for the Geithner announcement, and
because the bailout (or at least the timing of the event) was not entirely anticipated, it could confound the
estimation of the effect of the Geithner announcement, to the extent that there is any correlation between
firms connected to Geithner and firms impacted by the Citigroup bailout news.2 In our tests, we address
this issue in two ways. First, we report results for stock price reactions on November 21 only, which is
prior to the Citigroup bailout announcement. While this approach avoids the confounding effects of the
Citigroup bailout, it is not entirely appealing because the post-leak return on November 21 is only one hour
in length, and because some uncertainty about the nomination remained until the official announcement on
November 24. So as a second approach, we exclude from our tests the firms that would be most likely to
be affected by the bailout announcement. We rank all firms in the sample based on their return correlation
with Citigroup during the period beginning the day of the Lehman collapse and ending the day before the
Geithner nomination announcement. We exclude all firms that rank among the top 10% in correlation with
Citigroup, and call this reduced sample our "base sample". The use of this base sample should eliminate, to
a great extent, the impact of the bailout announcement on our estimations.
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics of our variables for political connections and financial data. We
identify connections to Geithner in three different ways. The first measure of connections, which we refer to
as "schedule connections", identifies the number of times that Geithner interacted with executives from each
firm while he was president of the New York Fed. We identify these interactions by searching Geithner's
daily schedule for each day from January 2007 through January 2009.30 For example, a search of Geithner's
schedule for Moody's Corporation reveals two interactions between Geithner and executives of Moody's. On
July 5, 2007, the schedule reads, "11:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Meeting w/Raymond McDaniel, Chairman &
28
"Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the FDIC on Citigroup"(press release), November 23, 2008.
29It is not certain that a bailout would be positive news for Geithner-connected firms. We test the effect of Geithner
connections on returns surrounding another significant government bailout, the bailout of Bank of America on January 16, 2009.
The Bank of America bailout was similar in structure to the Citigroup bailout, and confirmed the government's willingness
to take unprecedented measures to keep the largest banks afloat. However, our tests show that cumulative abnormal returns
for Geithner-connected firms surrounding the Bank of America bailout are generally negative, which suggests that Geithner-
connected firms do not generally have positive responses to the news of significant government bailouts of major banks.
so"Geithner's Calendar at the New York Fed," The New York Times, available at http://documents.nytimes.com/geithner-
schedule-new-york-fed.
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CEO, Moody's Corpomtion", and on September 15, 2008, the schedule reads "11:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Rating
Agencies Meeting" and Raymond McDaniel is listed as one of the participants. Based on this information,
we code Moody's schedule connections as two. Row 1 of Panel A of Table 2.2.1 reports descriptive statistics
for this variable. By far the firm with the greatest number of interactions listed on Geithner's schedule is
Citigroup, with a total of 34. Panel A of Appendix Table 2.14 lists all of the sample firms found on Geithner's
schedule and the number of interactions.
The second measure of connections to Geithner, which we refer to as "personal connections", identifies
the number of links that Geithner has with each firm through personal relationships. We identify these links
using the relationship maps provided by muckety.com (run by reputable independent journalists).3 ' The
maps on muckety.com show the links for a given individual to other people or to organizations. 32 We count
a link between Geithner and a firm if he has a personal link with a person who is a director of the firm, or if
he shares a board or similar position (e.g., trustees of the Economic Club of New York) with someone who
works for the firm.33 We require that those links be active as of the time of the announcement of Geithner's
nomination. For example, we find a link between Geithner and American Express on muckety.com through
Kenneth Chenault, chairman and CEO of American Express, who is associated with Geithner through the
National Academy Foundation, where they are both directors, and through the Partnership for New York
City, where Chenault is a vice chairman and Geithner is a board member. Based on this information we
code personal connections for American Express as one. Descriptive statistics for this variable are reported
in Row 2 of Table 2.1. Geithner has the greatest number of personal connections (nine) to Citigroup; in
contrast, he has only one connection with Bank of America (a company not based in New York). Appendix
Table 2.12 lists all of the identified personal connections between Geithner and sample firms. We use the
same methodology to identify personal connections for other candidates for Treasury Secretary including
Lawrence Summers, Jon Corzine, Paul Volcker, and Sheila Bair. These identified connections are listed in
Appendix Table A2.
To independently verify the accuracy of the information provided by muckety.com we search the annual
reports of each company with an identified personal connection to Geithner, as well as other publicly available
information. We are able to verify 52 of the 58 connections reported by muckety.com, 45 of those using the
annual report filed most immediately subsequent to the Geithner nomination announcement (typically, for
years ending December 31, 2008), and another seven using other sources such as Forbes and Bloomberg. Of
the remaining six connections, two are confirmed to be errors and are excluded from our data. The other
four are unique to the list of connections in that the connected individuals are identified as legal counsel for
31These data are broadly similar to what is available for emerging markets, e.g., Gomes and Jomo (1997 and 1998) on
Malaysia. Many connections in emerging markets are formed early in careers. Most of the Geithner connections seem to come
from his time at the New York Fed, but that job and many of his connections appear to arise from his relationship with Robert
Rubin. We use muckety.com relationship maps from 2009.3 2 Measuring connections in ths way is standard in the network sociology literature. See, for example, Useem (1984). Fisman
et al. (2006) review the sociology literature on why board ties matter, including for the flow of information.
33 Most of our data are board memberships, which are a matter of public record. However, the muckety.com coding also
contains some well-known mentor/adviser relationships, with Robert Rubin and a few others.
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financial firms in the sample. These have also been excluded from our data due to the difficulty of verifying
the connection and because of the different nature of the connections. These exclusions leave us with a set
of 52 personal connections to Geithner from 21 different financial firms.
The third measure of connections to Geithner is based on firm location, under the reasonable assumption
that Geithner would have greater contact with executives of firms headquartered in New York City, where
Geithner was located as president of the New York Fed. This variable is a dummy variable set to one if the
headquarters of the firm is identified as New York City in the Datastream database. Descriptive statistics
are reported in Row 3 of Table 2.1. Forty-five of the sample firms have headquarters in New York City; these
firms are listed in Appendix Table 2.14.
Rows 4 through 6 of Panel A of Table 2.1 report basic financial information for the sample firms as
obtained from the Worldscope database for the year 2008. Size (Row 4) is reported as the logarithm of
total assets, profitability (Row 5) is return on equity, and leverage (Row 6) is the ratio of total debt to total
capital. As shown in Panel A, financial information is missing for a few of these firms. Rows 7 through 9
report summary statistics for our primary measure of firm performance, cumulative abnormal stock returns
(CARs). Calculation of CARs is discussed in the next section. Rows 10 through 12 report statistics for our
secondary measure of performance, changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads, which are also discussed
in the next section.
Panel B of Table 2.1 reports differences in the means of these variables between firms connected to
Geithner and non-connected firms; for this panel his schedule connections are converted to a dummy variable
for any connections. Row 13 of Panel B shows that connected firms are significantly larger than non-connected
firms for all three measures of connections. Row 14 shows that profitability is significantly lower for connected
firms, but only when we use the New York measure. Row 15 shows that leverage is higher for connected
firms, but the difference is only significant for the schedule measure of connections. Panel C repeats the
analysis of Panel B for the base sample. The differences reported in Panel C are broadly similar to those
reported in Panel B. Because of the performance differences shown in Panels B and C, we will control for
these variables in subsequent analysis. Finally, Panel D of Table 2.1 reports correlation coefficients between
the explanatory variables reported in Panel A.
2.4 Geithner Connections and Stock Returns
In this section we study whether connections to Geithner, as defined in the previous section, are associated
with differences in returns at the time of the announcement of Geithner's nomination. We begin by calculating
returns for each firm in the sample on the relevant dates. Geithner's nomination was officially announced
by President-elect Barack Obama early on Monday, November 24, 2008. However, news of his impending
nomination was leaked to the press late in the trading day on Friday, November 21, 2008 at approximately
3:00 p.m. ET, a time that coincides with the beginning of a stock market rally. For the purposes of studying
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stock reactions, we define event day 0 as November 21 and event day 1 as November 24, with subsequent event
days corresponding to subsequent trading days. We obtain daily stock returns for each sample firm from the
Datastream database. In order to more carefully delineate the response to the Geithner announcement on
event day 0, we calculate returns on that day as only the returns from 3:00 p.m. until the market close at
4:00 p.m. We obtain intraday returns from the TAQ database.
2.4.1 Univariate Tests
Panel A of Table 2.2 compares actual returns between connected and non-connected firms in the base sample
for event days 0 through 10. Panel A shows that on event day 0, using schedule connections, connected firms
outperformed non-connected firms by 4.3 percentage points, a difference that is significant at the 5% level.
Results are similar for the other measures of connections, though not statistically significant for personal
connections. On event day 1, when the nomination was officially announced, return differences are even
more pronounced. Using the schedule measure, connected firms outperformed non-connected firms by 8.4
percentage points on this day. The corresponding outperformance for firms with personal connections is 9.6
percentage points, and for firms with New York connections it is 3.1 percentage points. In all cases the
difference is significant at the 1% or 10% level.
Panel A shows that connected firms continued to outperform non-connected firms on each day through
event day 10, with the primary exception being event day 5, in which connected firms sharply underperformed
non-connected firms.' The final row of Panel A reports cumulative performance for event days 0 through
10. Using the schedule measure of connections, connected firms outperformed non-connected firms by 37.2
percentage points over this period. For personal connections the difference was 46.3 percentage points, and
for New York connections the difference was 29.9 percentage points. By any measure of connections, the
outperformance of connected firms over this period was economically large and highly statistically significant.
Because there .were large market movements during the event window, it is important to also calculate
abnormal returns for the event days. Our procedure for calculating abnormal returns is outlined in Campbell,
Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). We calculate cumulative abnormal returns using the market model as follows:
CAR[0,n]i = OARzt,
where CAR[0, n]i is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i for event days 0 through n. ARit is calculated
as
ARit = R%- - [&j + PRt],
where ARte is the abnormal return for firm i on event day t, Rt is the actual return on firm i for event day
t, and RIt is the return on the market for event day t, with the market return represented by the return on
3On event day 5 (December 1, 2008), a day in which there was a large market decline, the NBER officially declared a
recession, Ben Bernanke warned of a protracted downturn, Henry Paulson announced the need to further tap bailout funds,
and large banks announced layoffs.
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the S&P 500 index. The parameters di and 3 are estimated from the following equation:
=t cii +#[3 Rmt + Ecit,
on a pre-event period of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. Although the choice of
estimation period length is subjective, a length of 250 days corresponds to roughly one year of trading and
is a length that has been used in other studies such as Jayachandran (2006) and Li and Lie (2006). The
cumulative abnormal returns show the actual returns of each firm less the predicted returns of each firm
based on that firm's performance relative to the market over the estimation period.
Panel B of Table 2.2 compares cumulative abnormal returns between connected firms and non-connected
firms in the base sample for event days 0 through 10. In contrast to the actual returns reported in Panel
A, no significant difference is reported between CARs of connected firms and non-connected firms for the
one hour of event day 0. Beginning on event day 1, the differences in CARs between connected firms and
non-connected firms are relatively large, though also not statistically significant. Significant differences in
CARs increase on subsequent event days. The final row of Panel B shows that using the schedule measure,
CAR[O, 10] for connected firms is higher than CAR[0, 10] for non-connected firms by 15.7 percentage points.
The corresponding differences for the other measures are 15.8 percentage points and 11.0 percentage points,
and in all cases the difference between the CARs is significant at the 5% level or higher. Panels C and D
of Table 2.2 repeat the analysis of Panels A and B, but for the full sample. The results are fairly similar to
those reported for the base sample.
In summary, Table 2.2 shows strong performance of connected firms relative to non-connected firms in
response to Geithner's nomination as 'reasury Secretary, with higher returns for connected firms in the range
of 40 percentage points for actual returns and in the range of 15 percentage points for abnormal returns over
event days 0 through 10. In the tests that follow, we assess whether these results hold when controlling for
other firm characteristics in a multivariate setting.
2.4.2 OLS Regression Results
To control for additional characteristics of the sample firms, we test the relation between connections to
Geithner and cumulative abnormal returns in a regression framework. We estimate the following equation:
CAR, = a +xi + z,4+ ei, (2.1)
where CARi is either CAR[0], CAR[0, 1], or CAR[0, 101 for firm i, xi is a measure of connections for firm i,
and zi is a set of firm-level covariates for firm i (such as firm size, profitability, and leverage).
The firm-level covariates are included to control for other basic firm characteristics that could have some
effect on the observed relationship between connectedness and returns. A common practice in regressions
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of this type in previous literature is to not control for firm-level characteristics (see, e.g., Fisman (2001),
Jayachandran (2006), Fisman et al. (2006)), although Johnson and Mitton (2003) control for firm size and
leverage, and Jayachandran (2006) controls for firm size in robustness checks. Nevertheless, results from such
regressions can be confounded by the differential effects of events following Geithner's nomination on firms
with different characteristics. For this reason, in the regressions that follow we control for a range of firm-level
characteristics (and as a further step in this direction, we will also report results from a synthetic matching
estimation). In particular, firm size is included as a control because if Geithner had more interaction with
larger firms (Panel B of Table 2.1 indicates that this is the case), then the observed performance of Geithner-
connected firms could be due to their size rather than to their connections. Profitability is also an important
control because it is an indicator of how hard each firm had been hit by the crisis, and it is possible that the
firms that had been hit the hardest had the most to gain from Geithner's appointment. Finally, leverage is
included as an additional indicator of the vulnerability of each firm during the crisis.
Similar considerations suggest that there might be other factors causing correlation of error terms (residual
returns) across firms. Unadjusted OLS standard errors would be biased in this case. To adjust for this
possibility, we estimate adjusted standard errors that account for potential cross-firm correlation of residual
returns. We estimate the covariance matrix of returns using pre-event return data on a window of 250 trading
days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. This estimated covariance matrix is then used to calculate our
standard errors, under the assumption that the pre-event covariance matrix is an appropriate estimate of
the covariance matrix during the event. These adjusted standard errors should account for observed cross-
sectional correlation of returns between firms in our sample (see Greenwood (2005); Becker, Bergstresser,
and Subramanian (2012)). We use these adjusted standard errors throughout the paper unless otherwise
noted.
Table 2.3 reports results of the estimation of equation (2.1). The adjusted standard errors are reported
below coefficients in parentheses. The three measures of Geithner connections (schedule, personal, and New
York) are tested in turn. Although there is no established standard in the literature for the appropriate
length of the event window, we follow the practice of reporting results for shorter event windows (CAR[O]
and CAR[0, 1]) and a longer event window (CAR[0, 10]) for comparison. The first three columns of the table
report results on the full sample with CAR[0] as the dependent variable (correlation with Citigroup occurs
after the first trading day and is thus not a concern when we use CAR[0]). In Column 1 the coefficient
on schedule connections is 0.0025, which is not particularly large economically (it represents an abnormal
return of under 0.3% for each additional connection), but it is statistically significant at the 10% level. The
coefficient for personal connections is not statistically significant, and the coefficient on New York connections
is significant at the 10% level and indicates that firms with New York connections had abnormal returns of
1.4% during the last hour of trading on November 21.5
3 5 Given that the day 0 returns occurred prior to the Citigroup bailout announcement, we do not report results for the base
sample for CAR[O], but for reference the corresponding coefficients in the base sample are generally positive and statistically
insignificant.
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Columns 4 through 6 of Table 2.3 report results for CAR[0, 1] focusing on our base sample.36  The
coefficients on schedule connections and personal connections are both positive and significant at the 1%
level. The magnitude of the coefficient on schedule connections indicates that each additional interaction
between Geithner and a firm during his tenure at the New York Fed is associated with an abnormal return of
1.4% for event days 0 and 1. Likewise, the coefficient on personal connections indicates an abnormal return
of 5.5% for each additional personal connection between Geithner and the firm. The coefficient on New York
connections is not statistically significant.
The last three columns of Table 2.3 report results for the estimation of equation (2.1) with CAR[0, 10]
as the dependent variable. In these three columns the coefficient on Geithner connections is positive and
significant at the 10%, 1% and 1% level respectively. In contrast to the results for CAR[0, 1], here the
coefficients on New York connections are also significant, with the coefficient in Column 9 indicating that
firms headquartered in New York City had abnormal returns of 10.2% relative to non-New York firms. In
summary, Table 2.3 reports economically large and statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns for
Geithner-connected firms following the announcement of his nomination as Treasury Secretary, particularly
for longer event windows.
2.4.2.1 Robustness Checks for OLS Results
We perform additional tests to assess the robustness of our baseline results reported in Table 2.3, and
these are presented in Table 2.4. In this table and in other tables that follow, we suppress reporting
of the coefficients of control variables for brevity, although we always include the control variables (size,
profitability, and leverage) in all specifications. Also in the interest of brevity we do not report results for
New York connections.
We first address the question of whether Geithner-connected firms performed well after the announcement
of his nomination because of their personal connections to Geithner or because they were firms that had
the most to gain from a rebound precipitated by Geithner's appointment. To address this question, we
first posit that firms that had the greatest potential for rebound were those that had the greatest declines
in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. For each firm we calculate
the cumulative abnormal return beginning on the day of Lehman's collapse (a Monday) through the end
of the trading week (Friday). We use this CAR[0, 4] as a proxy for each firm's vulnerability to the crisis
and potential for rebound. As a second variable to control for crisis vulnerability, we control for whether
the firm is a deposit-taking institution, as deposit-taking institutions may have differed in vulnerability to
the crisis from other financial firms. Using Worldscope data, we create a dummy variable equal to one for
firms that have a ratio of deposits to total assets greater than zero. Finally we also control for whether firms
had already received TARP funding prior to the announcement of Geithner's nomination, which can act as
another proxy for the systemic importance of a firm. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4 report results controlling
36 To save space, we do not report results for the full sample for CAR[0, 1] and CAR[0, 10], but for reference the corresponding
coefficients in the full sample are generally stronger than those reported for the base sample.
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for all three of these proxies for crisis vulnerability (coefficients not reported). Columns 1 and 2 show that
the results are similar to our baseline results when controlling for crisis vulnerability, except that the results
for CAR[0, 10] are somewhat weaker (Panel C).
As another robustness check we recalculate abnormal returns using an estimation window that is focused
on the turbulent period surrounding Lehman's collapse. Our intent is to have our measure of expected
returns be based on #'s that reflect the response of each firm to market movements during this particular
period. We calculate abnormal returns as described above, except that the estimation period begins two
weeks prior to the Lehman collapse (Monday, September 1, 2008) and ends three weeks after the Lehman
collapse (Friday, October 3, 2008), when Congress ultimately approved EESA (which included TARP).
Results using this measure of abnormal returns are reported in Columns 3 and 4. The results show that the
coefficients on Geithner connections are significant across all three panels in this specification and are all
larger in magnitude than the coefficients in our baseline results.
Although we control for firm size throughout our analysis, in Columns 5 and 6 we take another approach
to controlling for size by limiting the sample to only the top size decile of sample firms, thereby creating
a subsample that is more homogenous in terms of size. With one exception, the results are statistically
significant across all three panels in this small subsample. In Columns 7 and 8 we exclude firms that the
administration deemed to be of systemic importance, in that they were later included in the government-
administered stress tests. The firms that the government included in the stress tests (i.e., the Supervisory
Capital Assessment Program, SCAP) are those viewed as systemically important by the administration and
thus may have been more likely to have benefited from bailouts similar to the one given to Citigroup or other
policies.3 7 These estimates are significant when we look at the longer-term CARs but not for CAR[0].
In Columns 9 and 10 of Table 2.4 we check for the influence of outliers by excluding firms with extreme
CARs, defined as those larger than the 99th percentile or smaller than the 1st percentile. Panel A shows that
these results are not significant for CAR[0], but in the other two panels the results are robust. In Columns
11 and 12 we add controls for a quartic in firm size. The motivation for this control is to assess if results are
driven especially by very large firms. For completeness, we also include higher-degree powers of profitability
and leverage up to the quartic. The results in Columns 11 and 12 show that the coefficients are statistically
significant in all six cases.
As an additional robustness test, we consider whether the results for the schedule measure of connections
are robust when we calculate the number of connections using only Geithner's appointments from the year
2007. By 2008, the initial stages of the crisis were underway, so Geithner may have had an increased number
of meetings during this time with firms affected by the crisis. Using only 2007 appointments as the schedule
measure of connections puts the focus on pre-crisis relationships. The results using the 2007 measure are
reported in Column 13. The coefficient on schedule connections is significant in two of the three panels,
37 This excludes the following 17 firms from our sample: American Express, Bank of America, BB&T, Bank of New York
Mellon, Capital One, Citigroup, Fifth Third Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase, Key Corp., Morgan Stanley, PNC Fi-
nancial Services, Regions Financial, State Street, SunTrust, U.S. Bancorp, and Wells Fargo. The two other SCAP participants,
GMAC and MetLife, are not part of our sample.
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and in all three panels, the magnitude of the Geithner effect is larger than the comparable coefficient in the
baseline regressions.
To summarize the results of the robustness checks in Table 2.4, the coefficients on Geithner connections
are always positive across the different specifications. The coefficients generally retain statistical significance,
although there are some exceptions. The magnitudes of the coefficients vary but are often larger than those
reported in the corresponding baseline results in Table 2.3. Taken as a whole, Table 2.4 shows that the positive
relation between Geithner connections and abnormal returns surrounding his nomination announcement is
a fairly robust result.38
2.4.3 Synthetic Matching Methodology
The results presented so far - and most event studies of this type - implicitly assume that the differences
between the test group (in this case, Geithner-connected firms) and the control group (in this case, non-
connected firms) can be captured by a combination of the excess return adjustment and the covariates
included in the regression model. But connected and non-connected firms may be different in other ways,
which might be, at least partially, responsible for our results.
To further address these concerns, we turn to the method of synthetic matching developed in Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2009). The main idea of this method is to
construct a synthetic match for each firm in the treatment group (i.e., firms connected to Geithner) by using
the firms in the control group in such a way that the synthetic firm has similar behavior to the actual firm
before the event of interest. The effect of the event can be measured as a function of the difference between
the behavior of the firm and its synthetic match after the event. Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2009)
show that a primary reason to use this method is to control for the effect of unobservable factors that have
an effect on the common time trend of samples in the treatment and control groups.
Most previous papers employ synthetic matching for the case of one entity in the treatment group and one
intervention. Since our sample includes many connected firms we extend this method for the case of many
firms in the treatment group. Inference is based on confidence intervals we construct from the distribution
of the "Geithner effect" for "placebo treatment" groups before Geithner's nomination as we explain below.3 9
More formally, our synthetic matching procedure is as follows. First, we divide the firms into treatment
and control groups according to our measures of connection to Geithner. Then we construct a synthetic
asIn an unreported test, we examine the connections of Henry Paulson, the previous Treasury Secretary, applying the same
method of identifying personal connections. His only identifiable connection on muckety.com is with Goldman Sachs. On the
day of Paulson's announcement (May 30, 2006), Goldman Sachs stock fell by 2.0% (the S&P 500 fell by 1.6% that day), and in
the 10 days following the announcement, Goldman fell by 5.2% (the S&P fell by 3.3%). Clearly this is only one observation,
but Paulson's appointment (during an economic boom) did not appear to have a positive effect on his connections, consistent
with the idea that connections matter more during crisis periods.
39 These intervals are constructed for testing the hypothesis of whether the effect of Geithner connections is zero or not (and
are thus not standard confidence intervals).
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match for each firm in the treatment group by solving the following optimization problem:
Vi E treatment group, {W *}jEControl Group = arg min - Rjt2
{wj}EControf Group jEControl Group
tEEstimation Window
s.t. w. = 1 and Vj E Control Group, Vi E Treatment Group wj > 0
jEControl Group
where Rt is the daily return on date t and wj is the weight of control firm j employed in the optimal
weighting for firm i. It is important that the estimation window not include the period of intervention and
it is typically selected as some period prior to the intervention. As before, we use 250 trading days ending 30
days prior to the Geithner nomination announcement as our estimation window. 40 Imposing the two criteria
(wj = 1, wj 0) means the return for firms in the treatment group belong to convex combinations of
3
returns for firms in the control group.
After finding the optimal weights through iteration for each firm in the treatment group, the return for
the synthetic firm is constructed by:
R = jRj t
jEControl Group
and the abnormal return is computed as the difference between the actual return and the synthetic firm
return (Rt).
To estimate the effect of intervention, we compute
k
ZRi,-Rt=o
ir, k) - iETreatment Group
iETreatment Group
where
[Rit - R~tt]2j tEEstimation Window
Ji=\ T
In the above formula, 0(r, k) is the effect of intervention at date r when we are computing this effect
using cumulative abnormal returns of dates [r, r + k], a'i is a measure of goodness of the match in the
estimation window, and T is the length of the estimation window. Note that this formula for the average
effect of intervention on the treatment group is a weighted average formula which gives more weight to better
matches. This is because the difference between actual returns and synthetic firm returns should contain
more information about the intervention when we are better able to predict the return of the firms during
the estimation window.
4 0We find that the main results are robust to using other estimation windows. The results are somewhat stronger when we
use estimation windows closer to Geithner's nomination starting from September 2008.
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To construct the confidence intervals, we randomly draw 1000 placebo treatment groups from the control
group - with each group having the same size as the real treatment group. We compute the Geithner-
connection effect for these placebo treatment groups on non-event days, and construct the confidence intervals
for hypothesis testing of whether the coefficient is significantly different from zero. The effect of Geithner
connections is significant at 5% if it does not belong to the interval that contains the [2.5, 97.5] percentiles
of the effect of the Geithner connection for placebo treatment groups.4 1
Table 2.5 presents the results from the synthetic matching estimation. Because synthetic matching
requires a dichotomous definition of the treatment group and control group, we also looked at two additional
definitions of connections: "highly connected" firms which are defined as those with more than two identified
meetings with Geithner, and "mildly connected" firms which are those with one or two identified meetings.
Panel A of Table 2.5 presents results for CAR[0], and Columns 1 through 3 present results for all Geithner
connections (highly and mildly connected). Column 1 reports standard OLS results, which differ from those
presented in Tables 3 and 4 for two reasons. First, in order to be comparable to the synthetic matching
results, the connections variable is a dummy (equal to one for firms with any number of connections). Second,
the significance of OLS coefficients is provided as a reference point to the synthetic matching results, and
thus is determined using typical OLS standard errors - whereas in Tables 3 and 4 the standard errors are
adjusted for pre-event correlations between firms. The OLS regressions control for size, profitability, and
leverage as before. Column 1 shows that Geithner connections are associated with an abnormal return of
1.6% for the one-hour return on day 0, and that this coefficient is significant at the 5% level. Below the
coefficient we report the number of significant coefficients obtained at each significance level when we test the
effect of Geithner connections on 100 trading days between October 31, 2008, and April 7, 2009, excluding
key event dates. The number of significant coefficients on non-event days is indicative of the drawback of
using unadjusted OLS standard errors in that the Geithner connections coefficient is significant more often
than would be expected.
Column 2 presents the synthetic matching results as outlined above. The coefficient on Geithner con-
nections is smaller than in the OLS results, and is not found to be statistically significant. The number
of significant coefficients shows that in the non-event-day tests, the Geithner connections coefficient is sig-
nificant with a frequency that is much closer to what would be expected in theory. This makes us more
confident that in the synthetic matching method we are isolating the true effect of Geithner connections
rather than the effect of some other correlation among Geithner-connected firms (which would have led to
more frequent rejections on non-event days).
Column 3 presents "corrected" synthetic matching results in which for our inference procedure we elimi-
nate firms for which we do not have a good synthetic match, defined as the firms in the control group with
41In the synthetic matching approach it is theoretically possible to use another approach to address the confounding effect of
the Citigroup bailout. This could be based on using a convex combination of firms in the control group to replicate the effects
of Citigroup bailout for treatment group firms. For transparency and simplicity, we continue to focus on the base sample (which
excludes the top 10% of Citigroup-correlated firms) in our tests.
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a more than V15 times the average a for the real treatment group firms.42 Although the formula used in
the synthetic matching method already gives greater weight to firms with better matches, we present the
corrected results as a robustness check to ensure that our confidence intervals are appropriate. The corrected
results are similar to the uncorrected results in Column 2. Columns 4 through 6 present a similar set of
results for the "highly connected" indicator, and Columns 7 through 9 for the "mildly connected" indicator.
As would be expected, the results are stronger for highly connected firms. Overall, Panel A suggests that
the effect of Geithner connections on the one-hour day 0 returns is positive but not statistically significant
once the synthetic matching adjustments are made.
Panel B of Table 2.5 repeats the tests of Panel A but for CAR[0, 1]. These tests show a much stronger
effect of Geithner connections, even in the synthetic matching results. Column 2 shows that Geithner
connections are associated with an abnormal return of 5.9%, which, though smaller than the OLS estimate,
is still economically significant and statistically significant at the 1% level. As expected, the results are even
stronger for highly connected firms relative to mildly connected firms.
Finally, Panel C repeats the results for CAR[O, 10]. The coefficients in columns 2 and 3 indicate a
12.4% abnormal return associated with Geithner connections. Once again the matching estimate for highly
connected firms is larger than for mildly connected firms, although the coefficient is significant for highly
connected firms only with the corrected estimates.' Taken as a whole, Panels B and C suggest that
the synthetic matching methodology confirms the presence of a positive and significant effect of Geithner
connections at horizons longer than the one-hour day 0 returns.
2.4.3.1 Robustness Checks for Synthetic Matching
Table 2.6 presents robustness checks for the synthetic matching results, focusing on CAR[0, 1]. In Panel A,
we use the financial crisis estimation window (September 1, 2008 to October 3, 2008) as reported above in
the OLS robustness checks. The main results are similar to those presented in Panel B of Table 2.5. The
primary difference is that the effect is stronger for highly connected firms while it is no longer significant for
mildly connected firms. Panel B uses the personal measure of connections. In these regressions the coefficient
on Geithner connections is significant at standard levels in all cases, except for mildly connected firms.
In Panel C, we use the New York measure of connections to Geithner. Again the results show the
estimated Geithner connection coefficient is statistically significant, although the size of the coefficient is
smaller than with the other measures. This could be due to attenuation bias since having headquarters in
New York is a noisier measure of connections to Geithner. In Panel D we use just information from Geithner's
2007 schedule to create the connections variable (as done in the OLS robustness checks) and find that the
synthetic matching results are robust to this change.
Table 2.7 provides an additional robustness check to determine whether the positive response of Geithner-
4 2 Our results are not sensitive to different cutoffs.
43In Panel C, the Geithner connections coefficient tends to have more significant coefficients in the non-event-day tests,
relative to the shorter-horizon CARs.
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connected firms is due to mean reversion of returns prior to the nomination announcement, perhaps due to
a Citigroup downturn prior to its bailout. We test whether Geithner connections were significant in the days
before the announcement using, in turn, CAR[-1,0] in Panel A, CAR[-5,O] in Panel B, and CAR[-10,0]
in Panel C. In Columns 1 through 3 of Table 2.7 we present results for schedule connections. These columns
show that there is a negative trend for Geithner-connected firms prior to the announcement, but none of the
estimates is statistically significant. In Columns 4 and 5 we present results comparable to Column 1, but for
personal and New York connections. Again, the pre-trend is negative, but not statistically significant except
for CAR[-10, 0] for New York connections.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the pre-trends graphically. Figure 1 shows the Geithner connection coefficient
for 20 trading days prior to the nomination announcement as well as confidence intervals for hypothesis
testing for cumulative abnormal returns of days [x, x + 1] for the base sample. Figure 2.1 shows that the
nomination event stands out as the most significant event during the period. Figure 2.2 is the same as
Figure 2.1 except that it is for highly connected firms in the base sample. Figure 2.2 shows no pre-trend
after exclusion of Citigroup-correlated firms since the Geithner connection coefficient lies inside confidence
intervals before the nomination. These results suggest that the positive reaction of Geithner-connected firms
to the nomination announcement was not just a reversal of previous trends.
2.4.4 CDS Spreads
If the market perceived that benefits would accrue to Geithner-connected firms from his appointment as
Treasury Secretary, then the news of his nomination should have impacted not just stock returns of connected
firms but also the probability of default for connected firms - as reflected in their Credit Default Swap
(CDS) spreads. Specifically, if market participants expected that Geithner could protect connected firms
from bankruptcy or other trigger events, then one would expect CDS spreads on the debt of connected firms
to fall relative to nonconnected firms upon the Geithner nomination announcement.
Because data on CDS spreads are available for relatively few firms, we view CDS spreads as a secondary
measure of firm performance. We obtain CDS data from the data provider Markit for every firm in the
full sample for which Markit has data available. After eliminating three firms which have missing control
variables, we have a sample of 27 firms for our CDS tests. Each firm has multiple CDS listings for various
maturities and contract specifications. For our tests we use CDS contracts of five-year maturities (the most
common tenor) on senior unsecured debt (the most common priority level) with modified restructuring
provisions (the most common provision). Summary statistics for CDS spreads are reported in row 10 of
Table 2.1. At the time of the Geithner nomination announcement, the average spread among sample firms
was 465 basis points, while the median spread was 233 basis points.
Table 2.8 reports estimations of equation (2.1) in which the dependent variable is the percentage change
in the CDS spread rather than the CAR in stock prices. (Summary statistics for CDS spread changes are
reported in rows 11 and 12 of Table 2.1). Panel A reports OLS results, first for the percentage change in
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CDS spreads on day 1, and then for the percentage change in CDS spreads from day 1 to day 10. Results
are not reported for day 0 because of the unavailability of intra-day quotes on CDS spreads. Included
but not reported in the regressions are the same control variables from previous regressions. As in the
CAR results, the standard errors in these regressions are adjusted for pre-event correlations between firms.
Panel A shows that for all three measures of connections the coefficient on Geithner connections is negative
whether Citigroup is included or not and for both return horizons. In the first three columns, the coefficient
is statistically significant. The negative coefficient is as predicted, in that the Geithner nomination is
associated with a reduction in the premium required for insurance on the debt of Geithner-connected firms.
As an example of how to interpret the magnitude of these effects, the coefficient of -0.013 in column 1
indicates that each additional schedule connection is associated with a 1.3% drop in a firm's CDS spread on
day 1. For an average-spread firm with, say, 5 schedule connections, this would indicate a fall of about 33
basis points.
Panel B of Table 2.8 reports synthetic matching results. Again the coefficient on Geithner connections is
negative in all cases, and the coefficients are statistically significant in all but two cases. In some specifications
the estimated effects are particularly large. For example, in Column 9, the coefficient of -0.213 indicates
that New York connections are associated with a 21.3% drop in a firm's CDS spread from day 1 to day 10
(about 107 basis points for an average-spread firm). In short, the results in Table 2.8 are complementary to
the results for stock returns and are broadly supportive of the hypothesis that the market expected benefits
for Geithner-connected firms when the Geithner nomination was announced.
2.5 Reactions of Firms Linked to Other Candidates
The previous section documents the positive reaction of Geithner-connected firms to the announcement of
Geithner's nomination as Treasury Secretary. We also study the reaction of firms linked to other leading
candidates for the position. This is particularly useful as a falsification exercise. If some unobservable
characteristic makes firms both more likely to be connected to Geithner and also more likely to perform well
during our event window, then we might expect the same characteristic to lead to greater connections to
other candidates. If connections to other candidates also matter during the event window, this would be a
rejection of our identifying assumption. Our results in this section do not indicate such a pattern and are
thus reassuring.
After Geithner, the next leading candidates in the week prior to the announcement were Lawrence
Summers, Jon Corzine, Paul Volcker, and Sheila Bair. We follow the procedure discussed above, using
data from Muckety, for determining Geithner personal connections to find personal connections to firms for
Summers, Corzine, Volcker, and Bair. We list the firms connected to the other candidates and the nature of
those connections in Appendix Table 2.13.
In principle, we might expect to see a negative reaction of Summers-connected firms in contrast to
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the positive reaction of Geithner-connected firms when Geithner's nomination was announced. In practice,
however, this prediction is clouded by two factors. First, because Geithner and Summers themselves are
closely connected, and because they have interacted with people in similar circles, there is a great deal of
overlap between Geithner connections and Summers connections. The correlation between Geithner personal
connections and Summers personal connections is 0.92. Second, the day of Geithner's official announcement
as Treasury Secretary did not bring all bad news for Summers, because Barack Obama announced Summers
as his choice as director of the National Economic Council on the same day. It is likely that Summers would
still have been expected to have major influence over economic decisions.
We conduct regressions to test the effect of connections to all candidates on cumulative abnormal returns
following the Geithner announcement." We employ the full sample in these tests in order to retain a
reasonable number of connections to the other candidates (although we continue to exclude Citigroup from
the regressions). Results of these tests are reported in Table 2.9. The first five columns report results with
CAR[0, 1] as the dependent variable. For purposes of comparison, Column 1 reports coefficients for Geithner
connections alone. Column 2 reports the result with the measure of Summers connections included. The
coefficient on Summers connections is smaller than the Geithner coefficient and is not significant, whereas
the coefficient on Geithner connections remains significant at the 1% level. In Columns 3 through 5 we run a
similar regression but test Corzine, Volcker, and Bair connections in turn. The coefficient on connections for
Corzine is positive and slightly larger in magnitude than the coefficient on Geithner connections, suggesting
some positive effect of the announcement on firms connected to Corzine. The coefficient is negative for
the other two candidates, and in all cases, the coefficient on Geithner connections remains positive and
significant.
In the final four columns of Table 2.9 we repeat the same regressions but with the percentage change in
CDS spreads as the dependent variable. The coefficient on Geithner connections is negative and significant
in all cases, again indicating that the market expected benefits for Geithner-connected firms. The coefficients
are positive for the alternative candidates. (Bair has no connections to firms in the CDS sample.) Overall,
Table 2.9 shows that the strong reactions for Geithner-connected firms were not matched by firms connected
to other candidates.
2.6 Geithner's Tax Problems
A secondary event related to Geithner's nomination as Treasury Secretary allows us to further test the
relation between Geithner connections and firm value. On Tuesday, January 13, 2009, the Senate Finance
Committee publicly disclosed that Geithner had failed to pay over $34,000 in taxes while an employee of
the International Monetary Fund. This disclosure cast doubt on whether Geithner would be confirmed by
the Senate. If the market expected Geithner-connected firms to derive value from his position as Treasury
"The synthetic matching approach cannot be used as there are multiple potential effects of this form.
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Secretary, then this event should have been associated with negative stock returns for Geithner-connected
firms relative to non-connected firms.
Event day 0 is defined as January 14, 2009, given that the Senate Finance Committee announcement
was made after the market closing on January 13, 2009. As for the end of the event period, it is impossible
to determine exactly when it became clear to most market participants that Geithner would be confirmed,
despite the tax issue. We examined all articles concerning Geithner and his taxes appearing in The Wall
Street Journal, beginning on January 14. The first article to predict that Geithner would be confirmed
appeared on Wednesday, January 21, or event day 4.4 (The markets were closed on Monday, January 19
for Martin Luther King Day.)
Panel A of Table 2.10 compares actual returns between connected and non-connected firms for event
days 0 through 4 for the base sample. In these tests we alter the base sample to also exclude the top 10%
of firms based on return correlation with Bank of America, as this event occurred shortly after the Bank
of America bailout was announced. Panel A shows that from event day 0 through event day 3, using the
schedule measure of connections, connected firms underperformed non-connected firms by 7.9 percentage
points, a difference that is significant at the 5% level. Results are weaker using the other measures of
connections. Panel A also shows that the fortunes of connected firms reversed on event day 4, as connected
firms outperformed non-connected firms on this day.
Panel B of Table 2.10 compares cumulative abnormal returns between connected firms and non-connected
firms for event days 0 through 4. Cumulative abnormal returns are again calculated as described above. Again
in Panel B the returns are negative for the schedule measure and the personal measure though the differences
are not significant. For the New York measure, the CAR is only negative on day 0. Panels C and D of Table
2.10 repeat the results for the full sample, and the results tend to be stronger in this sample. Panels C and
D both show a pattern of negative and significant returns through day 3 that tend to reverse on day 4. The
pattern of returns demonstrated in Table 2.10 is supportive of the hypothesis that Geithner's tax problems
created a negative shock to Geithner connections, and that concern over the news dissipated after a few
days, particularly on event day 4.
We also estimate the effect of Geithner connections during his tax problems in a regression framework.
Table 2.11 reports results of the estimation of equation (2.1) for the tax event. Panel A of Table 2.11
reports OLS estimates, and Panel B reports synthetic matching estimates. The first six columns of the table
report results with CAR[0, 1] as the dependent variable, and the last six columns report results with with
CAR[0, 3] as the dependent variable. Table 2.11 shows that Geithner connections tend to be associated
with negative returns when Geithner's tax problems were disclosed, though these estimates are less precise
than our main results. In Panel A, the results are mixed, and only Columns 4 and 10 report a significant
negative coefficient on Geithner Connections. In Panel B, the results are also mixed, but more negative and
significant returns are reported. Overall, although the regression results are fairly weak, Tables 10 and 11
4 5Deborah Solomon, "The Inauguration: Tax Issue Won't Derail Geithner," The Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2009, p.
A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123249640035200279.html.
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together are consistent with the hypothesis that connections to Geithner were a source of value for connected
firms. The relatively weak results may just be due to market participants correctly anticipating that these
tax issues would not derail Geithner's nomination.
2.7 After the Announcement
The results above imply that market participants, in aggregate, expected a Geithner Treasury to benefit
financial institutions that had connections to the incoming Secretary. Even without specifying a precise
channel of influence, the finding that people, via the markets, thought that connections to the incoming
Treasury Secretary would pay off in financial terms is itself noteworthy.
There is a further question that still deserves consideration, however: whether the expectations revealed
by this event study were subsequently borne out. It is possible that those expectations were mistaken,
in which case this is a story in which markets do not provide additional information about the future.
Alternatively, it is possible that Secretary Geithner did go on to take actions that benefited certain segments
of the financial sector over others and that the "winners" were more likely than not to be those firms with
which he had preexisting connections.
Unfortunately, this question does not lend itself to a definitive answer. First, it is not always clear who are
the winners and losers in particular policy decisions. Second, even when the beneficiaries can be tentatively
identified, they will rarely be strictly limited to firms with prior connections to Geithner. For illustration,
assume that Citigroup was able to use its superior connections to gain preferential access and nudge the
Treasury Department toward a policy that favored its interests. Such a policy would be likely to also benefit
other financial institutions to the extent that they are similar to Citigroup, regardless of their place in
Geithner's network. At most, then, we can assess Treasury Department policies to see whether they favored
the kinds of institutions with which Geithner had the most contact in the years prior to his nomination. If
so, then the abnormal returns enjoyed by connected firms might have foreshadowed the direction of future
policy.
2.7.1 Hiring
Geithner hired a number of key people from prominent Wall Street firms, including from those with which he
had a strong connection. Mark Patterson, a former Goldman Sachs lobbyist, became his chief of staff. Lee
Sachs, previously with Bear Stearns and Mariner Investment Group, became a senior adviser to Geithner
with responsibility for helping to design financial sector policies. Herb Allison, who was brought in to run
TARP as assistant secretary, was formerly a senior executive at Merrill Lynch and TIAA-CREF. David
Miller, a Goldman Sachs alumnus, became TARP's chief investment officer; as a member of the Paulson
Treasury, he had been involved in the bailouts of late 2008 and early 2009.46
4 6 http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/treasurys-warrior-at-the-negotiating-table/
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Not all of Geithner's staff came from Wall Street, however. For example, Neal Wolin, whose private sector
experience was at The Hartford, an insurance company, became Deputy Treasury Secretary. However, Wolin
had previously worked in the Rubin-Summers Treasury. Geithner hired people from within his personal
network (and that of Robert Rubin).
2.7.2 From Nomination to Confirmation
Geithner's nomination was leaked to the press on November 21, 2008, but he was not confirmed by the Senate
until January 26, 2009. In the interim, he undoubtedly had influence on policymaking within Treasury, both
as president of the New York Fed and the likely incoming Treasury Secretary. This period was marked by
two high-profile interventions: the bailout of Citigroup in late November and the bailout of Bank of America
in January.
These bailouts represented major emergency subsidies from the Treasury Department. In each case, the
bank received additional TARP capital, but the government also agreed to guarantee a pool of assets against
declines in value. These guarantees were effectively a non-transparent and underpriced form of insurance
(compared with what such guarantees would have cost in the free market)."
While the Citigroup bailout (November 2008 edition) was always understood as a means of saving the
bank, it was reported in January 2009 that the Bank of America bailout had been promised in exchange
for the bank agreeing to complete its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, then the third-largest investment bank
on Wall Street. In April 2009, an investigation by New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo further
revealed that then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson had threatened to replace Ken Lewis as CEO of Bank
of America if he refused to complete the Merrill acquisition. These interventions clearly benefited Citigroup,
which otherwise might have failed, and Merrill Lynch, which otherwise would almost certainly have failed.
Whether they benefited Bank of America is another question that is difficult to answer. As losses mounted at
Merrill in December 2008, it may have become rational for Bank of America to walk away from the planned
acquisition; the subsidy provided by the government in the form of the January bailout may or may not
have compensated it for those additional losses. The net effect was to pressure a North Carolina-based retail
bank (with relatively small investment banking operations) to complete its acquisition of a New York-based
investment bank.4
2.7.3 Rescue Programs Under Geithner
The Capital Assistance Program (CAP) was one mechanism for providing capital to banks that needed it.
The terms of CAP were generally favorable to the recipients of capital, but it is not obvious whether the
program was more or less favorable than the Capital Purchase Program that was created by Paulson in
47 As a result, according to the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel, the Citigroup bailout contained an implicit subsidy
percentage of 50%, as compared to a subsidy of 22% in the TARP Capital Purchase Program. Congressional Oversight Panel,
"February Oversight Report: Valuing Treasury's Acquisitions," February 6, 2009, p. 7.
48 According to Bair (2012), Geithner went to bat repeatedly for Citigroup and its shareholders (see Bair (2012), Chapter 10).
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October 2008. Investments under the CAP were in convertible preferred stock, which has the potential to
dilute existing bank shareholders. However, the conversion option was held by the bank, not by Treasury,
essentially giving the bank a valuable option.
At the same time, the CAP was coupled with bank stress tests that were conducted in March and
April 2009 on nineteen major financial institutions. Of the nineteen institutions, ten were found to need
additional capital. The complexity of individual bank balance sheets, and the process by which the test
results were released, left significant room for firm-specific negotiation. At least Citigroup, Bank of America,
PNC Financial, and Wells Fargo negotiated with the government over the final stress test results. According
to The Wall Street Journal, "The Federal Reserve significantly scaled back the size of the capital hole facing
some of the nation's biggest banks shortly before concluding its stress tests, following two weeks of intense
bargaining."50 This created latitude for regulators to take actions that might favor some banks over others. 51
The Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) delivered on the expectation that Geithner would revive
Paulson's original plan to use government money to purchase banks' troubled assets. The PPIP offered non-
recourse government loans and FDIC loan guarantees to private sector investors willing to acquire troubled
assets. This plan effectively provided a subsidy to these investors in order to increase their willingness-to-pay
for the assets and help close the gap that separated bids and asks in the open market. Therefore, the plan
aimed to benefit banks holding large amounts of troubled assets, but it also benefited buy-side institutions
such as hedge funds, private equity firms, and asset management firms that could participate in the program.
According to Neil Barofsky, then Special Inspector General for TARP, "PPIP had been designed by Wall
Street, for Wall Street" - in particular, by BlackRock, the Trust Company of the West Group, and PIMCO.s2
Barofsky was particularly concerned by the opportunities PPIP created for fraud and money laundering.sa
This example shows the potential for well-connected financial institutions to influence government policy at
key moments during the financial crisis.
Following Geithner's confirmation, Treasury engaged in fewer firm-specific interventions than in the
November 2008-January 2009 period. The two big exceptions were the Citigroup bailout on February 27,
2009, and the AIG bailout on March 2, 2009.
In late February 2009, there were signs that Citigroup was facing another wholesale bank run, most
evident in its declining stock price, the falling price of its subordinated bonds, and the rising price of credit
default swap protection on its senior bonds. Geithner's initial proposal was to split Citigroup into a "good
49 "Capital Assistance Program, Summary of Mandatorily Convertible Preferred Stock ('Con-
vertible Preferred') Terms," Treasury Department fact sheet, February 25, 2009, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/tg4Ocaptermsheet.pdf.
soDavid Enrich, Dan Fitzpatrick, and Marshall Eckblad, "Banks Won Concessions on Tests," The Wall Street Journal, May
9, 2009.
5 1For example, the decision to base capital requirements on Tier 1 common capital rather than tangible common equity
affected different banks differently, arguably hurting Wells Fargo the most. Ibid.; Felix Salmon, "Chart of the Day: Common
Capital vs. TCE," Reuters, May 9, 2009.5 2 Barofsky (2012), p. 1 29 .
53"We saw Geithner's Financial Stability Plan for what it was: an unprecedented trillion-dollar playground for fraud and
self-dealing." Barofsky (2012), p. 132. In Barofsky's opinion, Geithner was dismissive of attempts to improve oversight and
compliance of TARP programs. Ibid., p. 113.
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bank" and a "bad bank". According to Sheila Bair, this would have transferred all of the bank's losses
to the FDIC, "without imposing any loss absorption on shareholders and bondholders" and letting "Citi's
private stakeholders take all of the upside" (Bair (2012), p. 167). The government's eventual response was to
engineer a preferred-for-common swap including both the Treasury Department and several large investors in
Citigroup; however, many of the preferred shareholders and subordinated debt investors were not required
to convert their investments into common stock.54 The bank's common stock price fell on the news, so
presumably the market was expecting an even more generous bailout.55
After a disastrous fourth quarter of 2008 that threatened AIG's viability as a going concern, the govern-
ment improved the terms on its existing preferred stock, invested more cash in exchange for more preferred
stock, and improved the terms on AIG's credit line.56 By this point, AIG was largely owned by the U.S.
government, so the bailout was not intended to benefit AIG's shareholders; instead, its goal was to keep AIG
afloat in order to minimize collateral damage to other firms. Because it was still supposedly solvent, AIG
was able to honor its commitments to its counterparties, largely credit default swap protection it had sold
to other financial institutions - most notably (excluding European banks) Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch,
Bank of America, Citigroup, Wachovia, Morgan Stanley, and JPMorgan Chase. Because AIG was able to
make its counterparties whole, these banks - including, after the acquisitions of September-October 2008,
the six largest banks - received more cash than they would have if AIG had failed.57
2.8 Conclusion
The announcement of Timothy Geithner as President-elect Obama's nominee for Treasury Secretary in
November 2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for financial firms with which he had a personal
connection relative to other comparable, non-connected firms. This return, which was about 15 percent
from day 0 through day 10, appears fairly robust. It is present using different measures of connections,
with flexible controls for firm size and other characteristics, and using synthetic matching methodology.
There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected firms when news broke that Geithner's
confirmation might be derailed by tax issues, even though these returns are less precisely estimated.
In our view, these excess returns reflect the market's expectation that, during a period of turbulence
and unusually high policy discretion, the new Treasury Secretary would need to rely on a core group of
employees and a small social network for real-time advice, and that these employees were likely to be hired
""Transaction Outline," Treasury Department fact sheet, February 27, 2009, available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/transaction-outline.pdf. According to Bair, Geithner resisted requiring
any of Citigroup's private stakeholders to convert, against the wishes of the FDIC. Bair (2012), Chapter 15.
55Citigroup (along with GM and AIG) also benefited from "Notices" issued by the Treasury Department allowing the company
to keep the tax benefits provided by its past net operating losses - a policy that has been contested by a number of commentators
and legal scholars. See, for example, Ramseyer and Rasmussen (2011).
56"U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board Announce Participation in AIG Restructuring Plan," Treasury Department press
release, March 2, 2009.57 Goldman Sachs claimed that even if AIG had collapsed, its positions with AIG were fully hedged. Peter Edmonston,
"Goldman Insists It Would Have Lost Little If A.I.G. Had Failed," The New York Times, March 20, 2009. Barofsky argues
that AIG did not need to pay 100 cents on the dollar, but there was no serious attempt to negotiate a reduction in payments
(Barofsky (2012), pp. 186-187.)
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from financial institutions with which Geithner had connections. This is the "social connections meets the
crisis" interpretation.
We lean towards this interpretation because our results cannot be explained by Geithner bringing a
safe pair of hands to the management of the economy or by Geithner and his advisors solely favoring
large, complex Wall Street firms at the expense of other financial institutions. This is because our results
are derived from specifications that control flexibly for firm size. Put differently, they are derived from
differences between connected and non-connected financial institutions of roughly the same size. Consistent
with this interpretation, Geithner's Treasury employed key personnel from financial institutions with which
he was connected, and some of the decisions of his department can be interpreted as being, at the margin,
favorable to connected firms (at least for Citigroup, on which we have the best anecdotal data).
If our interpretation is correct, the benefit to connected firms is temporary - and very much related to
the crisis atmosphere of November 2008. Once policy discretion declines and the speed with which important
decisions have to be taken slows down, these connections should become less important. Whether this is the
case remains an area for further research.
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Figure 2.1: Geithner Connections Coefficient
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Note: This figure shows the time-series plot for November 2008 of the coefficient on Geithner Connections for cumulative abnormal returns measured
over the interval [x, x±1]. Citigroup-correlated firms are excluded. Confidence intervals at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are also presented. November
21, 2008 is the day of the Geitbner nomination announcement.
Figure 2.2: Geithner Connections Coefficient (Highly Connected Firms)
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
The table presents descriptive statistics of firm-level data used in subsequent tables. The sample includes firms listed on NYSE or NASDAQ and
classified as banks or financial services firms in the Datastream database. The base sample excludes firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup.
Schedule connections are the number of times the firm was on Geithner's schedule during 2007-08, when he was president of the New York Fed; personal
connections are as compiled from muckety.com; and New York connections are defined as firms having headquarters in New York City. Size,
profitability, and leverage are from the Worldscope database for the year 2008. CDS spreads are for five-year contracts and are stated in percents.
Panel A: Summary Statistics (Full sample)
Mean Min 25th Pctile Median 75th Pctile Max St. Dev. N
(1) Geithner Connections (Schedule) 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.00 1.74 603
(2) Geithner Connections (Personal) 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.00 0.60 603
(3) Geithner Connection (New York) 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0 .26 603
(4) Size (Log of Total Assets) 2t.33 16.32 20.23 21.03 22.10 28.41 132 596
(5) Profitability (ROE) -0.05 -3.62 -0.06 0.04 0.09 0.82 0.35 585
(6) Leverage (Total Debt/Total Capital) 0.57 0.00 0.43 0.61 0.71 3.10 0.27 592
(7) CAR[0] -0.02 -0.24 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.35 0.06 603
(8) CAR[0,1] -0.02 -0.46 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 0.48 0.11 603
(9) CAR[0,10] 0.02 -0.69 -0.10 -0.02 0.09 1.38 0.21 603
(10) CDS Spread, Day 1 4.65 0.23 16 2.33 5.32 29.29 6.15 30
(11) % Change in CDS Spread[1] -0.04 -0.49 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10 30
(12) % Change in CDS Spread[1,10] -0.06 -0.49 -0.12 -0.04 0.00 0.15 0.13 30
Panel B: Geithner Connected vs. Non-connected (Full sample)
Schedule Non Diff. Personal Non Diff. New York Non Diff.
(13) Size (Log of Total Assets) 24.40 21.20 3.20*** 25.00 21.20 3.80*** 21.78 21.30 0.48*
(14) Profitability (ROE) 0.04 -0.06 0.10 -0.15 -0.05 -0.10 -0.17 -0.04 -0.13**
(15) Leverage (Total Debt/Total Capital) 0.73 0.56 0.17*** 0.60 0.56 0.04 0.57 0.56 0.00
(16) Number of obseravations in full sample 25 578 21 582 45 558
Panel C: Geithner Connected vs. Non-connected (Base sample)
Schedule Non Diff. Personal Non Diff. New York Non Diff.
(17) Size (Log of Total Assets) 23.13 20.98 2.16*** 23.17 21.00 2.17*** 20.95 21.04 -0.09
(18) Profitability (ROE) 0.06 -0.07 0.13 -0.42 -0.06 -0.36*** -0.20 -0.05 -0.14**
(19) Leverage (Total Debt/Total Capital) 0.71 0.56 0.15** 0.52 0.57 -0.05 0.54 0.57 -0.03
(20) Number of observations in base sample 15 530 9 536 38 507
PanelDO: Correlation Coefficients (Full sample)
Schedule Personal New York Size Profitability Leverage
(21) Geithner Connections (Schedule) 1.00
(22) Geithner Connections (Personal) 0.86 1.00
(23) Geithner Connection (New York) 0.35 0.39 1.00
(24) Size (Log of Total Assets) 0.35 0.37 0.10 1.00
(25) Profitability (ROE) 0.00 -0.03 -0.11 0.05 1.00
(26) Leverage (Total Debt/Total Capital) 0.04 0.06 -0.15 0.28 -0.16 1.00
0
Table 2.2: Connections to Geithner and Stock Price Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement
The table presents returns of stocks of financial firms around the announcementof Barack Obama's nomination of Timothy Geithner as treasury secretary.
Event day 0 is defmedas November 21, 2008, when the pending announcementwas leaked late in the trading day, and returns on that day are measured from
3pm to market closing. The announcement was officially made on event day 1. Panels A and C present actual returns while Panels B and D present
cumulative abnormal returns. The base sample excludes firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup. Abnormalreturns are calculated using the market
model with an estimation window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. Schedule connections indicate that the firm was on Geithner's
schedule during his tenure as president of the New York Fed, personal connections are as compiled from mucketycom,and New York connections are
defined as firms having headquarters in New York City. Asterisks denote significance level of a two-tailed t-test (***=I%, **=5%, *=10%)
PanelA: Actual Retuns (Base sample)
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference
0 11/21/2008 0.086 0.042 0.043 ** 0.075 0.043 0.033 0.085 0.040 0.044 ***
1 11/24/2008 0.130 0.046 0.084 *** 0.143 0.047 0.096 *** 0.078 0.046 0.031 *
2 11/25/2008 0.026 0.015 0.011 0.057 0.014 0.043 0.032 0.014 0.018
3 11/26/2008 0.112 0.041 0.071 *** 0.112 0.042 0.071 ** 0.087 0.040 0.048 ***
4 11/28/2008 0.056 0.018 0.038 * 0.085 0.018 0.067 ** 0.016 0.019 -0.003
5 12/1/2008 -0.131 -0.076 -0.056 ** -0.144 -0.076 -0.067 ** -0.105 -0.075 -0.030 *
6 12/2/2008 0.046 0.043 0.003 0.044 0.043 0.001 0.090 0.040 0.050 ***
7 12/3/2008 0.034 0.018 0.016 0.043 0.018 0.024 0.031 0.018 0.013
8 12/4/2008 -0.009 -0.013 0.005 0.005 -0.014 0.019 -0.020 -0.013 -0.008
9 12/5/2008 0.063 0.024 0.038 ** 0.042 0.025 0.017 0.050 0.024 0.026 **
10 12/8/2008 0,064 0.027 0.037 0.072 0.028 0.045 ** 0.050 0.027 0.023
0-10 (Cumulative) 0.551 0.180 0.372 *** 0.645 0.183 0.463 *** 0.468 0.169 0.299 ***
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Base sample)
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference
0 11/21/2008 -0.013 -0.015 0.001 -0.034 -0.014 -0.020 -0.005 -0.015 0.011
1 11/24/2008 0.024 -0.022 0.046 0.005 -0.021 0.026 -0.011 -0.021 0.010
2 11/25/2008 0.039 -0.013 0.052 0.052 -0.012 0.064 0.012 -0.013 0.025
3 11/26/2008 0.099 -0.001 0.101 ** 0.107 0.000 0.108 * 0.053 -0.002 0.055 *
4 11/28/2008 0.141 0.009 0.132 *** 0.177 0.009 0.167 * 0.056 0.009 0.048
5 12/1/2008 0.136 0.006 0.129 ** 0.175 0.007 0.168 *** 0.067 0.006 0.061 **
6 12/2/2008 0.124 0.017 0.107 ** 0.156 0.017 0.138 ** 0.105 0.013 0.092 ***
7 12/3/2008 0.120 0.013 0.107 ** 0.156 0.014 0.142 ** 0.101 0.010 0.091 ***
8 12/4/2008 0.152 0.024 0.129 ** 0 208 0.024 0.184 *** 0.118 0.021 0.098 *
9 12/5/2008 0.162 0.018 0.144 *** 0.192 0.019 0.172 *** 0.121 0.015 0.106 ***
10 12/8/2008 0.171 0.014 0.157 *** 0.173 0.015 0.158 ** 0.120 0.010 0.110 *
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Table 2.2: continued
Panel C: Actual Returns (Full sample)
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference
0 11/21/2008 0.093 0.047 0.046 *** 0.096 0.047 0.049 *** 0.089 0.046 0.043 ***
1 11/24/2008 0.165 0.054 0.111 *** 0.185 0.054 0.131 *** 0.107 0.055 0.052 *
2 11/25/2008 0.032 0.015 0.017 0.047 0.015 0.032 0.033 0.014 0.019
3 11/26/2008 0.087 0.042 0.045 ** 0.076 0.043 0.034 0.085 0.040 0.045 ***
4 11/28/2008 0.051 0.018 0.033 ** 0.054 0.018 0.036 ** 0.021 0.019 0.002
5 12/1/2008 -0.151 -0.083 -0.068 *** -0.165 -0.083 -0.082 *** -0.118 -0.083 -0.034 **
6 12/2/2008 0.054 0.046 0.008 0.058 0.046 0.012 0.086 0.043 0.043 ***
7 12/3/2008 0.045 0.020 0.024 0.056 0.020 0.036 ** 0.035 0.020 0.015
8 12/4/2008 -0.009 -0.014 0.005 -0.003 -0.015 0.011 -0.021 -0.014 -0.008
9 12/5/2008 0.060 0.029 0.031 ** 0.056 0.029 0.027 * 0.054 0.028 0.026 **
10 12/8/2008 0.073 0.027 0.046 ** 0.072 0.028 0.045 ** 0.057 0.027 0.030 **
0-10 (Cumulative) 0.584 0.197 0.387 *** 0.646 0.197 0.448 *** 0.512 0.189 0.323 ***
Panel D: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Full sample)
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference
0 11/21/2008 -0.016 -0.015 0.000 -0.025 -0.015 -0.010 -0.007 -0.016 0.009
1 11/24/2008 0.046 -0.020 0.066 *** 0.046 -0.020 0.065 *** 0.010 -0.020 0.029 *
2 11/25/2008 0.067 -0.011 0.079 *** 0.080 0.011 0.069 *** 0.033 -0.011 0.045 **
3 11/26/2008 0.097 -0.002 0.099 *** 0.093 -0.001 0.094 *** 0.069 -0.003 0.072 ***
4 11/28/2008 0.131 0.007 0.124 *** 0.130 0.008 0.121 *** 0.076 0.007 0.069 **
5 12/1/2008 0.120 0.005 0.115 *** 0.120 0.005 0.115 *** 0.083 0.003 0.079 ***
6 12/2/2008 0.110 0.014 0.096 *** 0.107 0.015 0.092 ** 0.113 0.010 0.103 *
7 12/3/2008 0.112 0.010 0.102 *** 0.116 0.011 0.105 ** 0.111 0.007 0.104 *
8 12/4/2008 0.149 0.022 0.126 *** 0.163 0.023 0.140 *** 0.130 0.019 0.111 *
9 12/5/2008 0.150 0.018 0.132 *** 0.154 0.018 0.135 *** 0.133 0.014 0.119 ***
10 12/8/2008 0.161 0.010 0.151 *** 0.157 0.011 0.147 *** 0.136 0.006 0.129 *
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Table 2.3: Connections to Geithner and Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement, OLS Regression Results
The table reports coefficient estimates of regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the announcement of Geithner as treasury secretary on
measures of connections to Geithner and control variables. Event day 0 is defmed as November21, 2008, when the pending announcementwas leaked late in the trading
day, and returns on that day are measured from 3pm to market closing. The announcementwas officially made on event day 1. The CAR is measured as day 0 only,
from day 0 to day 1, or from day 0 to day 10, as indicated. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation window of 250 trading days
ending 30 days prior to event day 0. The base sample excludes firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup. Schedule connectionsare the number of times the firm
was on Geithnef s schedule during 2007-08, when he was president of the New York Fed; personal connections are as compiled from muckety.com; and New York
connections are defined as firms having headquarters in New York City. Basic control variables are measured as of year-end 2008: size is the log of total assets,
profitability is return on equity, and leverage is total debt to total capital. Robust standard errors, adjusted for pre-event correlations between firms, are below
coefficients in parentheses, and asterisks denote significance levels (***1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable is CAR [0] Dependent variable is CAR [0,1] Dependent variable is CAR [0,10]
(Full sample) (Base sample) (Base sample)
Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York
Geithner Connections 0.0025 * 0,0057 0.0141 * 0.014 *** 0.055 *** 0.012 0.016 * 0.074 *** 0.102 ***
(0.0013) (0.0040) (0.0081) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.026) (0.029)
Size -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.006 *** -0.006 *** -0.004 *** -0.017 *** -0.017 *** -0.016 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Profitability 0.022 *** 0.022 *** 0.023 *** 0.043 *** 0.048 *** 0.044 *** -0.048 *** -0.042 *** -0.036 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004)
Leverage -0.005 *** -0.006 *** -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.006 * -0.048 *** -0.045 *** -0.029 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
Number of firms 583 583 583 525 525 525 525 525 525
R-squared 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.031 0.037 0.023 0.024 0.027 0.034
0
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Table 2.4: Connections to Geithner and Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement, OLS Robustness Checks
The table reports coefficient estimates of regressions of cumulativeabnormal returns (CARs) surroundingthe announcementof Geithner as treasury secretary on measures of connectionsto Geithnerand control
variables. Event day 0 is defined as November 21, 2008, when the pending announcementwas leaked late in the trading day, and returns on that day are measured from 3pm to market closing. The
announcement was officially made on event day 1. The CAR is measured as day 0 only, from day 0 to day 1, or from day 0 to day 10, as indicated. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model
with an estimation window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. The base sample excludes firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup. Schedule connectionsare the numberof times
the firm was on Geithner's schedule during 2007-08 (only 2007 in column 13), when he was president of the New York Fed; personal connectionsare as compiled from muckety.com. Also included in the
regressions but not reported are control variables measured as of year-end2008: size is the log of total assets, profitabilityis return on equity, and leverage is total debt to total capital. "Systemic importance"
firms are those that were later evaluated in government-administeredstress tests, In Columns I and 2 other controls (not reported) include the CAR[0,4] for the firn subsequent to the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, a dummyvariable equal to one if the firm takes deposits, and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm had accepted TARP funding as of Geithner'snominationannouncement. In Columns3 and 4,
the estimation window is a five-week window surrounding the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. In Columns 11 and 12, powers of the basic control variables (size, profitability, and
leverage, up to the fourth power) are also included but not reported. Robust standard errors, adjusted for pre-event correlations between firms, are below coefficients in parentheses, and asterisks denote
significance levels (***=1% **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Controlfor crisis Lehman collapse Exclude "systemic Exclude extreme C ARs Include powers of control 2007 appts
vulnerability estimation beta Top size decile only importance"firms (%/99%) variables only
Schedule Personal Schedule Personal Schedule Personal Schedule Personal Schedule Personal Schedule Personal Schedule
Panel A: Dependent variable is CAR [O (Full sample)
Geithner Connections 0.0023 ** 0.0051 * 0,0025 * 0.0075 * 0.0031 *** 0,0071 ** 0.0035 0.0036 0.0021 0.0046 0,0032 *** 0.0068 ** 0,0033 *
(0.0010) (0.0031) (0.0013) (0.0040) (0.0009) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0072) (0.0013) (0.0040) (0.0009) (0.0032) (0.0019)
Number of firms 576 576 583 583 58 58 566 566 571 571 583 583 583
R-squared 0.030 0.028 0.050 0.050 0.225 0.154 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.024 0.043 0.041 0.028
Panel B: Dependent variable is CAR [0,1 f (Base sample)
Geithner Connections 0.012 *** 0.054 *** 0.015 *** 0.069 *** 0.012 *** 0.046 *** 0.013 *** 0.056 ** 0.012 * 0.052 *** 0.012 ** 0.047 * 0.035 ***
(0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Number of firms 518 518 525 525 52 52 523 523 517 517 525 525 525
R-squared 0.037 0.044 0.038 0.047 0.068 0.104 0.029 0.039 0.043 0.051 0.048 0.052 0.038
Panel C: Dependent variable is CAR [0,10] (Base sample)
Geithner Connections 0.006 0.042 * 0.029 *** 0.128 *** 0.011 0.109 *** 0.020 ** 0.074 *** 0.016 * 0.076 *** 0.011 * 0.064 ** 0.016
(0.006) (0.023) (0.009) (0.026) (0.006) (0.024) (0.008) (0.027) (0.009) (0.026) (0.006) (0.007) (0.016)
Number of firms 518 518 525 525 52 52 523 523 516 516 525 525 525
R-squared 0.086 0.087 0.054 0.060 0.034 0.146 0.025 0.028 0.020 0.026 0.080 0.083 0.022
I-L
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Table 2.5: Connections to Geithner and Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement, Synthetic Matching Estimation
The table reports coefficient estimates of regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the announcement of Geithner as treasury secretary on measures of
connections to Geithner and control variables. Standard OLS estimates (without standard error adjustments) as well as synthetic matching estimates are reported. Event day 0 is
defined as November 21, 2008, when the pending announcement was leaked late in the trading day, and returns on that day are measured from 3pm to market closing. The
announcement was officially made on event day 1. The CAR is ineasured for day 0 only in Panel A, from day 0 to day t in Panel B, and from day 0 to day 10 in Panel C. Abnormal
returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. The base sample excludes firms with returns
highly correlated to Citigroup. "Geithner Connections" is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was on Geithner's schedule during 2007-08, when he was president of the New
York Fed. "Highly connected" indicates more than two meetings with Geithner, and "Mildly connected" indicates one or two meetings. Basic control variables (not reported) are
measured as ofycar-end 2008: size is the log of total assets, profitabilityis return on equity, and leverage is total debt to total capital. For matching estimators, the matching window
is the 250 days ending 30 days before the Geithner nomination announcement. Confidence intervals in columns for matching estimators are computed according to a placebo
exercise (5,000 simulations) of finding Geithner coefficients for non-connected firms. The number of times in which the Geithner coefficient is significant for a test window are also
reported (based on 100 trading days from 10/31/08 through 4/7/09, with key event dates excluded). Asterisks denote significance levels (***=I%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All Geithner connections Highly connected Mildly connected
OLS Matching Corrected OLS Matching Corrected OLS Matching Corrected
Panel A Dependent variable is CAR [01 (Full sample)
Geithner Connections 0.016 ** 0.004 0.001 0.024 ** 0.010 0.004 0.011 *0 0.000 0.000
Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.032 -0.029 -0.044 -0.046 -0.036 -0.036
Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.013 0,011 0.025 0.025 0.021 0.018
Number of sigicoefficients (10%1 40 7 8 37 11 11 30 0 2
Number of sig. coefficients (5%) 35 4 4 30 6 4 22 0 1
Number ofsig. coefficients (1%) 16 0 0 14 1 0 10 0 0
Number of firms 583 583 469 583 583 469 574 574 460
Number in treatment group 22 22 21 9 9 8 13 13 13
Panel B: Dependent variable is CAR 0,1] (Base sample)
Geithner Connections 0.073 *** 0.059 *** 0.059 *** 0.171 *** 0.153 ** 0.153 *** 0.041 4" 0.033 * 0.033 *
Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.074 -0.072 -0.133 -0.125 -0.083 -0.077
Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.030 0.026 0.107 0.080 0.039 0.037
Number ofsig.coefficients (10%) 23 13 17 12 4 7 23 8 13
Number ofsig.coefficients (5%) 12 5 9 7 0 3 16 1 3
Number ofsig. coefficients (1%) 7 0 1 6 0 0 10 0 1
Number of firms 525 525 443 525 525 455 522 522 436
Number in treatment group 12 12 12 3 3 3 9 9 9
Panel C: Dependent variable is CAR [0,10] (Base sample)
Geithner Connections 0.138 *** 0;124 ** 0.124 *** 0.130 0.151 0.151 * 0.136 *** 0.117 4" 0.117 4"
Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.110 -0.103 -0.198 -0.180 -0.115 -0.105
Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.089 0.072 0.229 0.181 0.099 0.093
Nunberofsig.coefficients (10%) 35 21 32 11 13 19 46 15 19
Number of sig. coefficients (5%) 29 13 14 8 8 11 40 5 6
Number of sig. coefficients (1%) 10 3 3 2 1 1 26 0 1
Number of firms 525 525 443 525 525 455 522 522 436
Number in treatment group 12 12 12 3 3 3 9 9 9
to
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Table 2.6: Connections to Geithner and Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement, Synthetic Matching Estimation - Robustness Checks
The table reports coefficient estimates of regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the announcement of Geithner as treasury secretary on measures of
connections to Geithner and control variables. OLS estimates as well as synthetic matching estimates are reported. Event day 0 is defined as November21, 2008, and returns on that
day are measured from 3pm to market closing. The announcement was officiallymade on event day 1. In all panels the dependent variableis CAR[0,1], and the base sample (excluding
firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup) is used. In Panel A, the estimation window is the most severe phase of financial crisis, from September 2008 through mid-October
2008, "Geithner Connections" is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was on Geithner's schedule during 2007-08, when he was president of the New York Fed. "Highly
connected" indicates more than two meetings with Geithner, and "Mildly connected" indicates one or two meetings. In Panel B, personal connections are as compiled from
muckety.com, and highly connected means having more than one connection with Geithner while mildlyconnected means having one connection. In Panel C, New York connections
are defined as having headquarters in New York. In Panel D, only schedule connections from 2007 are counted as connections. For OLS results basic controlvariables (not reported)
are measured as of year-end 2008: size is the log of total assets, profitabilityis return on equity, and leverage is total debt to total capital. Formatching estimatorsthe matching window
is the 250 days ending 30 days before the Geithner nomination announcement. Confidence intervals for hypothesis testing of the effect of Geithner connections being equal to zero are
computed according to 1,000 placebo simulations. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=I%, **=5%, *=10%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Al! Geithner connections Highly connected Mildly connected
OLS Matching Corrected OLS Matching Corrected OLS Matching Corrected
Dependent variable is CAR [0, ]
Panel A: Financial Crisis estimation window, Schedule connections
Geithner Connections 0.073 * 0.071 * 0.071 * 0.171 0,181 0.181 ** 0.041 ** 0.042 0.042
Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.065 -0.067 -0.121 -0.127 -0.079 -0.075
Confidence interval.(97.5%) 0.053 0.053 0.114 0.139 0.079 0.061
Number of firms 525 525 479 525 525 492 522 522 478
Number in treatment group 12 12 12 3 3 3 9 9 9
Panel B: Personal connections
Geithner Connections 0.067 *** 0.030 * 0.030 * 0.115 *** 0.096 ** 0.096 ** 0.038 -0.009 -0.009
Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.086 -0.077 -0.121 -0.133 -0.107 -0.098
Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.039 0.047 0.096 0.095 0.070 0.065
Number of firms 525 525 501 525 525 511 522 525 493
Number in treatment group 8 8 8 3 3 3 5 5 5
Panel C: New York connections
Geithner Connections 0.013 0.010 ** 0.010 ***
Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.053 -0.053
Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.007 0.005
Number of'firms 525 525 508
Number in treatment group 34 34 34
PanetD: 2007 Schedule
Geithner Connections 0.063 0.058 * 0.058 * 0.050 0.120 * 0.120 ** 0.074 ** -0.001 -0.009
Confidence interval(2.5%) -0.098 -0.094 -0.123 -0.124 -0.131 -0.098
Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.052 0.043 0.099 0.079 0.094 0.065
Number of firms 525 525 392 525 525 398 522 522 493
Number in treatment group 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 3 3
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Table 2.7: Connections to Geithner and Returns Prior to Treasury Secretary Announcement
The table reports coefficient estimates of regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) prior to the
announcement of Geithner as treasury secretary on measures of connections to Geithner and control variables.
Synthetic matching estimates are reported. Event day 0 is defined as November 21, 2008, when the pending
announcementwas leaked late in the trading day, and returns on that day are measured from the market opening
to 3pm. The CAR is measured from event day -1 to event day 0, day -5 to day 0, or day-10 to day 0 as
indicated. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation window of 250 trading
days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. The base sample excludes firms with returns highly correlated to
Citigroup. Schedule connections indicate whether the firm was on Geithner's schedule during 2007-08, when he
was president of the New York Fed; personal connections are as compiled from muckety.com; and New York
connections are defined as firms having headquarters in New York City. "Highly connected" indicates more
than two meetings with Geithner, and "Mildly connected" indicates one or two meetings. The 95% confidence
interval (generated from 5,000 simulations) is reported. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%,
*=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Conn. Highly Conn. Mildly Conn. All Conn.
Schedule Personal New York
Panel A: Dependent variable is CAR[-l,O]
Geithner Connections -0.016 -0.039 -0.010 -0.015 -0.015
Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.050 -0.118 -0.061 -0.067 -0.029
Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.044 0.101 0.051 0.052 0.024
Number of firms 525 525 522 525 525
Number in treatment group 12 3 9 8 34
Panel B: Dependent variable is CAR[-5,O]
Geithner Connections -0.052 -0.049 -0.053 -0.034 -0.0155
Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.064 -0.186 -0.079 -0.086 -0.0279
Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.079 0.148 0.084 0.086 0.0511
Number of firms 525 525 522 525 525
Number in treatment group 12 3 9 8 34
Panel C: Dependent variable is CAR[-10,O]
Geithner Connections -0.064 -0.027 -0.075 -0.080 -0.045 *
Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.097 -0.238 -0.111 -0.121 -0.047
Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.087 0.172 0.103 0.103 0.054
Number of fins 525 525 522 525 525
Number in treatment group 12 3 9 8 34
108
Table 2.8: Connections to Geithner and Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement, CDS Spreads
The table reports coefficient estimates of regressions of percent changes in CDS spreads surrounding the announcement of Geithner as treasury secretary on measures of connections to Geithner and control variables.
CDS spreads are on 5-year $US-denominated contracts. Event day 0 is defined as November 21, 2008, when the pending announcement was leaked late in the trading day, but due to a lack of liquidity and a lack of
intraday quotes, the changes are measured beginning on day 1, when the announcement was officially made. The % change in CDS spread is measured as day I only, or from day I to day 10, as indicated. Schedule
connections are the number of times the firm was on Geithner's schedule during 2007-08, when he was president of the New York Fed; personal connections are as compiled from muckety.com; and New York
connections are defined as firms having headquarters in New York City. For OLS results basic control variables (not reported) are measured as of year-end 2008: sit is the log of total assets, profitability is return
on equity, and leverage is total debt to tote capital For matching estimatom the matching window is the 100 days ending 30 days before the Geithner nomination announcernent Robust standard errors, adjusted for
pre-event correlations between firms, are below coefficients in parentheses, and asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **5%, *10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: OLS estimates
Dependent variable is % change in CDS spread [1] Dependent variable is % change in CDS spread [1, 10]
Ciigroup included Citigroup excluded Citigroup included Citigroup excluded
Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York
Geithner Connections 0.013 *** -0.037 *** -0.127 * -0.009 -0.020 -0,073 -0,012 -0.037 -0.226 .0.010 -0.025 -0.189
(0.003) (0.010) (0.056) (0.006) (0.013) (0.058) (0.009) (0.035) (0.054) (0.023) (0.013) (0.189)
Number of firms 27 27 27 26 26 26 27 27 27 26 26 26
R-squared 0.917 0.776 0.512 0.683 0.774 0.627 0.541 0.526 0.605 0.274 0.321 0.530
Panel B. Synthetic matching estimates
Dependent variable is % change in CDS spread [1] Dependent variable is % change in CDS spread [1,10]
Citigroup included Ciligroup excluded Citigroup included Citigroup excluded
Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York
Geithner Connections -0.090 *** -0.024 ** -0.115 ** -0.036 *** -0.004 ** -0.046 ** -0.043 -0.122 *** -0.213 * 0.015 -0.100 *** -0.158 *
Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.010 -0.001 -0.012 -0.012 -0.001 -0.020 -0.064 -0.021 -0.069 -0.072 -0.023 -0.071
Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.013 0.000 0.010 0.026 0.000 0.042 0.043 0.001 0.065
Number of firms 27 27 27 26 26 26 27 27 27 26 26 26
Number in treatment group 7 11 6 6 10 5 7 11 6 6 10 5
Table 2.9: Connections to Other Teasury Secretary Candidates and Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement
The table reports coefficient estimates of regressions of cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) and percent changes in CDS spreads surrounding the announcement
of Geithner as treasury secretary on measures of connectionsto treasury secretary candidates and control variables. Estimates for the full sample (excluding Citigroup in
CAR results) are reported. Event day 0 is defined as November21, 2008, when the pending announcementwas leaked late in the trading day, and stock returns on that
day are measured from 3pm to market closing. The announcement was officially made on event day 1. In Columns 1 to 5, the CAR is measured from day 0 to day 1,
and in Columns 6 to 9, the percent change in CDS spreads are measured for day 1. Abnormal stock returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation
window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. Connections are the number of connectionsto each firm for Geithneror other candidates as compiled
from muckcty.com. Control variables (includedbut not reportcd) arcmeasured as of year-end 2008: size is the log of total assets, profitability is return on equity, and
leverage is total debt to total capital. Robust standard errors, adjusted for pre-event correlations between firms, are below coefficients in parentheses. Asterisks denote
significance levels (***-%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable is CAR [0,1] Dependent variable is% change in CDS spread[I]
Gcithner Connections 0.030 *** 0.026 *** 0,026 *** 0.034 *** 0.030 * -0.037 *** -0.045 * -0.047 * -0.061 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Summers Connections 0.006 0.015
(0.013) (0.015)
Corzine Connections 0.028 * 0.090 ***
(0.017) (0.028)
Voicker'Connections -0.006 0.047 ***
(0.013) (0.016)
Bair Connections -0.040
(0.034)
Number of firms 582 582 582 582 582 27 27 27 27
R-squared 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.774 0.781 0.849 0.850
Table 2.10: Connections to Geithner and Stock Price Reactions to Tax Problems
The table presents returns of stocks of financial firms around the announcement of Timothy Geithner's tax errors and delayed confirmation hearing. Event day
0 is defined as January 14, 2009; the tax problems were disclosed by the Senate Finance Committee on January 13, 2009 after the market closed on that day.
The base sample excludes firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup or Bank of America. Panels A and C present actual returns and Panels B and D
present cumulative abnormal returns, Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation window of 250 trading days ending 30 days
prior to Event Day 0. Schedule connections indicate that the firm was on Geithner's schedule during his tenure as president of the New York Fed, personal
connections are as compiled from muckety.com, and New York connections are defined as firms having headquarters in New York City. Asterisks denote
significance level of a two-tailed t-test (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
Panel A: Actual Returns, Base samle
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference
0 1/14/2009 -0.054 -0.029 -0.025 -0.053 -0.029 -0.024 -0.054 -0.028 -0.027 **
1 1/15/2009 -0.008 0.000 -0.009 -0.024 0.001 -0.025 0.020 -0.001 0.021 **
2 1/16/2009 0.005 -0.002 0.007 -0.011 -0.002 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
3 1/19/2009 -0.119 -0.061 -0.058 ** -0.070 -0.062 -0.009 -0.076 -0.061 -0.015
0-3 (Cumulative) -0.169 -0.090 -0.079 -0.145 -0.091 -0.054 -0.110 -0.090 -0.020
4 1/20/2009 0.071 0.039 0.032 0.101 0.038 0.062 ** 0.085 0.036 0049 ***
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Base sample
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference
0 1/14/2009 -0.014 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 -0.018 -0.006 -0.012
1 1/15/2009 -0.024 -0.007 -0.018 -0.034 -0.007 -0.028 0.000 -0.008 0.008
2 1/16/2009 -0.029 -0.014 -0.015 -0.056 -0.014 -0.042 -0.010 -0.015 0.005
3 1/19/2009 -0.085 -0.039 -0.046 -0.056 -0.040 -0.016 -0.028 -0.041 0.013
4 1/20/2009 -0.066 -0.030 -0.037 -0.014 -0.031 0.017 0.009 -0.034 0.043 **
Panel C. Actual Returns, Full sample
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference
0 1/14/2009 -0.058 -0.032 -0.026 ** -0.063 -0.032 -0.031 ** -0.059 -0.031 -0.028 ***
1 1/15/2009 -0.026 -0.003 -0.023 * -0.051 -0.003 -0.048 *** 0.007 -0.005 0.012
2 1/16/2009 -0.011 -0.003 -0.009 -0.031 -0.002 -0.029 ** -0.006 -0.003 -0.003
3 1/19/2009 -0.145 -0.066 -0.078 *** -0.132 -0.067 -0.065 *** -0.091 -0.068 -0.023 *
0-3 (Cumulative) -0.217 -0.101 -0.116 *** -0.243 -0.101 -0.142 *** -0.140 -0.103 -0.037 *
4 1/20/2009 0.130 0.043 0.087 *** 0.148 0.043 0.105 *** 0.104 0.042 0.063 ***
Panel D. Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Full sample
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Conn. Non-Conn. Difference Con. Non-Conn. Difference
0 1/14/2009 -0.013 -0.007 -0.006 -0.015 -0.007 -0.008 -0.018 -0.006 -0.012
1 1/15/2009 -0.041 -0.011 -0.030 * -0.068 -0.010 -0.058 *** -0.013 -0.012 -0.001
2 1/16/2009 -0.064 -0.020 -0.044 ** -0.111 -0.018 -0.093 *** -0.028 -0.021 -0.007
3 1/19/2009 -0.137 -0.047 -0.091 *** -0.166 -0.046 -0.120 *** -0.055 -0.050 -0.005
4 1/20/2009 -0.067 -0.037 -0.031 -0.083 -0.006 -0.077 * -0.004 -0.041 0.037 **
I-L
Table 2.11: Connections to Geithner and Reactions to Tax Problems, Regression Results
The table reports coefficient estimates of regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the announcement of Gcithncr's tax problems on measures of connections to Gcithner and
control variables. OLS estimates (Panel A) and synthetic matching estimates (Panel 13) are reported. Event day 0 is defined as January 14, 2009; the tax problems were disclosed by the Senate
Finance Committee on January 13, 2009 after the market closed on that day. The base sample excludes firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup or Bank of America. In Columns ito 6, the
CAR is measured from day 0 to day 1, and in Columns 7 to 12, the CAR is measured from day O to day 3. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation window of250
trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. Schedule connections are the number of times the firm was on Geithner's schedule during 2007-08, when he was president of the New York Fed (a
0/1 indicator in Panel B); personal connections are as compiled from muckety.com; and New York connections are defined as firms having headquarters in New York City. "Highly connected"
indicates more than two meetings with Geithner, and "Mildly connected" indicates one or two meetings. Control variables (not reported) are measured as of year-end 2008: size is the log of total
assets, profitability is return on equity, and leverage is total debt to total capital. In Panel A, robust standard errors, adjusted for pre-event correlations between firms, are below coefficients in
parentheses, and in Panel B the 95% confidence interval (generated from 5,000 simulations) is reported. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, 5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: OLS estimates
Dependent variable is CAR [0,1] Dependent variable is CAR [0,3)
Base sample Full sample Base sample Full sample
Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York
Geithner Connections -0.002 -0.011 0.012 -0.004 * -0.008 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.026 -0.005 * -0.010 0.022
(0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.009) (0.018)
Number of firms 515 515 515 583 583 583 515 515 515 583 583 583
R-squared 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.076 0.072 0.070 0.092 0.092 0.095 0.178 0.176 0.176
Panel B: Synthetic matching estimates
Dependent variable is CAR [0,1] Dependent variable is CAR [0,3]
Base sample Full sample Base sample Full sample
All Conn. Highly Conn. Mildly Carn. All Conn. Highly Conn. Mildly Conn. All Conn. Highly Conn. Mildly Conn. All Conn. Highly Conn. Mildly Conn.
Geithner Connections -0.021 -0.048 -0.016 0.003 -0.027 0.019 -0.053 ** -0.079 -0.047 -0.044 *** -0.148 * 0.014
Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.032 -0.108 -0.039 -0.017 -0.033 -0.027 -0.038 -0.128 -0.050 -0.019 -0.039 -0.032
Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.049 0.094 0.053 0.033 0.050 0.042 0.072 0.155 0.078 0.057 0.084 0.069
Number of firms $15 515 513 583 583 574 515 515 513 583 583 574
Number in treatment group 10 2 8 22 9 13 10 2 8 22 9 13
'-4
Table 2.12: Connections of Timothy Geithner to Financial Firms
The table lists firms to which Timothy Geithner has connections through one or more individuals. The connections are compiled from muckety.com. The connections
represent either known connections between Geithner and an individual or potential connections in that Geithner and the individual are associated with the same
organization.
Firm
American Express
American Express
Bank of America
BlackRock
BlackRock.
Blackstone Group
Blackstone Group
Blackstone Group
Blackstone Group
Capital One
Carver Bancorp
CIT Group
CIT Group
CIT Group
Citigroup
Citigroup
Citigroup
Citigroup
Citigroup
Citigroup
Citigroup
Citigroup
Citigroup
Fannie Mae
Fannie Mae
Fortress Inv. Group
Franklin Resources
GAMCO Investors
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs
JP Morgan Chase
IP Morgan Chase
JP Morgan Chase
JP Morgan Chase
JP Morgan Chase
JP Morgan Chase
M&T Bank
Morgan Stanley
Morgan Stanley
Morgan Stanley
NASDAQ
NYSE
PNC Fin. Services
Popular
Wells Fargo
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Connected Person
Kenneth I. Chenault
Kenneth 1. Chenault
Patricia F. Mitchell
James E. Rohr
John A. Thsain
J. Tomilson Hill
Paul H. ONcill
Peter G. Peterson
Richard F. Salomon
Patrick W. Gross
Deborah C. Wright
Jeffrey M. Peek
Seymour Stenberg
Seymour Steinberg
Alain J.P. Belda
C. Michael Armstrong
Judith Rodin
Kenneth T. Derr
Michael B.G. Froman
Pamela P. Flaherty
Richard D. Parsons
Robert E. Rubin
Roberto H. Ramirez
Herbert M. Allison Jr.
Herbert M. Allison Jr.
Richard N. Haass
Anne M. Tatlock
Eugene R. McGrath
Ashton B. Carter
F. Gerald Corrigan
James A. Johnson
John C. Whitehead
Lloyd C. Blankfein
Robert D. Hormats
Ruth J. Simmons
Stephen Friedman
Stephen Friedman
Andrew D. Crockett
Ellen V. Futter
James Dimon
James Dimon
Ratan N. Tata
William M. Daley
Robert G. Wilmers
Frederick B. Whittemore
John J. Mack
Philip Lader
Robert Greifeld
Shirley Ann Jackson
James E. Rohr
Richard L. Carrion
Donald B. Rice
Position with Finn
chairman & CEO
chairman & CEO
director
director
director
vice chainnan
special adviser
chairman and co-founder
adv. board chair, alt. asset ngt.
director
chairman & president & CEO
chairman & CFO
director
director
director
director
director
director
managing director
director, corporate citizenship
chairman
director
director
President & CEO
President & CEO
director
director
director
consultant
managing director
director
foundation chairman
chairman & CFO
vice chairman, GS International
director
director
director
executive committee member
director
chairman & CEO
chairman & CEO
international advisory board
chairman midwest region
chairman & CEO
partner & managing director
chairman & CEO
senior adviser
president & CEO
director
chairman & CEO
chairman, president, & CEO
director
Connection to Geithner
National Academy Foundation
Partnership for New York City
Council on Foreign Relations
RAND Corporation
Unofficial Adviser to (ieithner
Council on Foreign Relations
RAND Corporation
Unofficial Adviser to Gcithner
Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
Partnership for New York City
Partnership for New York City
Council on Foreign Relations
Partnership for New York City
Partnership for New York City
Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
Partnership for New York City
Gcithner is Protogd of Rubin
Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York
Economic Club of New York
Partnership for New York City
Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
Economic Club of New York
Council on Foreign Relations
Unofficial Adviser to Geithner
Council on Foreign Relations
International Rescue Committee
Partnership for New York City
Economic Club of New York
Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Group of Thirty
Council on Foreign Relations
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Partnership for New York City
RAND Corporation
Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
Partnership for New York City
RAND Corporation
Partnership for New York City
Council on Foreign Relations
RAND Corporation
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
RAND Corporation
GCithner's Position Connected Person's
with Connection Position with Connction
director director
board member vice chair
member member
trustee trustee
NA NA
member director
trustee trustee
NA NA
member vice chairman
member member
board member director
board member director
member member
board member director
board member director
member member
member member
member member
member member
member member
board member chair emeritus, director
NA NA
president int'l advisory board
trustee trustee
board member director
member president
member member
trustee trustee
member member
NA NA
member member
trustee trustee
hoard member director
trustee trustee, vice chair
member member
member director
president chair
member member
member member
president director
board member director
trustee trustee
member member
member member
member trustee
board member director
trustee trustee
board member director
member director
trustee trustee
president director
trustee trustee
Table 2.13: Connections of Other Treasury Secretary Candidates to Financial Firms
The table lists firms to which other treasury secretary candidates have connections through one or more individuals. The connections are compiled from muckety.com. The connections
represent either known connections between the candidate and an individual or potential connections in that the candidate and the individual are associated with the same organization.
Candidates' Position Connected Person's
Firm Connected Person Position with Finn Connection to Candidate with Connection Position with
Panel A: Lawrence Summers
BlackRock Laurence D. Fink chairman & CEO Informal Adviser NA NA
Blackstone Group Richard E. Salomon adv. board chair, alt. asset mgt. Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Blackstone Group Peter G. Peterson chairman and co-founder Peterson Institute for International Economics director chairman
Charles Schwab Donald G. Fisher director Teach for America director director
Charles Schwab Paula A. Sneed director Teach for America director director
Citigroup Robert E. Rubin director Summers is Protdgd of Rubin NA NA
Citigroup Richard D. Parsons chairman Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
Citigroup Judith Rodin director Brookings Institution trustee honorary trustee
Citigroup Anne M. Mulcahy director Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
Goldman Sachs James A. Johnson director Brookings Institution trustee honorary trustee
Goldman Sachs John C. Whitehead foundation chairman Brookings Institution trustee honorary trustee
Goldman Sachs Richard A. Friedman managing director Mount Sinai Medical Center (New York) trustee trustee
Goldman Sachs Suzanne Nora Johnson senior director Brookings Institution trustee trustee
Goldman Sachs Abby Joseph Cohen senior investment strategist Brookings Institution trustee trustee
Icahn Enterprises Carl C. Icahn owner Mount Sinai Medical Center (New York) trustee trustee
JP Morgan Chase George P. Shultz chairman international council American Corporate Partners adv. council member adv. council member
JP Morgan Chase William M. Dalcy chairman Midwest division Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
JP Morgan Chase Frnesto Zedillo int'l advisory board member Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Lazard Vernon E. Jordan Jr. director Brookings Institution trustee honorary trustee
Morgan Stanley Laura D'Andrea Tyson director Brookings Institution trustee trustee
Morgan Stanley Laura DAndrea Tyson director Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
Morgan Stanley Hutham S. Olayan director Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Morgan Stanley Laura DAndrea Tyson director Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
NASDAQ Glenn H. Hutchins director Brookings Institution trustee trustee
NYSE Shirley Ann Jackson director Brookings Institution trustee trustee
Och-Ziff David Windreich partner Mount Sinai Medical Center (New York) trustee trustee
Sallie Mac Barry A. Munitz director Broad Foundations governor governor
VISA Suzanne Nora Johnson director Brookings Institution trustee trustee
Panel 8: Paul Volcker
Blackstone Group Peter G. Peterson chairman & co-founder Concord Coalition director founding president
Blackstone Group Peter G. Peterson chairman & co-founder Japan Society life director life director
Blackstone Group Peter G. Peterson chairman & co-founder Peterson Institute for Intemational Economics director chairman
Blackstone Group Richard E. Salomon adv. board chair, alt. asset mgt. Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Capital One Patrick W. Gross director Aspen Institute lifetime trustee trustee
CIT Group James S. McDonald director Japan Society life director director
Citigroup Richard D. Parsons chairman Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
Citigroup Robert E. Rubin director Concord Coalition director director
Citigroup Anne M. Mulcahy director Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
Goldman Sachs Stephen Friedman director Aspen Institute lifetime trustee trustee
Goldman Sachs John C. Whitehead foundation chairman Financial Services Volunteer Corps honorary chairman co-founder & chairman
Goldman Sachs John C. Whitehead foundation chairman International House chairman honorary trustee
Goldman Sachs Josef Joffe foundation member Aspen Institute lifetime trustee member
Goldman Sachs E. Gerald Corrigan managing director Group of Thirty chairman of the board member
Goldman Sachs Henry Cornell managing director Japan Society life director director
JP Morgan Chase William M. Daley chairman Midwest division Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
JP Morgan Chase William H. Gray Ill director Concord Coalition director director
JP Morgan Chase Andrew D. Crockett executive committee member Group of Thirty chairman of the board member
JP Morgan Chase Ernesto Zedillo int'l advisory board member Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Moody's Henry A. McKinnell Jr. director Japan Society life director life director
Morgan Stanley Laura DAndrea Tyson director Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
Morgan Stanley Hutham S. Olayan director Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Morgan Stanley Laura D'Andrea Tyson director Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Morgan Stanley Frederick B. Whittemore partnerhmanaging director Aspen Institute lifetime trustee trustee
NASDAQ Merit E. Janow director Japan Society life director director
NYSE James S. McDonald director Japan Society life director director
Panel C: Sheila Bair
NYSE Self senior vice president (former) NA NA NA
Panel D: Jon Corzine
Bank of New York Gerald L. Hassell president New York Philharmonic director emeritus director
Fannie Mae Philip A. Laskawy chairman New York Philharmonic director emeritus director
Goldman Sachs Self chairman & CEO (former) NA NA NA
Goldman Sachs John F. W. Rogers partner & foundation trustee Corzines former chief of staff NA NA
Lazard Philip A. Laskawy director New York Philharmonic director emeritus director
US Bancorp Jerry W. Levin director New York Philharmonic director emeritus director
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Table 2.14: Comparison of Geithner-Connected Firms with Non-Connected Firms
The table compares firms with identifiable connections to Geithner to those with no connections. In Panel A, connected firms are those that were
listed on Geithner's schedule during his tenure as president of the New York Fed. In Panel B, connected firms are those with a personal connection
to Geithner as identified on muckety.com. In both panels "Base Sample" indicates whether the firm is included in our base sample (by virtue of not
being highly correlated to Citigroup). CAR [0,10] is the cumulative abnormal return for the firm surrounding the announcement of Geithner as
treasury secretary. Total assets are for the year 2008 from Worldscope.
Panel A: Schedule Connections
Firm
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO.
CITIGROUP INCO.
BANK OF AMERICA CORP.
FANNIE MAE
THE GOLDMAN SACHS GPIN.
MORGAN STANLEY
PNC FINL.SVS.GP.INCO.
BANK OF NY.MELLON CORP.
STATE STREET CORP.
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.
NORTHERN TRUST CORP.
CME GROUP INCO.
NY.CMTY.BANC.TNCO.
ASTORIA FINL.CORP.
BLACKROCK INCO.
NYSE EURONEXT
THE NASDAQ OMX GP.INCO.
THE BLACKSTONE GROUP LP.
PROVIDENT FINL.SVS.TNCO.
LAZARD LTD.
MOODY'S CORP.
OCH-ZIFF CAP.MAN.GP.LLC.
BEACON FED.BANC.INCORP.
FEDERATED INVRSJNCO.
EVERCORE PARTNERS INCO.
On Geithner's Schedule
Base
Occurrences Sample
14 N
34 N
4 N
1 N
10 N
9 N
3 N
7 Y
I Y
2 N
1 Y
2 Y
2 N
2 N
13 Y
2 N
2 Y
6 Y
2 Y
1 Y
2 N
1 N
I Y
1 Y
I Y
Not on Geithner's Schedule (25 Largest)
CAR [0,10]
0.186
0.743
0.168
1.008
0.192
0.224
0.044
-0.095
0.091
0.029
0.117
0.010
-0.078
-0.132
0.082
0.089
0.212
0.345
-0.145
0.126
0.114
0.107
0.039
0.065
0.485
Total Assets ($Bn)
2,175.00
1,938.00
1,818.00
908.50
876.20
658.80
291.10
237.50
173.60
122.60
82.05
48.16
32.33
21.98
19.91
13.28
12.05
8.41
6.51
2.79
1.55
1.02
1.02
0.85
0.68
Firm
WELLS FARGO & CO
FREDDIE MAC
US BANCORP
SUNTRUST BANKS INCO.
SLM CORP.
CAPITAL ONE FINL.CORP.
BB&T CORP.
REGIONS FINL.CORP.
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP
KEYCORP
AMERTPRTSE FINL.INCO.
CIT GROUP INCO.
COMERICA INCO.
M&T BK.CORP.
MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP.
ZIONS BANCORPORATION
HUNTINGTON BCSH.INCO.
HUDSON CITY BANC.INCO.
CHARLES SCHWAB CORP.
MF GLOBAL LTD.
E*TRADE FINANCIAL CORP.
DISCOVER FINANCIAL SVS.
POPULAR INCO.
SYNOVUS FINL.CORP.
FIRST HORTZON NAT. CORP.
CAR [0,101
0.124
0.659
0.078
0.200
0.064
-0.053
-0.131
-0.206
-0.232
0.062
0.297
0.500
0.037
-0.045
-0.300
-0.255
-0.073
-0.231
-0.141
-0.180
0.051
0.122
-0.194
-0.031
-0.124
Total Assets ($Bn)
1,310.00
835.60
265.90
189.10
168.80
165.90
152.00
146.20
119.50
104.50
94.67
80.45
67.55
65.82
62.34
54.61
54.35
54.09
51.17
49.18
47.50
39.20
38.53
35.62
31.02
Panel B: Personal Connections
Personal Connection to Geithner
Firm
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO.
CITIGROUP INCO.
BANK OF AMERICA CORP.
WELLS FARGO & CO
FANNIE MAE
THE GOLDMAN SACHS GPIN.
MORGAN STANLEY
PNC FINL.SVS.GP.INCO.
CAPITAL ONE FINL.CORP.
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.
CIT GROUP INCO.
M&T BK.CORP.
POPULAR INCO.
BLACKROCK INCO.
NYSE EURONEXT
THE NASDAQ OMX GP.INCO.
FRANKLIN RESOURCES INCO.
THE BLACKSTONE GROUP LP.
FORTRESS INV.GP.LLC.
CARVER BANCORP INCO.
GAMCO INVESTORS INCO.
Base
Connections Sample CAR [0,101
0.186
0.743
0.168
0.124
1.008
0.192
0.224
0.044
-0.053
0.029
0.500
-0.045
-0.194
0.082
0.089
0.212
0.046
0.345
-0.131
-0.116
-0.147
Total Assets ($Bn)
2,175.00
1,938.00
1,818.00
1,310.00
908.50
876.20
658.80
291.10
165.90
122.60
80.45
65.82
38.53
19.91
13.28
12.05
9.18
8.41
1.17
0.79
0.67
No Personal Connection (21 Largest)
Firm CAR [0,10] Total Assets ($Bn)
FREDDIE MAC
US BANCORP
BANK OF NY.MELLON CORP.
SUNTRUST BANKS INCO.
STATE STREET CORP.
SLM CORP.
BB&T CORP.
REGIONS FINL.CORP.
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP
KEYCORP
AMERIPRISE FINL.INCO.
NORTHERN TRUST CORP.
COMERICA INCO.
MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP.
ZIONS BANCORPORATION
HUNTINGTON BCSH.INCO.
HUDSON CITY BANC.INCO.
CHARLES SCHWAB CORP.
MF GLOBAL LTD.
CME GROUP INCO.
E*TRADE FINANCIAL CORP.
0.659
0.078
-0.095
0.200
0.091
0.064
-0.131
-0.206
-0.232
0.062
0.297
0.117
0.037
-0.300
-0.255
-0.073
-0.231
-0.141
-0.180
0.010
0.051
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835.60
265.90
237.50
189.10
173.60
168.80
152.00
146.20
119.50
104.50
94.67
82.05
67.55
62.34
54.61
54.35
54.09
51.17
49.18
48.16
47.50
Table 2.15: Comparison of New York Firms to Non-New York Firms
The table compares firms in the sample headquartered in New York City with firms in the sample headquartered elsewhere. CAR [0,10] is the cumulative
abnormal return for the firm surrounding the announcement of Geithner as treasury secretary. Total assets are for the year 2008 from Worldscope.
New York Non-New York (Largest 45)
Firm
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO.
CITIGROUP INCO.
THE GOLDMAN SACHS GPIN.
MORGAN STANLEY
BANK OF NY.MELLON CORP.
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.
CIT GROUP INCO.
E*TRADE FINANCIAL CORP.
BLACKROCK INCO.
JEFFERIES GP.INCO.
ICAHN ENTERPRISES LP.
NYSE EURONEXT
THE NASDAQ OMX GP.INCO.
THE BLACKSTONE GROUP 1LP.
SIGNATURE BK.
LABRANCHE & CO.INCO.
INTERVEST BCSH.CORP.
STERLING BANC.
FINLFED.CORP.
INV.TECH.GP.
ALLBERN.HLDG.LP.
MOODY'S CORP.
NAT.FINL.PTNS.CORP.
FORTRESS INV.GP.LLC.
GFI GROUP INCO.
BGC PARTNERS INCO.
OCH-ZIFF CAP.MAN.GP.LLC.
MSCI INCO.
BERKSHIRE BANCORP INCO.
CARVER BANCORP INCO.
BROADPOINT SECS.GPJNCO.
EVERCORE PARTNERS INCO.
MEDALLION FINL.CORP.
KBW INCO.
GLG PARTNERS INCO.
DUFF & PHELPS CORP.
COHEN & STEERS INCO.
GREENHILL & CO.INCO.
MARKETAXESS HDG.INCO.
COWEN GROUP INCORPORATED
CMS BANCORP INCO.
PZENA INV.MAN.INCO.
EPOCH HOLDING CORP.
RODMAN & RENSHAW CAP.GP.
SIEBERT FINANCIAL CORP.
Base
Sample
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
CAR [0,10]
0.186
0.743
0.192
0.224
-0.095
0.029
0.500
0.051
0.082
0.071
0.764
0.089
0.212
0.345
-0.064
0.127
-0.259
-0.137
0.277
0.164
0.401
0.114
0.989
-0.131
-0.278
0.328
0.107
0.090
-0.190
-0.116
0.204
0.485
0.146
-0.382
-0.012
0.438
0.204
-0.064
0.040
0.057
0.100
-0.151
0.030
0.217
-0.031
Total Assets ($Bn)
2,175.00
1,938.00
876.20
658.80
237.50
122.60
80.45
47.50
19.91
19.60
18.82
13.28
12.05
8.41
7.11
3.73
2.26
2.19
1.94
1.68
1.60
1.55
1.52
1.17
1.09
1.07
1.02
1.02
0.91
0.79
0.69
0.68
0.65
0.57
0.49
0.35
0.28
0.23
0.21
0.20
0.20
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.04
Firm
BANK OF AMERICA CORP.
WELLS FARGO & CO
FANNIE MAE
FREDDIE MAC
PNC FINL.SVS.GP.INCO.
US BANCORP
SUNTRUST BANKS INCO.
STATE STREET CORP.
SLM CORP.
CAPITAL ONE FINL.CORP.
BB&T CORP.
REGIONS FINL.CORP.
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP
KEYCORP
AMERIPRISE FINL.INCO.
NORTHERN TRUST CORP.
COMERICA INCO.
M&T BK.CORP.
MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP.
ZIONS BANCORPORATION
HUNTINGTON BCSH.INCO.
HUDSON CITY BANC.INCO.
CHARLES SCHWAB CORP.
MF GLOBAL LTD.
CME GROUP INCO.
DISCOVER FINANCIAL SVS.
POPULAR INCO.
SYNOVUS FINL.CORP.
NY.CMTY.BANC.INCO.
FIRST HORIZON NAT.CORP.
THE STUDENT LN.CORP.
INTACT.BCK.GP.INCORP.
THE COLO.BANCGROUP INCO.
ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP
BOK FINL.CORP.
ASTORIA FINL.CORP.
RAYMOND JAMES FINL.INCO.
PEOPLES UTD.FINL.INCO.
FIRST BANC.
CAPITALSOURCE INCO.
COMMERCE BCSH.INCO.
WEBSTER FINL.CORP.
FIRST CTZN.BCSH.INCO.
TCF FINANCIAL CORP.
AMERICREDIT CORP.
CAR [0,10]
0.168
0.124
1.008
0.659
0.044
0.078
0.200
0.091
0.064
-0.053
-0.131
-0.206
-0.232
0.062
0.297
0.117
0.037
-0.045
-0.300
-0.255
-0.073
-0.231
-0.141
-0.180
0.010
0.122
-0.194
-0.031
-0.078
-0.124
0.321
0.073
0.020
-0.056
-0.065
-0.132
-0.020
-0.174
-0.093
0.135
-0.106
0.067
-0.053
-0.026
0.363
Total Assets ($Bn)
1,818.00
1,310.00
908.50
835.60
291.10
265.90
189.10
173.60
168.80
165.90
152.00
146.20
119.50
104.50
94.67
82.05
67.55
65.82
62.34
54.61
54.35
54.09
51.17
49.18
48.16
39.20
38.53
35.62
32.33
31.02
28.14
28.00
25.50
24.19
22.73
21.98
20.62
20.17
19.49
18.41
17.53
17.39
16.75
16.74
16.23
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Chapter 3
Does Skin-in-the-Game Affect
Security Performance? Evidence from
the Conduit CMBS Market
With Adam Ashcraft and Kunal Gooriah
3.1 Introduction
One of responses by Congress to the collapse of securities markets during the recent financial crisis was
Section 941 of the Dodd Frank Act, which instructs regulatory agencies to require the sponsor of new issue
securitization transactions to retain at least five percent of the credit risk of those securities. The purpose
of requiring the sponsor to retain risk from the transaction, hereafter referred to as risk retention, is to
ensure adequate skin-in-th-game, which aligns the incentives of the sponsor with those of a balance sheet
lender. In principle, meaningful sponsor risk retention has the potential to improve the underwriting of loans
sold into the securitization transaction, leading to less procyclicality in credit markets and more predictable
performance of securities.
Why should the sponsor of a securitization transaction have different incentives than those of a balance
sheet lender? One explanation, described by Adrian and Ashcraft (2012), is that when investors provide
risk-insensitive debt funding to the sponsor, limited liability of the sponsor creates well-known incentives
for risk-shifting, especially when not offset by franchise value." 2 These incentives to increase asset risk
'Rajan (2005) provides on explanation for why investors would provide risk-insensitive debt funding. He focuses on the
compensation structure of the asset management industry, which combines limited liability with peer evaluation, which together
creates incentives for herding and excessive risk-taking.
2 As an example, Keeley (1990) documents evidence that the de-regulation of banks in the 1970s eroded their franchise value,
which consequently lead to increases in asset risk and leverage.
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and leverage are manifested though weaker loan underwriting and a push to reduce credit enhancement
levels through ratings shopping. This hypothesis is based on growing circumstantial empirical support in the
academic literature. See Adelino (2009), Ashcraft et. al. (2011), Ashcraft et. al. (2010), Stanton and Wallace
(2011) for evidence that investors and rating agencies are inadequately risk-sensitive.3 See Cohen (2011) or
Giffin and Tang (2012) for evidence of successful ratings shopping.4 See Keys et al. (2010), Loutskina and
Strahan (2000), Purnanandam (2010), and Demiroglu and James for evidence that the originate-to-distribute
form of securitization affects loan underwriting and performance. 5
While the above literature provides evidence that the frictions which would make risk retention important
appear to exist, the literature lacks direct evidence that retention itself is significant. The purpose of this
paper is to fill this gap in the literature by identifying and measuring the impact of risk retention on
performance.
In order to do this, we focus on the conduit commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) market in
order to exploit measurable variation in the amount of risk retained. As described below, this market is
unique in that the bottom five percent of the capital structure is sold to a sophisticated investor known
as a B-piece buyer who re-underwrites all of the loans in the underlying pool. Consequently, there is no
adverse information problem between the sponsor and the B-piece investor, and senior investors can free
ride off of this investor's screening activities at issue. Historically, B-piece investors funded their positions
with equity and minimal leverage. However, the development of the commercial real estate collateralized
debt obligation (CRE CDO) market in the early 2000s created a new funding strategy for B-piece investors. 6
In particular, the risk-insensitive provision of funding by the CRE CDO market created the incentives for
3Adelino (2009) documents that while the junior tranches of residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) tranches were
sensitive to ex ante measures of risk, the senior AAA-rated tranches were not. Ashcraft et. al. (2011) investigate further,
documenting that while the junior tranches of RMBS deals were sensitive to risk, they were too sensitive to credit ratings
(measured by the amount of credit enhancement) relative to the information about future performance. Ashcraft et. al. (2010)
document that the credit enhancement of subprime and Alt-A RMBS deals fell in ex ante risk-adjusted terms throughout the
boom. In the market for commercial mortgage backed securities, Stanton and Wallace (2010) provide evidence of continuous
decline in subordination levels from 2001 to 2006 despite no significant change in the quality of underlying assets, consistent
with market pressure on rating agencies. Titman and Tayplakov (2010) find that commercial mortgages that are originated by
institutions with large negative stock returns in the quarters prior to the origination date tend to have higher credit spreads and
default more than other mortgages with similar observable characteristics. Focusing on the period before 2003, they find that
rating agencies reacted by requiring higher level of subordination for deals with higher share of underperforming originators.4 Cohen (2011) documents that a sponsor which hired a rating agency is had not used recently in the CMBS market could
reduce required credit enhancement levels by 100 bps. Griffin and Tang (2012) used an internal model of a top credit rating
agency and show the rating agency on average gave 12 percent more AAA rating to CDO deals than the output of the rating
agency own model. Moreover they show CDOs with smaller model-implied AAA sizes receive larger adjustments. In the market
for RMBS, Ashcraft et al. (2010) document a progressive decline in credit rating agencies standards around the peak of the
market for residential mortgage backed securities and show the problem is more severe for deals with a higher fraction of opaque
low-documentation loans. He et al. (2012) show large issuers in RMBS market received relatively better ratings for their deals
however the market reacted partially to these inflated ratings by asking a higher initial yield for securitized assets issued by
large issuers.5Keys et al. (2010), Loutskina and Strahan (2000) and Purnanandam (2010) document lower performance of loans that
were issued for "originate-to-distribute" and argue that loan sales lowered incentive of loan originators in ex ante screening of
applicants. Demiroglu and James (2012) find that ex post loss and foreclosure rates are significantly higher for RMBS in which
originators are not affiliated with the sponsor or servicer and argue this is caused by unaffiliated originators having less "skin
in the game". However Bubb and Kaufman (2009) and Kermani (2013) question some of these findings and show that lower
performance of these loans can be part of market structure as opposed to evidence of moral hazard.6 Barnett-Hart (2009) and Cordell et al. (2011) gathered data on the underlying assets of CDOs and provide a comprehensive
description of type of assets that went into CDOs. Both of these studies find a central role played by CDO deal underwriters in
determining the performance of CDO deals. Coval et al. (2009) indicates extreme fragility of CDOs not only to the assumptions
about the performance of underlying assets but also the estimation of the correlation of underlying assets (or systemic risk).
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greater risk and leverage alluded to above, and is thus the ideal source of variation to study the importance
of skin-in-the-game for security performance.7
In this paper, we exploit variation in the amount of retention over time and across B-piece investors
as measured by the amount sold to the CRE CDO market in order to measure the impact on the conduit
CMBS market. The results are not surprising. In particular, we document that after controlling for all
information available at issue, including market pricing, rating agency credit enhancement levels, and other
deal characteristics, the percent of the B-piece sold to CRE CDOs has a significant adverse impact on the
probability that more senior tranches ultimately default. The result is robust to alternative specifications,
including dealer or B-piece buyer fixed effects. Moreover, the result is robust to the use of an instrumental
variables strategy which relies on the greater ability of larger B-piece buyers to create CRE CDOs given
the need for large pools of collateral. The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes CMBS
securitization process and the role of B-piece buyers in this market. Section 3 describes our data sources
and trends in the CMBS and CRE CDO market. Our main empirical analysis result is presented in section
4. Section 5 present some additional robustness checks and section 6 concludes.
3.2 CMBS Market and the Role of B-Piece Buyers
In the early 1990s, the Resolution Trust Company (RTC) gave rise to the CMBS market by issuing the
first CMBS deal collateralized by the commercial real estate loans of failed savings and loan institutions.
The RTC issued subsequent deals with simple, largely overcollateralized structures, where equity pieces were
retained by the RTC. By the time the RTC wound down the assets it inherited, sufficient investor demand
for CMBS had built to the extent that investment banks began engaging in commercial mortgage origination
practices to securitize pools and issue CMBS deals.
The process of accumulating mortgages and issuing a CMBS deal is an intricate one involving several
parties. Borrowers of commercial loans submit financial and property information to an originating banker,
who initiates the underwriting process and assesses the amount of debt that can be sustained by the property.
Thereafter, terms of the loan are agreed upon by both parties and the mortgage is originated. The CMBS
issuer accumulates many of these mortgages and sells them into a trust called a REMIC. 8 Loans sold into
the REMIC aim at satisfying several attributes of the total pool. These attributes can range from the total
size of all loans and their geographic distribution to the risk measures of the mortgages.9 By creating a
pool of loans that is diversified and backed by properties generating sustainable cash flow, the originating
7 Faltin-Traeger and Mayer (2011) provide evidence that CDO originators successfully sold securities and insurance against
the worst performing securitized assets and show that even after controlling for the asset characteristics, CDO assets performed
much worse than comparable securities that were not included in a CDO. Beltran et al. (2013) shed light on type of information
asymmetries in asset backed securities CDOs and explain how these information asymmetries can account for the collapse of
the CDO market.
8REMICs (Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit) are static pools of loans that are intended to be securitized and sold
to investors as mortgage-backed securities.
9 More concentrated pools to a geographic location require extra subordination for AAA tranches. Similarly, unfavorable
risk measures such as high LTV's and low DSCR's also require extra subordination.
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banker seeks to minimize the subordination of AAA tranches within the CMBS securitization. Financial
reports and underwriting results of the pool are passed to the rating agencies that assign ratings and levels
of subordination to the CMBS waterfall structure. The pool is then securitized and a CMBS deal is issued
and sold to investors.
At the very bottom of the securitization is the first loss piece, known as the B-piece, which receives a
higher coupon than all other tranches in the securitization. The tradeoff is the higher risk associated with
absorbing the initial losses that pass through from defaults in the underlying pool. Prior to the issuance of
the CMBS deal, the B-piece is auctioned off to investors, typically those who command real estate expertise
or a high risk appetite. Bids are submitted and the winning bidder gains control of the pool underlying the
deal. The winning B-piece buyer then has two to six weeks to perform the necessary due diligence. This
typically entails underwriting the majority (if not all, which can amount to more than 100 loans) of the loans
as well as physical inspection of the underlying properties. Upon completion of the due diligence process,
the first loss buyer can decide whether or not to kick out particular loans within the pool.
The B-piece buyers are thought to be investors who have their "skin in the game". Typically, these buyers
are the final underwriters of the mortgages before a CMBS deal is issued. In the 1990's and early 2000's, they
represented a class of experts in the real estate market with extensive experience in property valuation and
management. B-piece buyers were essential for the market to trust the quality of the underlying mortgage
assets. During this period, buyers would sometimes kick out 10% of the collateral pool as they believed the
fair value of these mortgages was less than the original price.10 For undergoing the painstaking due diligence
involved in assessing the value of the trust, buyers of the B-piece were rewarded with returns as high as 28%
up until the early 2000s.
Since the B-piece is the most information sensitive tranche in the CMBS waterfall, historically B-piece
buyers were unable to sell their positions to the market and kept their B-piece investments on their own
balance sheet. However, development of commercial real estate CDO (CRE CDO) market in the early 2000s
enabled large B-piece buyers to pool their B-piece positions in a deal and issue safe assets that were more
liquid." This development combined with generous ratings given to CDOs by rating agencies provided a
relatively risk-insensitive source of funding for B-piece buyers, enabling them to have greater leverage and
less risk retention in their B-piece positions.
3.3 Data Sources and Trends in CMBS and CRE CDO Markets
The primary source of data for this study is Intex. From Intex we identified the universe of CMBS deals that
are classified as Conduit or Fusion deals (666 deals). In order to avoid problems with possible misclassification
of deals, we eliminated deals with less than 30 loans (30 deals), deals consisting of only mezzanine loans (3
10Some of the most conservative players would kick out as high as 20% of the collateral pool for a particular deal. Alternatively,
it was not uncommon for 0% of the collateral pool to be kicked out if the mortgage underwriting was found to be of high quality.
1IDeMarzo (2005) provide the theoretical justification on how the process of pooling and tranching can produce safe assets
that are less subject to information asymmetries.
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deals), deals with no B-piece (49 deals) and deals with no BBB tranche (7 deals). Deals with more than 50
percent of collateral in Canada (42 deals) were also eliminated.1 2 . Figure 3.1 shows the annual issuance
of CMBS conduit/fusion deals in our database that satisfy these criteria. As Figure 3.1 shows, CMBS
conduit/fusion annual issuance experienced fast growth between the years 2002 and 2007 and reached 200
billion dollars in annual issuance by 2007 before plummeting to only 10 billion dollars in 2008 and a complete
collapse of the market by 2009. The pattern that is hardly different from other asset classes of non-agency
structured products. Finally, for the main analysis we eliminated deals that were issued before 1997 (19
deals) or after 2007 (32).13 This left us with 483 conduit or fusion CMBS deals.
Perhaps one of the factors that contributed to the fast growth of CMBS as a source of financing for
commercial real estate loans has been generous ratings given to these deals by rating agencies (see Stanton
and Wallace (2010) for a detailed discussion of inflated ratings in CMBS market). As Figure 3.2 shows, the
average subordination levels below the BBB tranche of CMBS deals declined from more than 13 percent
in 1996 to about 3 percent by 2006 before rating agencies reconsidered their models and their assumption
about the probabilities of default of the underlying assets.
However it should be mentioned that despite this fast decline in subordination levels, as Figure 3.2 shows
during the period of 2000 to 2005, Spread for BBB tranches, defined as the difference between the coupon
rate of the BBB bonds and 10 year T-Notes14 at issuance date, declined by more than 100 basis points. This
suggests that perhaps markets were even more optimistic about the performance of these securitized assets
than rating agencies.
In order to control for the characteristics of CMBS deals, we also collected data on the underlying
collateral of these conduit/fusion CMBS deals and for each deal we constructed deal loan to value (LTV)
and deal spread as the weighted averages of the loan to value ratio at origination and the weighted average
of underlying commercial loans spread at origination, weighted by loans size. 15
Figure 3.3 shows that during the period of 2001 to 2005 underlying commercial loans' spread rates
also declined by more than 100 basis points.16 Looking at LTV shows that overall loan to value ratios
of underlying commercial loans did not change as much as the increase for loans underlying non-agency
residential mortgage backed securities.17 However, it is worth noting that there was significant commercial
property price appreciation over this period. So while LTVs were stable, debt yields, defined as the ratio of
12 1nclusion of Canadian deals makes all of our results more significant. However we want to minimize the bias due to possible
differences in institutions and the state of the economy.
13 The data for underlying collateral of deals that were issued before 1997 is less reliable than deals that were issued from
1997 afterward. All the results -are robust to inclusion of deals that were issued from 2008 afterward. However one may be
concerned that deals that were issued during and after the financial crisis have very different characteristics with different type
of institutions.
14 This is because almost all underlying commercial loans have fixed rates with a maturity of ten years and BBB tranche is
among the last tranches to be paid back. Which means the maturity of BBB tranche is almost ten years.
isSpread is defined as the difference between loan interest rate and 10-year T-notes.
1'One interesting question here is to what extent the decline in underlying loans' spread rate is driven by mis-pricing of risk
in the securitization process.
17 For example Keys et al. (2012) shows that cumulative loan to value ratios for non-agency RMBS deals increased from less
than 85 percent in 2000 to more than 95 percent by 2006. However one caveat here is that we do not have data on cumulative
loan to value ratios for commercial real estates.
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net operating income (NOI) to the amount of debt outstanding, were declining significantly. As commercial
real estate loans are balloons, debt yields are an important measure of maturity default risk.
For the baseline analysis we only focus on the performance of the most junior BBB (most junior investment
grade) tranche of each deal. There are two reasons for focusing on the most junior investment grade tranche.
First, since almost all investment grade tranches were traded at par, we can use the spread between tranche
coupon rate and 10-year T-Notes as a measure of market perception of the riskiness of the tranche and
therefore assess whether the risk associated with a tranche was reflected in its coupon rate or not.18 Second,
among investment grade tranches, the most junior BBB tranche performance has the highest sensitivity to
the performance of underlying commercial real estates. Therefore, by focusing on the performance of these
tranches, we minimize attenuation bias. At the tranche level, in order to measure the performance of a
tranche, we used Bloomberg to collect data on the default status of each BBB tranche. For each tranche
Default variable is equal to one if the default status of tranche in Bloomberg is equal to "Default" or "Paid
in Full/Default" and is equal to zero if it is "Current" or "Paid in Full". An alternative to default status
would be to use the number of downgrades of a tranche rating as an indicator of its performance. Default
status has two advantages over the number of downgrades: first, there is no disagreement between different
rating agencies about the default status of a tranche whereas current ratings are more prone to subjective
assessments. Second, default status is available for all deals in our base sample whereas current ratings are
missing for 53 deals in the base sample.
Figure 3.4 shows the average default rate of the most junior BBB tranche for deals that were issued in
different years. This figure shows that almost all of the junior BBB tranches of deals issued in 2007 are
currently in default. The figure also shows the average delinquency rate for the underlying commercial loans
of the same CMBS deals. A commercial loan is defined as delinquent if it has any history of being serviced
with a special servicer. Here it is worth mentioning that the average delinquency rate of deals issued in
2005 is less than the delinquency rate of deals issued in 2000. However BBB tranches of CMBS deals issued
in 2000 defaulted much less often, primarily due to higher levels of subordinations for deals issued in 2000
compared to those issued in 2005. The chart illustrates the poor performance of bubble vintages (2005-2007),
with default rates in excess of 80 percent. It is worth noting that these numbers are not final, and could
increase further when the 7 and 10 year loans from these vintages finally mature and require refinancing.
Using data from Commercial Real Estate Direct.com as well CMAlert, we were able to identify the names
of B-piece buyers for 383 deals in the base sample.19 Table 3.1, Panel B shows information on the number
of deals, the total notional value of deals and the total notional value of B-pieces that each of the fifteen top
B-piece buyers bought. In regressions where we control for the B-piece buyer fixed effect, we drop deals for
which we could not identify the B-piece buyer of the deal.
181n contrast to investment grade tranches, B-pieces are usually sold at large discounts and therefore the yield on the B-piece
is not equal to the tranche coupon. Therefore it is impossible to assess whether the risk associated with these tranches was
correctly priced or not by looking at the tranche coupon.
190ut of 100 deals for which we do not have information on the b-piece buyer, 79 deals were issued between 1997 and 1999
where our data sources have very limited coverage. The distribution of missing deals among different years is (22/1997, 32/1998,
25/1999, 7/2000, 8/2001, 2/2002, 1/2003, 1/2005, 2/2007)
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Finally in order to construct a measure of risk retention of B-piece buyers, we identified the universe of
Commercial Real Estate CDOs, which contains 190 deals issued between 1999 and 2008. Among these deals,
Intex does not have information for the underlying assets of 20 CRE CDO deals. 20 Since many of these
CRE CDOs have a dynamic pool (i.e. the collateral manager can replace or include new assets as collateral
into the deal) we pulled the collateral information of each of the remaining 170 CRE CDO deals at the end
of each quarter from the first quarter of 2000 to the last quarter of 2008. Since our main focus here is the
risk retention of B-piece buyers we proceed by dropping synthetic collateral entries.21 The reason for this
is that a synthetic reference to a B-piece tranche in a CRE CDO deal does not change the risk retention
of the original B-piece buyer in the CMBS deal.22 This left us with 73 CRE CDO deals that had at least
one CMBS tranche with a rating below BBB (B-piece) as part of the underlying collateral. Here it should
be mentioned that issuers of all of these deals are specialized players in the commercial real estate industry
and in fact many of these deals were constructed by large B-piece buyers in the CMBS market such as LNR,
Anthracite, ARCap and JER.
For each deal we computed percent of B-piece sold in (after) 12 months as the percentage of the notional
value of the tranches below BBB (B-piece) that was sold into a CRE CDO within a period of 12 months
from the settle date of the CMBS deal. Figure 3.6 shows the evolution of the mean of percent of B-piece
sold within 12 months as well as the 25th percentile to 75th percentiles of this percentage for each year. As
we can see even after the rise of CRE CDOs from 2001 afterward there remains a lot of heterogeneity among
different deals in the percentage of B-piece that was sold into CRE CDOs. This heterogeneity within each
quarter is the source of variation that we use in our empirical analysis to assess the relation between the
percentage of the B-piece that was sold into CRE CDOs and the performance of the CMBS deal.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
As we discussed in section two, the creation of CRE CDOs combined with generous ratings given to these
CRE CDOs provided an exit strategy for B-piece buyers that enabled them to have less exposure to the risk
associated with the underlying loans in conduit/fusion CMBS deals. In this environment we should expect
inferior performance of deals in which the B-piece buyer sold a larger fraction of the B-piece into CRE CDOs
and therefore had less "skin in the game". In this section, by using the default status of the most junior BBB
tranche as a measure of the performance of the deal, we first document that this was indeed the case and
CMBS deals with a higher percentage of the B-piece sold into CRE CDOs performed worse. Then we test a
20The distribution of CRE CDO deals with missing collateral information is (1/2002, 3/2005, 3/2006,11/2007, 2/2008).
2 1We first dropped all collateral entries which Intex classifies as synthetic. Moreover in order to address the problem with
missing information about the synthetic field of collateral entries and possible misclassifications, we dropped all entries with
the notional amount of collateral larger than the tranche notional original balance. Finally we dropped collateral entries with
notional amounts equal to 5, 10, 15, 20 or 30 million dollars and missing synthetic information for cusips where the total
amount of the tranche that was sold into CRE CDOs exceeded the cusip's original balance. This is because most of the
synthetic collateral enteries have values that are multiples of 5 million dollars.
2 2 Moreover Faltin-Traeger and Mayer (2011) find securitized assets that were included in synthetic CDOs performed worse
than other type of assets, which is suggestive of an adverse selection problem with synthetic tranches that is not the focus of
this paper.
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number of rival theories that can explain the OLS results. Finally we use instrumental variable approach to
establish the causal relation between the rise of CRE CDOs as a source of financing for B piece buyers and
the inferior performance of CMBS deals.
3.4.1 OLS Estimation
Figure 3.7 shows the motivating fact for the OLS estimations. This figure shows the average default rate
of the most junior BBB tranche for deals in which the B-piece was sold into a CRE CDO within a year
from CMBS deal settle date performed worse than deals in which the B-piece was not sold into a CRE CDO
in all years but 2002.23 In order to establish this relation in a more systematic way we run the following
regression:
Default,ti = a +#xij,t + Z ,5,#+ Yt + 8j + ejt
Where data varies by deal (i), quarter (t) and the B-piece buyer (j). Defaut,5,t is equal to one if the
most junior BBB tranche of the ith deal (issued in quarter t where the B-piece was bought with the jth
B-piece buyer) is in default and it is equal to zero otherwise. zit is the percentage of the B-piece of deal i
that was sold into CRE CDOs. Zi,t, is the vector of controls which consists of original loan-to-value ratio of
the deal, the percentage of the most junior BBB tranche of the deal that went into CDO, the spread rate on
the most junior BBB tranche and Subordination below the most junior BBB tranche. LTV, tranche spread
and Subordination all relates directly to observable characteristics related to the probability of the default
of a tranche in a deal. It is possible that deal issuers had a harder time to sell more risky BBB tranches
directly to the market and therefore they also used CRE CDO to sell those risky tranches. If this is the
case, one can think of percent of BBB tranche that was sold to CRE CDO as another measure of market
perception of the riskiness of the asset and therefore by we control for the percent of BBB sold into CRE
CDO as well. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. 24
Before looking at results, it is worth pausing to consider what could be interpreted from OLS estimation
of 3 in the equation above. At a minimum, the estimate documents the correlation between the percent
of the B-piece sold to CDOs and subsequent security performance, controlling for all information available
at issue. It seems quite possible that the B-piece investor is choosing to sell risk in a fashion which is not
exogenous to how the deals would perform if not sold. In particular, the B-piece might choose to sell more of
deals with the worst unobserved information to the CDO market, where there is variation in unobservables
across deals and over time, so the estimated coefficient is simply.measuring how a given amount of risk is
being allocated between the B-piece investor and CDO market. However, one would expect that the presence
of a risk-insensitive investor in CDOs would not just result in a shift in how risk is ultimately allocated,
but would actually lead to an increase in the amount of risk taken by the B-piece investor at issue. To the
23 A B-piece sold into CDO is defined as percent sold in 12 month being greater than 75 and not sold into CDO is defined as
this percent being equal to zero.
24 Clustering at quarter and B piece buyer resulted to very similar standard errors.
124
extent that the presence of CDOs affected the risk appetite of B-piece investors, these investors would want
to unload this marginal risk rather quickly into the CDO market.25 Consequently, we distinguish below
between the percent sold within one year and the percent sold after one year, where the former measure
should better capture impact of CRE CDO liquidity on the marginal risk-taking of the B-piece investors.
Table 3.2 shows the results of this regression for the base sample. Column (1) shows the most junior BBB
tranche of a deal in which the entire B-piece was sold into CRE CDOs within one year defaulted about
14 percent more often than deals in which the B-piece buyer kept the B-piece on their own balance sheet,
controlling for the quarter fixed effect. On the other hand, the percent sold after one year has no statistical
impact on the performance of the BBB tranche. Column (2) shows the same regression when we control for
other characteristics of the deal and the tranche itself. These controls do not change the estimated coefficient
of # mainly because, as we will see later, observable characteristics associated with a higher probability of
default such as LTV, tranche coupon rate or subordination are not correlated with the percentage of the
B-piece of the deal that was sold into CRE CDOs. Here it is worth mentioning that the tranche coupon
rate significantly predicts the tranche default rate which assures that there has been some pricing of the
risk beyond rating agencies action.26 However as we will see, investors did not take into account the risk
associated with a B-piece buyer having less skin in the game and therefore performing less due diligence
before the deal is finalized.
Since our focus here is on the impact of CRE CDOs on the risk taking of B-piece buyers, in the rest of
our analysis we only focus on the percentage of B-piece that was sold into CRE CDOs within 12 months.
Column (3) of Table 3.2, repeats the same regression as column (2) when we do not control for the percent
of B-piece that was sold after 12 months which results to almost identical results as before. One concern
here is that it is possible that B-piece buyers who were specialized in buying more risky B-pieces for higher
yields were also the ones that benefited the most from CDO financing and therefore the rise of CRE CDO
market just provided a better source of funding for these B-piece buyers and enabled them to take more
leverage but did not change their risk taking behavior.27 28 To the extent that this was the case we should
expect a lower estimated coefficient for # after controlling for the B-piece buyer fixed effect. In column (4) of
Table 3.2 we control for the B-piece buyer fixed effect and the resulted estimate of # is just slightly smaller
than before. This result suggests that the rise of CRE CDOs had an "intensive margin" impact and induced
B-piece buyers to take more risk.
If there is heterogeneity in the quality of deals issued with different issuers, an increase in risk taking
2 5The sooner the B-piece is sold into CRE CDOs, the less exposure the B-piece buyer has to the performance of underlying
assets. More importantly, as time passes, more information about the performance of the underlying assets becomes available
and the B-piece buyer will have less information advantage over uninformed investors in selling underperforming assets. See
Jiang et al. (2011) on how the time lag between loan origination and loan sales resulted in some of the worse loans remaining
on the originating bank's balance sheet.
26 Adelino (2009) and He, Qian and Strahan (2012) also found that in the case of residential mortgage backed securities,
tranche coupon rates have predictive power in explaining default rates above the rating agencies action.
27 For example because there is no maturity mismatch in CDO financing and therefore these B-piece buyers do not need to
worry about roll-over risk, more risky B-piece buyers may benefit more from CRE CDO financing.
28 Even in this case it can be argued that CRE CDOs contributed to lower performance of CMBS deals by allowing more
risky players to take higher leverage.
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of B-piece buyers can increase origination of more risky loans in two ways: First, more risky issuers have
easier time to sell their B-piece and can take more leverage and issue more deals. Second, because B-piece
buyers perform less due diligence, independent of the issuer identity CMBS deals become more risky. The
more important is the first channel, the smaller should be our estimate of 8 after we control for the issuer
fixed effect. In column (5) we control for the CMBS deal issuer fixed effect and again the result is almost
the same as before which suggests that more risk-taking of B-piece buyers induces issuers to originate more
risky deals. In column (6) we control both for the B-piece buyer fixed effect and CMBS deal issuer fixed
effect. Although the estimated # is positive, it is not significant any more.
One question that arises here is whether the lower performance of deals in which the B-Piece was sold to
CRE CDOs within a year was part of the optimal market structure' and whether the risk associated with
this lower performance was priced or not. According to the optimal market structure hypothesis, we should
observe that the percentage of the B-piece that was sold to CRE CDOs in 13 months is positively correlated
with other descriptive characteristics of the CMBS deal that are associated with a lower performance such
as higher LTV or higher spread rate of the underlying assets. We can also use the subordination level below
BBB as a measure of the rating agencies' assessment of the riskiness of these deals. Table 3.3 columns (1)
to (3) shows that there is no relation between deal's weighted average LTV, Spread, or Subordination level
below BBB and the percentage of the B-piece that was sold into CRE CDOs (after we control for the time
fixed effect) which is inconsistent with the optimal market structure hypothesis. Column (4) shows that
there is a positive correlation between the percentage of the B-piece that was sold into CRE CDOs and the
percentage of the most junior BBB tranche that was sold into CRE CDOs. Finally columns (5) and (6) show
that despite higher default rates of deals in which the B-piece was sold into CRE CDOs, there is no relation
between the tranche coupon and the percentage of the B-piece that was sold into CRE CDOs. This assures
that this agency problem with B-piece buyers was not observable to investors and the risk associated with
the CMBS deals in which a higher percentage of the B-piece was sold into CRE CDOs was not priced.
3.4.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
The OLS results show that CMBS deals in which a higher percentage of the B-piece was sold into CRE
CDOs defaulted more often than other deals and this result was robust to controlling for other characteristics
associated with the deal performance as well as the deal issuer fixed effect or the B-piece buyer fixed effect.
However there can be two explanations that are consistent with this result. One explanation is that even
after the rise of CRE CDOs, B-piece buyers continued to perform due diligence of deals. However they
passed B-piece of deals that performed worse (or they expected to perform worse) to CRE CDOs. Therefore
being sold to a CRE CDO is just a sign of underperformance of the deal and not the cause of it and even in
the absence of CRE CDOs the same loans would have ended up in CMBS deals. The second explanation is
2For example one can argue that even in an environment with perfect information there are larger gains from diversification
of more risky assets.
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that a B-piece buyer that gets risk insensitive nonrecourse leverage from a CRE CDO has weaker incentives
to screen which resulted in the CMBS deal performing worse. Therefore in the latter case there is a causal
relation between the rise of CRE CDOs and the poor performance of CMBS deals. (See Adrian and Ashcraft
(2012) for a formal model related to this argument.)
In order to differentiate between the two mechanisms explained above we use the fact that access to CRE
CDOs and its evolution through time was very different for different B-piece buyers. Figure 3.8 shows both
of these facts. First it shows that for the same group of B-piece buyers the average percentage that they sold
into CRE CDOs was different in different periods. But more importantly it also shows that the percentage
of the B-piece that was sold into CDOs by large B-piece buyers like LNR and GMac was significantly larger
than the percentage of B-piece that was sold to CDOs by small B-piece buyers. 30 As we will see shortly,
the size of the B-piece buyer was one of the important factors in determining this differential access to CRE
CDO financing.
In order to rule out the selection mechanism, we construct our first instrument variable for deal i as the
moving average of the percentage of the B-piece that was sold into CRE CDOs over deals that were issued
by the same B-piece buyer in a two year window centered at deal i settle date when we take out the deal i
itself. To be formal, our instrument is defined as:
Eki,j,rE [t-4,t+4] Xk,j,,-
zi,j,t =
EkAi,j,-rE[t-4,t+4] 1
Here as before subscription (i, j, t) refers to deal i, issued in quarter t where the B-piece was bought with
B-piece buyer j and xij,t is the percentage of the B-piece of deal i that was sold into a CRE CDO within a
year.
This instrument helps us to sort out the selection issue since the change in the percentage of deal i that
was sold to CRE CDOs does not have any impact on our instrument and therefore there is no relation
between ex post adverse selection for deal i and the average percentage of neighboring deals with the same
issuer that were sold into CRE CDOs.
Another important reason for using an instrumental variable approach is that because of the timing of
the sequence of events, what matters for the incentive of B-piece buyers to perform due diligence of the deal
is, in fact, the B-piece buyer's expectation of probability of selling the B-piece into a CRECDO at the time
B-piece buyer bids for the B-piece. Therefore the treatment effect that should be estimated is the impact of
change in the probability of B-piece being sold into a CRE CDO on the performance of the deal. Since the
actual percentage of the B-piece that was sold into a CRE CDO is a noisy measure of the expectation by
the B-piece buyer about the probability of the B-piece being sold into a CRE CDO, in a small sample, OLS
estimation will result in attenuation bias. Now using the fact that the probability of the B-piece sold into a
CRE CDO differs across different B-piece buyers and different times, we can use our instrument to captures
3
oSmall Bpiece buyers are defined as those who have been the Bpiece buyer of less than 10 deals during the period of 1999Q3
to the end of 2007.
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the impact of change in the probability of B-piece being sold into a CRE CDO on the performance of the
CMBS deal.
Figure 3.9 shows the difference in the average default rate of deals in the bottom quartile versus deals
in the upper quartile of distribution of zijt after we take out quarter and B-piece buyer fixed effects from
zij,t. As we can see in most of the years the junior BBB tranche of deals in the upper quartile defaulted
more often than the junior BBB tranche of deals in the lower quartile.
Table 3.4 columns (1) and (2), shows that our instrument zi,j,t has a very strong first stage even after we
control for the B-piece buyer (and deal issuer) fixed effects. Column (3) shows that the estimated coefficient
from IV regression for 8 is almost four times larger than the estimated coefficient from the OLS regression.
Perhaps the main source of this difference is the attenuation bias that arises in OLS estimation as a result
of using the actual percent of the B-piece that was sold into a CRE CDO as a measure for the ex-ante
probability of the B-piece sold into a CRE CDO. Column (4) shows that the IV estimation results are robust
to control for the issuer fixed effects (in addition to B-piece buyer fixed effects) as well.
However, one question that we have not addressed yet is, what is the source of variation among different
B-piece buyers in their ability to sell their B-piece into a CRE CDO? It seems that one of the main reasons for
this differential access of B-piece buyers to CRE CDO financing was the size of the B-piece buyer: Because
of the significant information asymmetry associated with the B-piece, B-piece buyers usually used their own
CRE CDOs to construct a CDO deal. However in order to construct a CDO deal they needed to have many
B-piece tranches in order to be able to satisfy certain "diversification" and "size" thresholds imposed by
rating agencies. In order to test this channel let us first define S5,, as the sum of the notional values of all
deals in the window of two years centered at t in which the B-piece was bought with B-piece buyer j.
Sit = Deal Notionalij,
ij,-rElt-4,t+4]
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.4 confirm that larger B-piece buyers indeed sold a higher percentage of their
B-piece into CRE CDOs.3 1 The estimated coefficient shows that one billion dollar increase in Sj,t results
in about a one percent increase in the probability of the B-piece sold into CRE CDOs." Columns (7) and
(8) report the result of IV estimation when we use 35,t as an instrument for xij,, the percentage of deal
i that was sold into a CRE CDO within a year. The estimated # without the B-piece buyer is almost the
same as the estimated coefficient with the other IV. Controlling for the B-piece buyer fixed effect makes the
estimated coefficient larger and more significant. Figure 3.10 also shows the difference in the average default
rate of the most junior BBB tranches in the upper quartile versus the bottom quartile distribution of Sj,t
after the quarter and B-piece buyer fixed effect is taken out.
3 1It should be mentioned that one concern here is that there is reverse causality as well: better access to CRE CDOs helps
the B-piece buyer to have a higher leverage and more resources for financing the purchase of a B-piece.
3 2It should be mentioned that one concern here is that there is reverse causality as well: better access to CRE CDOs helps
the B-piece buyer to have a higher leverage and more resources for financing the purchase of a B-piece.
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3.5 Robustness Check
In this section we test robustness of results in the previous section for a number of alternative specifications.
Table 3.5 replicates the specifications used in Table 3.2 when the linear probability model is replaced with
a probit model. In order to make the two tables comparable, in Table 3.5 we reported estimated average
marginal effects. The reason for the significantly lower number of observations in the probit regressions of
Table 3.5 is that there were many quarters in which none of the junior BBB tranches issued in those quarters
defaulted and therefore the quarter fixed effect perfectly predicts those observations. In general, when we
do not control for the B-piece buyer fixed effect or deal issuer fixed effect, probit model estimation results in
larger estimates of the coefficient on the relation between the percentage of the B-piece sold into CRE CDOs
within a year and probability of default of the most junior tranche. Controlling for the B-piece buyer fixed
effects or the deal issuer fixed effects makes the coefficient smaller and insignificant. However this may be
purely driven with the poor performance of non-linear models like probit when we have many fixed effects.
As the next set of robustness checks, we expand our sample to all BBB tranches (as opposed to the
most junior BBB tranche) of conduit and fusion CMBS deals that were issued between 1997 and 2007 and
investigate the relation between the default rate of these tranches and the percentage of the B-piece that
was sold into CRE CDOs within a year. We also cluster standard errors at the deal level to address the fact
that performances of different tranches within a deal are not independent of each other. Table 3.6 shows
that the result of the linear probability model and the probit model for the sample of all BBB tranches is
qualitatively the same as before although the estimated coefficient for the relation between the percentage
of the B-piece sold within a year and the default rate is no longer significant when we control for the B-piece
buyer fixed effect. However, because of the waterfall structure of CMBS tranches, we should have expected
that estimated coefficients for the probability of default of BBB tranches to be slightly smaller. Finally it
should be noted that the estimated # coefficient in the IV regression is no longer significant.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we documented the importance of the risk retention by informed investors for the performance
of securitized assets. In particular we exploit variation in the amount of retention over time and across B-
piece investors as measured by the amount sold to the CRE CDO market and document that after controlling
for all information available at issue, including market pricing, rating agency credit enhancement levels, and
other deal characteristics, the percent of the B-piece sold to CRE CDOs has a significant adverse impact
on the probability that more senior tranches ultimately default. The result of this paper is suggestive that
regulations like the Dodd Frank act that requires informed investors in the securitization process to retain
five percent of the credit risk of securitized assets can be beneficial and can make uninformed investors more
confident about the quality of underlying assets. It should be emphasized here that we see our findings
as a complement to other papers that document other information frictions in the securitization process
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such as inflated credit ratings and it is apparent from our estimations that even without the rise of CRE
CDOs a large fraction of BBB tranches would have defaulted as a result of historically low subordination
levels. There are a number of extensions to this paper that need to be conducted. First, using data for
the underlying commercial real estate loans of CMBS deals, it would be interesting to provide more direct
evidence of the relation between the B-piece buyers' risk retention and the performance of underlying loans.
Second, since in many cases the B-piece buyer is the same as the special servicer, it would be interesting to
compare the impact of risk retention rules on the ex-ante screening efforts of the B-piece buyers versus the
ex-post performance of the special servicers in dealing with delinquent loans.
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Table 3.1
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Deal Level Variables
1. Loan to Value (Weighted Average
Loan to Value Ratio of Underlying Loans
at Origination) 476 68.51 4.00 50.87 76.67
2. Spread (Weighted Average Spread of
underlying Loans at Origination) 482 1.56 0.53 0.68 2.58
3. Number of Loans 483 164.98 74.50 32.00 664.00
4. Deal Original Balance (bil.$) 483 1.68 1.10 0.16 7.90
5. Percent of B-piece sold in 12 months 483 0.34 0.40 0.0 1
6. Percent of B-piece sold after 12 months
483 0.27 0.33 0.0 1
Tranche Level Variables (Base Sample)
7. Default 483 0.42 0.49 0 1
8. Original Rating (8= BBB+, 2 =BBB, 3
=BBB-) 483 9.99 0.11 9.00 10.00
9. Subordination 483 5.79 3.15 1.38 13.50
10. Coupon Rate 483 1.52 0.56 0.48 3.01
11. Percent of BBB tranche sold 483 0.37 0.35 0 1
Tranche Level Variables (All BBB
Tranches)
12. Default 1314 0.38 0.49 0 1
13. Original Rating (8= BBB+, 9 =BBB, 10
=BBB-) 1314 9.09 0.79 8.00 10.00
14. Subordination 1314 6.45 3.17 1.38 21.59
15. Tranche Coupon Rate 1314 1.42 0.52 0.01 3.01
16. Percent of BBB tranche sold 1314 0.24 0.31 0 1
Panel B: Top B-Piece Buyers
B-Piece Buyer Name Number Value of Value of B3-of Deals Deals (bil$) Piece (bil $) pct pctwthnyear
LNR 89 170.16 6.19 0.84 0.54
ARCAP 53 69.16 2.69 0.78 0.44
ALLIED 31 35.46 1.99 0.7 0.36
ANTHRACITE 28 53.07 1.54 0.64 0.57
CW CAPITAL 28 75.11 2.29 0.85 0.35
GMAC 24 23.69 1.46 0.8 0.47
JER 22 50.78 1.33 0.88 0.83
ING 19 30.33 0.93 0.49 0.12
CENTERLINE 17 45.75 1.06 0.24 0.24
HYPERION 16 34.71 1.08 0.22 0.09
AMCAP 16 52.61 1.35 0.76 0.44
BANC ONE 10 13.19 0.46 0.23 0.15
CITIGROUP 8 11.88 0.35 0.07 0.05
INSIGNIA 4 3.43 0.17 0.2 0.06
PRESIDIO 4 11.33 0.3 0.06 0.06
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Table 3.2: B-piece Buyer Skin in the Game and the Performance of CMBS Deal, OLS Regression Resuts
The table reports coefficient estiamtes of regressions of the linear probability model for the default of the
most junior BBB tranche. Each observation refers to a CMBS deal that is originated between 1998 and
2007. Percent of B-piece sold in (after) 12 months is the percentage of B-piece tranches that were sold to
CRE CDOs within (after) 12 months from the issuance of the CMBS deal. Controls include percentage of
the most junior BBB tranche that was sold into CRE CDOs, coupon rate of the most junior BBB tranche,
subordination below the BBB tranche, initial rating of the tranche and the average loan to value of the
underlying commercial mortgages at the origination. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering for
observations in each quarter and reported In parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%,
**=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable is whether the most junior BBB tranche is in
default or not
Percent of B-piece sold in 12
months
Percent of B-piece sold after 12
months
Percent of BBB tranche sold
BBB tranche original spread
BBB tranche original subordination
Original loan to value
BBB tranche original rating
Quarter fixed effects
B-Piece Buyer fixed effects
Deal Issuer fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
0.14** 0.15**
(0.07) (0.06)
-0.00 -0.01
(0.05) (0.04)
0.03
(0.05)
0.12*
(0.06)
-0.03
(0.02)
0.02***
(0.01)
-0.09**
(0.04)
Y Y
N N
N N
483 476
0.63 0.64
0.15** 0.12* 0.12* 0.09
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
0.03
(0.05)
0.12*
(0.06)
-0.03
(0.02)
0.02***
(0.01)
-0.09**
(0.04)
0.06
(0.07)
0.21**
(0.08)
-0.04
(0.03)
0.02**
(0.01)
0.15
(0.14)
0.04
(0.06)
0.12*
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.02***
(0.01)
-0.03
(0.08)
0.07
(0.07)
0.21**
(0.09)
-0.01
(0.03)
0.02**
(0.01)
0.28
(0.17)
Y Y Y Y
N Y N Y
N N Y Y
476 380 476
0.64 0.62 0.66
380
0.64
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Table 3.3: B-piece Buyer Skin in the Game, Market Structure and Risk Pricing
The table reports coefficient estimates of regressions of characteristics of CMBS deals on the
percentage of B-piece that was sold into CRE CDO within a year. Each observation refers to a CMBS
deal that is originated between 1998 and 2007. Percent of B-piece sold in (after) 12 months is the
percentage of B-piece tranches that were sold to CRE CDOs within (after) 12 months from the
issuance of the CMBS deal. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering for observations in each quarter
and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coupon Spread Rate ofPercentage of B-piece Sold into CRE CDO the Most Junior BBB
witin a Year Tranche
Percent of B-piece -0.03 -0.04
sold in 12 months (0.04) (0.04)
Original loan to value -0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00)
Deal average spread 0.01 0.617(0.08) (0.07)
BBB tranche original -0.01 0.01
subordination (0.01) (0.02)
Percent of BBB 0.11**
tranche sold (0.05)
Observations 476 482 483 483 483 476
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.77 0.82
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Table 3.4: B-piece Buyer Skin in the Game and the Performance of CMBS Deal, Instrumental Variable Approach
Columns (1) and (2) report the first stage: regression of percentage of B-piece sold into CRE CDOs within a year on the moving average of the percentage of the B-
piece of neighboring deals with the same issuer that are sold into a CRE CDO. Columns (3) and (4) report coefficient estiamtes of 2SLS regressions of the linear
probability model for the default of the most junior BBB tranche. Columns (5) to (8) report the similar first stage and 2SLS estimations when the sum of total balance of
neighboring deals in which the B-piece was bought with the same B-piece buyer is used as an instrument for pctwthnyear. Each observation refers to a CMBS deal that
is issued between 1998 and the second quarter of 2008. Standard errors are clustered by deal issuer quarter and by B-piece buyer and reported in parentheses.
Asterisks denote significance levels (*=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2)
percentage of B-piece
sold into CRE CDO
within a year
(3) (4)
Default of the Most Junior
BBB Tranche
(5) (6)
percentage of B-piece
sold into CRE CDO
within a year
(7) (8)
Default of the Most
Junior BBB Tranche
Xi.J,t
(Percentage of B-piece of neighboring deals
with same B-piece Buyer sold in 12 months)
SJ,t
(Moving average size of B-piece buyer in 100
Billion $)
Percent of B-piece sold in 12 months
Percent of BBB tranche sold
BBB tranche original spread
BBB tranche original subordination
Original loan to value
Quarter fixed effects
B-Piece Buyer fixed effects
Deal Issuer fixed effects
0.82*** 0.82***
(0.10) (0.10)
0.78*** 0.74***
(0.20) (0.21)
0.07
(0.06)
-0.01
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.07
(0.06)
-0.01
(0.04)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.01)
Y Y
Y Y
N Y
0.37**
(0.15)
0.04
(0.06)
0.21***
(0.05)
-0.04
(0.03)
0.02***
(0.01)
Y
Y
N
0.40***
(0.14)
0.05
(0.06)
0.21***
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.03)
0.02***
(0.01)
Y
Y
Y
0.07
(0.07)
-0.00
(0.04)
-0.00
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.07
(0.06)
0.01
(0.05)
0.01
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.01)
Y Y
Y Y
N Y
376 376 376 376
0.63 0.64 0.60 0.61
380 380 380 380
0.56 0.58 0.55 0.56
Observations
R-squared
0.59**
(0.24)
0.03
(0.07)
0.21***
(0.05)
-0.04
(0.03)
0.02***
(0.01)
Y
Y
N
0.61**
(0.27)
0.04
(0.07)
0.20***
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.03)
0.03***
(0.01)
Y
Y
Y
Table 3.5: B-piece Buyer Skin in the Game and the Performance of CMBS Deal, Probit Regression Resuts
The table reports estimates of average marginal effects of a probit model of default of the most junior
BBB tranche. Each observation refers to a CMBS deal that is originated between 1998 and 2007.
Percent of B-piece sold in (after) 12 months is the percentage of B-piece tranches that were sold to
CRE CDOs within (after) 12 months from the issuance of the CMBS deal. Controls include percentage of
the most junior BBB tranche that was sold into CRE CDOs, coupon rate of the most junior BBB tranche,
subordination below the BBB tranche, initial rating of the tranche and the average loan to value of the
underlying commercial mortgages at the origination. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering for
observations in each quarter and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (*=1%,
**=5%, *=1 0%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable is whether the most junior BBB tranche is in
default or not
Percent of B-piece sold in 12
months
Percent of B-piece sold after 12
months
Percent of BBB tranche sold
BBB tranche original spread
BBB tranche original
subordination
Original loan to value
Quarter fixed effects
B-Piece Buyer fixed effects
Deal Issuer fixed effects
0.19** 0.18**
(0.09) (0.08)
0.03 0.02
(0.08) (0.06)
0.04
(0.08)
0.23**
(0.11)
-0.04
(0.04)
0.02**
(0.01)
Y Y
N
N
N
N
0.17** 0.10 0.11 0.04
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
0.04 0.09 0.04 0.10
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
0.22** 0.41*** 0.26** 0.43***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
-0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01
(0.04)
0.02**
(0.01)
(0.04)
0.02**
(0.01)
(0.05)
0.02**
(0.01)
(0.04)
0.02**
(0.01)
Y Y Y Y
N Y N Y
N N Y Y
284 280 280 255 262 242
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Observations
Table 3.6: B-piece Buyer Skin in the Game and Performance of All BBB Tranches, Robustness Check
The table reports robustness of relation between risk retention and deal performance when all BBB CMBS tranches are included in the sample.
Each observation is a BBB tranche in a CMBS deal. Columns (1) to (3) replicate Columns (6) to (8) of Table 2 for all BBB tranches. Columns
(4) to (6) correspond to Columns (6) to (8) of table 5 and Columns (7) and (8) replicate columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering for observations in each quarter and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%,
*=10%).
Dependent Variable is whether a tranche is in default or not
Linear Probability Model Probit Model 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percent of B-piece sold in 12 months 0.10** 0.08* 0.07 0.10** 0.07* 0.05 0.15* 0.19
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.14)
Percent of BBB tranche sold 0.09** 0.09** 0.10** 0.06 0.05 0.09** 0.10** 0.10**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
BBB tranche original spread 0.09** 0.10** 0.12** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
BBB tranche original subordination -0.04*** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Original loan to value 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
BBB tranche original rating 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04** 0.06*** 0.04* 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Quarter fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
B-Piece Buyer fixed effects N N Y N N Y N Y
Deal Issuer fixed effects N Y N N Y N N N
Observations 1,294 1,294 1,127 1,048 976 949 1,109 1,109
R-squared 0.57 0.60 0.57 0.55 0.56
Figure 3.1: Annual Issuance of Conduit/Fusion CMBS deals
CMBS Conduit/Fusion Issuance by Issue Year
1995 2000 2005 2010Issue Year
Annual Issuance (Bil. $) -.- AnnuallIssuance (Numbei
Figure 3.2: BBB Subordination and Spread Trends
Conduit/Fusion BBB Tranche Structure
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- -+- - spread over 10 year T-Bill - Subordination below BBI
Notes: The graph shows the average subordination below the most junior BBB tranche as well as the average
Spread Rate (defined as difference between the coupon rate and 10 year T-Notes at issuance date) of the
most junior BBB bonds
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of Characteristics of Commercial Loans Underlying CMBS Deals
Characteristics of Underlying Commercial Loans Over Time
C4C
0D
*00
0
1995 2000 2005 2010
Issue Year
- Spread Rate on Commercial Loans- -+- - LTV at Originatlo
Notes: The figure shows the weighted average of LTV and Spread Rates (defined as the difference between
loan coupon rate and 10 year T-Notes) of underlying commercial loans where the original loan size is used
as the weight.
Figure 3.4: Delinquency Rate of Underlying Commercial Loans and Default Rate of the BBB Tranche
linqunecy Rate of Commercial Loans vs Default Rate of BBB Tranc
C-.
1995 2000 isu er2005 2010
Delinqunecy Rate * Average Default
Notes: A loan is delinquent if it has any history of being serviced by a special servicer. A tranche is in
default if the default status in Bloomberg is either "Default" or "Paid in Full/Default".
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Figure 3.5: Commercial Real Estate CDOs Issuance by Year and Type
to
CD
CRE CDO Issuance by Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Cash Hybrid I
- Synthetic
2007 2008
Notes: This graph shows the notional amount of deals issued in each quarter which may overstate the market
value of new issuances since non-investment grade assets are sold at discount.
Figure 3.6: Evolution and Distribution of Percentage of B-piece Sold into CRE CDOs within a Year
0-
(0.
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008Issue Year
C (p 75) pctwthnyearl(p 25) pctwthnyear (mean) pctwthnyea
Notes: The figure shows the average percentage as well as the 25th to 75th percentiles of the distribution
of the B-piece that was sold into CRE CDOs within a year from CMBS deal issuance over the issue year of
CMBS deals.
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Figure 3.7: Performance of Deals across B-pieces sold into CDOs
Average Default of CMBS BBB Tranche
Across sale of b-piece into CDO within a year from CMBS issue date
N
{5
00 2002 2004 2006 200E
- b-piece not sold into CDO b-piece sold into CO
Notes: The B-piece sold into CDO is defined as pctwthnyear>0.75 (i.e. within a period of one year from
deal origination at least 75 percent of the notional value of the B-piece was sold into a CRE CDO). Not sold
into CDO is defined as pctwthnyear=0.
Figure 3.8: Differential Access of Different B-piece Buyers to CRE CDO financing
Percentage of B-Piece Sold into CDO across B-Piece Buyers
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Figure 3.9: Performance of Deals Across the Moving Average of the Percentage Sold into CRE CDOs (x )
Relative Performance of BBB Tranche
15
C-
0*
W)
< ,
1
1998
~,,
/
A
/
9
'I
I
/
/
i
, '
.- ~4/ /
2000 2002 Year
2004 2006 2008
i--+-- Bottom Quartile Deals
Upper Quartile Deals
Notes: In the above figure, the bottom (upper) quartile deals are deals in the bottom (upper) quartile
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Figure 3.10: Performance of Deals across the Moving Average Size of the B-piece Buyer Portfolio (Sj,,)
Relative Performance of BBB Tranche
CO
CO
C
/
'p
I
/
A
4V
2000 2002 Year
2004 2006 2008
Bottom Quartile Deals
Upper Quartile Deals
Notes: In the above figure, the bottom (upper) quartile deals are deals in the bottom (upper) quartile
distribution of our first instrument, S,t(sum of the original balance of deals in a window of two years
centered at t in which the B-piece was bought with the same B-piece buyer) after we take out the quarter
and B-piece buyer fixed effects.
141
I
Bibliography
[1] ABADIE, A., DIAMOND, A., AND HAINMUELLER, J. Synthetic control methods for comparative
case studies: Estimating the effect of california's tobacco control program. Journal of the American
Statistical Association 105, 490 (2010).
[2] ABADIE, A., AND GARDEAZABAL, J. The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the basque
country. American economic review (2003), 113-132.
[3] ACEMOGLU, D., AND ROBINSON, J. Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty.
Crown Business, 2012.
[4] ADELINO, M. Do investors rely only on ratings? the case of mortgage-backed securities. Job Market
Paper, MIT Sloan School of Management and Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (2009).
[5] ADRIAN, T., AND ASHCRAFT, A. Shadow banking regulation. FRB of New York Staff Report, 559
(2012).
[6] ADRIAN, T., COLLA, P., AND SHIN, H. S. Which Financial Frictions? Parsing the Evidence from the
Financial Crisis of 2007-9. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2012, Volume 27. University of Chicago
Press, 2012.
[7] AIYAGARI, S. R. Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 109, 3 (1994), 659-684.
[8] AOKI, K., BENIGNO, G., AND KIYOTAKI, N. Capital flows and asset prices. In NBER International
Seminar on Macroeconomics 2007 (2009), University of Chicago Press, pp. 175-216.
[9] ASHCRAFT, A., GOLDSMITH-PINKHAM, P., HULL, P., AND VICKERY, J. Credit ratings and security
prices in the subprime mbs market. American Economic Review 101, 3 (2011), 115-119.
[10] ASHCRAFT, A., GOLDSMITH-PINKHAM, P., AND VICKERY, J. Mbs ratings and the mortgage credit
boom. FRB of New York Staff Report, 449 (2010).
[11] ASHCRAFT, A., GOLDSMITH-PINKHAM, P., AND VICKERY, J. Mbs ratings and the mortgage credit
boom.
142
[12] ASHCRAFT, A. B., AND SCHUERMANN, T. Understanding the securitization of subprime mortgage
credit, vol. 2. Now Pub, 2008.
[13] ATTANASIO, 0. P., BLOw, L., HAMILTON, R., AND LEICESTER, A. Booms and busts: Consumption,
house prices and expectations. Economica 76, 301 (2009), 20-50.
[14] BAIR, S. Bull by the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street and Wall Street from Itself.
Free Press, 2012.
[15] BARNETT-HART, A. K. The story of the CDO market meltdown: An empirical analysis (2009).
[16] BAROFSKY, N. Bailout: How Washington Abandoned Main Street While Rescuing Wall Street. Free
Press, 2013.
[17] BAYER, P., GEISSLER, C., AND ROBERTS, J. W. Speculators and middlemen: The role of flippers in
the housing market (2011).
[18] BECKER, B., BERGSTRESSER, D., AND SUBRAMANIAN, G. Does shareholder proxy access improve
firm value? Evidence from the business roundtable challenge (2012).
[19] BELTRAN, D. 0., CORDELL, L., AND THOMAS, C. P. Asymmetric information and the death of abs
cdos.
[20] BEN-DAvID, I. Financial constraints and inflated home prices during the real estate boom. American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3, 3 (2011), 55-87.
[21] BERGER, D., VAVRA, J., AND BOOTH, C. Consumption dynamics during the great recession.
[22] BERNANKE, B. S., GERTLER, M., AND GILCHRIST, S. The financial accelerator in a quantitative
business cycle framework. Handbook of macroeconomics 1 (1999), 1341-1393.
[23] BERTRAND, M., BOMBARDINI, M., AND TREBBI, F. Is it whom you know or what you know? An
empirical assessment of the lobbying process (2011).
[24] BHAGWATI, J. The capital myth: the difference between trade in widgets and dollars. Foreign Affairs
(1998), 7-12.
[25] BLACK, L. K., CHU, C. S., COHEN, A., AND NICHOLS, J. B. Differences across originators in cmbs
loan underwriting. Journal of Financial Services Research 42, 1-2 (2012), 115-134.
[26] BOLTON, P., FREIXAS, X., AND SHAPIRO, J. The credit ratings game. The Journal of Finance 67,
1 (2012), 85-111.
[27] BRUNNERMEIER, M. K., AND SANNIKOV, Y. A macroeconomic model with a financial sector (2012).
143
[28] BRUNNERMEIER, M. K., AND SANNIKOV, Y. Redistributive monetary policy. In Policy Forum of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in Jackson Hole (2012).
[29] CABALLERO, R. J., AND KRISHNAMURTHY, A. International and domestic collateral constraints in a
model of emerging market crises. Journal of Monetary Economics 48, 3 (2001), 513-548.
[30] CALVO, G. A., CORICELLI, F., AND OTTONELLO, P. The labor market consequences of financial
crises with or without inflation: Jobless and wageless recoveries (2012).
[31] CAMPBELL, J. R., AND HERCOWITZ, Z. Welfare implications of the transition to high household
debt. Journal of Monetary Economics 56, 1 (2009), 1-16.
[32] CAMPBELL, J. Y., AND Cocco, J. F. How do house prices affect consumption? evidence from micro
data. Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 3 (2007), 591-621.
[33] CAMPBELL, J. Y., LO, A. W.-C., AND MACKINLAY, A. C. The econometrics of financial markets.
princeton University press, 1997.
[34] CASE, K. E., QUIGLEY, J. M., AND SHILLER, R. J. Comparing wealth effects: The stock market
versus the housing market.
[35] CHARLES, K. K., HURST, E., AND NOTOWIDIGDO, M. J. Manufacturing Decline, Housing Booms,
and Non-Employment (2013).
[36] CHOI, H. S. The impact of the anti-predatory lending laws on mortgage volume.
[37] COHEN, A. Rating shopping in the embs market.
[38] COIBION, 0., GORODNICHENKO, Y., KUENG, L., AND SILVIA, J. Innocent bystanders? Monetary
policy and inequality in the US (2012).
[39] CONNAUGHTON, J. The Payoff: Why Wall Street Always Wins. Prospecta Press, 2012.
[40] CORDELL, L., HUANG, Y., AND WILLIAMS, M. Collateral damage: sizing and assessing the subprime
cdo crisis.
[41] COVAL, J., JUREK, J., AND STAFFORD, E. The economics of structured finance. The Journal of
Economic Perspectives 23, 1 (2009), 3-26.
[42] DAGHER, J., AND Fu, N. What fuels the boom drives the bust: Regulation and the mortgage crisis.
IMF Working Papers (2011), 1-57.
[43] DAVIS, M. A., AND HEATHCOTE, J. The price and quantity of residential land in the united states.
Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 8 (2007), 2595-2620.
144
[44] DEMARZO, P., AND DUFFIE, D. A liquidity based model of security design. Econometrica 67, 1
(1999), 65-99.
[45] DEMIROGLU, C., AND JAMES, C. How important is having skin in the game? originator-sponsor
affiliation and losses on mortgage-backed securities. Review of Financial Studies 25, 11 (2012), 3217-
3258.
[46] DUBE, A., KAPLAN, E., AND NAIDU, S. Coups, corporations, and classified information. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, 3 (2011), 1375-1409.
[47] DUCHIN, R., AND SOSYURA, D. The politics of government investment. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics (2012).
[48] EGGERTSSON, G. B., AND KRUGMAN, P. Debt, deleveraging, and the liquidity trap: A fisher-minsky-
koo approach*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127, 3 (2012), 1469-1513.
[49] FAcCIo, M. Politically connected firms. American Economic Review 96, 1 (2006), 369-386.
[50] FACCIO, M., MASULIS, R. W., AND MCCONNELL, J. Political connections and corporate bailouts.
The Journal of Finance 61, 6 (2006), 2597-2635.
[51] FALTIN-TRAEGER, 0., AND MAYER, C. Lemons and cdos.
[52] FAVILUKIS, J., LUDVIGSON, S. C., AND NIEUWERBURGH, S. V. The macroeconomic effects of housing
wealth, housing finance, and limited risk-sharing in general equilibrium.
[53] FERGUSON, T., AND VOTH, H.-J. Betting on hitler-the value of political connections in nazi germany.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 1 (2008), 101-137.
[54] FERRERO, A. House prices booms and current account deficits. Unpublished paper (2011).
[55] FISMAN, R. Estimating the value of political connections. The American Economic Review 91, 4
(2001), 1095-1102.
[56] GAN, Y. H., AND MAYER, C. Agency conflicts, asset substitution, and securitization (2006).
[57] GARRIGA, C., MANUELLI, R., AND PERALTA-ALVA, A. A model of price swings in the housing
market. FRB of St.Louis Working Paper No (2012).
[58] GERTLER, M., AND KIYOTAKI, N. Financial intermediation and credit policy in business cycle anal-
ysis. Handbook of Monetary Economics 3 (2010), 547.
[59] GLAESER, E. L., GOTTLIEB, J. D., AND GYOURKO, J. Can cheap credit explain the housing boom?
Housing and the Financial Crisis. University of Chicago Press, 2012.
145
[60] GLAESER, E. L., GYOURKO, J., AND SAIZ, A. Housing supply and housing bubbles. Journal of
Urban Economics 64, 2 (2008), 198-217.
[61] GOMEZ, E. T., AND JOMO, K. Malaysia's political economy: Politics, patronage, and profits.
[62] GORTON, G., AND PENNACCHI, G. Financial intermediaries and liquidity creation. The Journal of
Finance 45, 1 (1990), 49-71.
[63] GORTON, G. B., AND PENNACCHI, G. G. Banks and loan sales marketing nonmarketable assets.
Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 3 (1995), 389-411.
[64] GREENSPAN, A., AND KENNEDY, J. Sources and uses of equity extracted from homes. Oxford Review
of Economic Policy 24, 1 (2008), 120-144.
[65] GREENWOOD, R. Short-and long-term demand curves for stocks: theory and evidence on the dynamics
of arbitrage. Journal of Financial Economics 75, 3 (2005), 607-649.
[66] GRIFFIN, J. M., AND TANG, D. Y. Did subjectivity play a role in cdo credit ratings? The Journal
of Finance 67, 4 (2012), 1293-1328.
[67] GUERRIERI, V., HARTLEY, D., AND HURST, E. Endogenous gentrification and housing price dynam-
ics. Journal of Public Economics (2013).
[68] GUERRIERI, V., AND LORENZONI, G. Credit crises, precautionary savings, and the liquidity trap
(2011).
[69] GUVENEN, F. A parsimonious macroeconomic model for asset pricing. Econometrica 77, 6 (2009),
1711-1750.
[70] HANSON, S. G., KASHYAP, A. K., AND STEIN, J. C. A macroprudential approach to financial
regulation. Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, 1 (2011), 3-28.
[71] HAUGHWOUT, A., LEE, D., TRAcy, J., DER KLAAUW, V., AND WILBERT, H. Real estate investors,
the leverage cycle, and the housing market crisis. FRB of New York Staff Report, 514 (2011).
[72] HE, J. J., QIAN, J. Q., AND STRAHAN, P. E. Are all ratings created equal? the impact of issuer
size on the pricing of mortgage backed securities. The Journal of Finance 67, 6 (2012), 2097-2137.
[73] HURST, E., AND STAFFORD, F. Home is where the equity is: mortgage refinancing and household
consumption. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (2004), 985-1014.
[74] IACOVIELLO, M. Household debt and income inequality, 1963-2003. Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 40, 5 (2008), 929-965.
[75] IGAN, D., AND MISHRA, P. Three Company: Washington, Wall Street and K Street (2011).
146
[76] IGAN, D., MISHRA, P., AND TRESSEL, T. A fistful of dollars: Lobbying and the financial crisis
(2011).
[77] JAYACHANDRAN, S. The jeffords effect*. Journal of Law and Economics 49, 2 (2006), 397-425.
[78] JEANNE, 0., AND KORINEK, A. Managing credit booms and busts: A Pigouvian taxation approach
(2010).
[79] JESKE, K., KRUEGER, D., AND MITMAN, K. Housing and the macroeconomy: The role of bailout
guarantees for government sponsored enterprises (2011).
[80] JIANG, W., NELSON, A., AND VYTLACIL, E. Liar's loan? effects of origination channel and informa-
tion falsification on mortgage delinquency. Effects of Origination Channel and Information Falsiication
on Mortgage Delinquency (September 27, 2011) (2011).
[81] JOH, S. W., AND CHIU, M. M. Loans to distressed firms: Political connections, related lending,
business group affiliation and bank governance. In Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings
(2004), Econometric Society.
[82] JOHNSON, S., AND KWAK, J. 13 bankers: the Wall Street takeover and the next financial meltdown.
Vintage, 2011.
[83] JOHNSON, S., AND MITTON, T. Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from malaysia. Journal of
Financial Economics 67, 2 (2003), 351-382.
[84] JONES, B. F., AND OLKEN, B. A. Do leaders matter? national leadership and growth since world
war ii. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 3 (2005), 835-864.
[85] KEELEY, M. C. Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking. The American Economic
Review (1990), 1183-1200.
[86] KEYS, B. J., MUKHERJEE, T., SERU, A., AND VIG, V. Did securitization lead to lax screening?
evidence from subprime loans. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125, 1 (2010), 307-362.
[87] KEYS, B. J., PISKORSKI, T., SERU, A., AND VIG, V. Mortgage Financing in the Housing Boom and
Bust. Housing and the Financial Crisis. University of Chicago Press, 2012.
[88] KEYS, B. J., PISKORSKI, T., SERU, A., AND VIG, V. Mortgage Financing in the Housing Boom and
Bust. Housing and the Financial Crisis. University of Chicago Press, 2012.
[89] KHWAJA, A. I., AND MIAN, A. Do lenders favor politically connected firms? rent provision in an
emerging financial market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 4 (2005), 1371-1411.
[90] KIYOTAKI, N., MICHAELIDES, A., AND NIKOLOV, K. Winners and losers in housing markets. Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking 43 (2011), 255-296.
147
fiftft.444" - -- -,-. ..,
[91] KIYOTAKI, N., AND MOORE, J. Credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105, 2 (1997).
[92] KUMHOF, M., AND RANCIERE, R. Inequality, leverage and crises. IMF Working Papers (2010), 1-37.
[93] LEE, D., DER KLAAUW, V., AND WILBERT, H. An introduction to the frbny consumer credit panel.
FRB of New York Staff Report, 479 (2010).
[94] LEE, D., MAYER, C. J., AND TRACY, J. A new look at second liens (2012).
[95] Li, W., AND LIE, E. Dividend changes and catering incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 80,
2 (2006), 293-308.
[96] LOUTSKINA, E., AND STRAHAN, P. E. Informed and uninformed investment in housing: The downside
of diversification. Review of Financial Studies 24, 5 (2011), 1447-1480.
[97] MANKIW, N. G., AND WEIL, D. N. The baby boom, the baby bust, and the housing market. Regional
Science and Urban Economics 19, 2 (1989), 235-258.
[98] MENDOZA, E. G. Sudden stops, financial crises, and leverage. The American Economic Review 100,
5 (2010), 1941-1966.
[99] MENDOZA, E. G., QUADRINI, V., AND RIOS-RULL, J.-V. Financial integration, financial deepness
and global imbalances (2007).
[100] MIAN, A., RAO, K., AND SUFI, A. Household balance sheets, consumption, and the economic slump.
Consumption, and the Economic Slump (June 1, 2012) (2011).
[101] MIAN, A., AND SUFI, A. House prices, home equity-based borrowing, and the us household leverage
crisis. American Economic Review 101, 5.
[102] MIAN, A., AND SUFI, A. The consequences of mortgage credit expansion: Evidence from the us
mortgage default crisis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, 4 (2009), 1449-1496.
[103] MIAN, A. R., AND SUFI, A. What explains high unemployment? The aggregate demand channel
(2012).
[104] MIAN, A. R., SUFI, A., AND TREBBI, F. The political economy of the us mortgage default crisis.
American Economic Review 100, 5 (2010), 1967-1998.
[105] MIDRIGAN, V., AND PHILIPPON, T. Household leverage and the recession.
[106] OUAZAD, A., AND RANCIERE, R. Credit standards and segregation.
[107] PIAZZESI, M., AND SCHNEIDER, M. Inflation and the price of real assets. Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, Research Department, 2009.
148
[108] PURNANANDAM, A. Originate-to-distribute model and the subprime mortgage crisis. Review of Fi-
nancial Studies 24, 6 (2011), 1881-1915.
[109] QUERUBIN, P., AND JR, J. M. S. The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis:
Wealth Accumulation by US Congressmen, 1850-1880 (2011).
[110] RAMPINI, A. A., AND VISWANATHAN, S. Financial intermediary capital.
[111] RAMSEYER, M. J., AND RASMUSEN, E. Can the treasury exempt its own companies from tax? the
45 billion dollars gm nol carryforward. Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper, 690 (2011).
[112] ROBERTS, B. E. A dead senator tells no lies: Seniority and the distribution of federal benefits.
American Journal of Political Science (1990), 31-58.
[113] SAIz, A. The geographic determinants of housing supply. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125,
3 (2010), 1253-1296.
[114] SCHEIBER, N. The Escape Artists: How Obama's Team Fumbled the Recovery. Simon and Schuster,
2012.
[115] SEIERSTAD, A., AND SYDSAETER, K. Optimal control theory with economic applications, vol. 20.
North-Holland Amsterdam, 1987.
[116] SORKIN, A. R. Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save
the FinancialSystem-and Themselves. Penguin Books, 2010.
[117] STANTON, R., AND WALLACE, N. CMBS subordination, ratings inflation, and the crisis of 2007-2009
(2010).
[118] STANTON, R., AND WALLACE, N. The bear's lair: Index credit default swaps and the subprime
mortgage crisis. Review of Financial Studies 24, 10 (2011), 3250-3280.
[119] STIGLER, G. J. The theory of economic regulation. The Bell journal of economics and management
science (1971), 3-21.
[120] SUSKIND, R. Confidence Men: Wall Street, Washington, and the Education of a President. Harper,
2011.
[121] TITMAN, S., TOMPAIDIS, S., AND TSYPLAKOV, S. Determinants of credit spreads in commercial
mortgages. Real Estate Economics 33, 4 (2005), 711-738.
[122] TITMAN, S., AND TSYPLAKOV, S. Originator performance, cmbs structures, and the risk of commercial
mortgages. Review of Financial Studies 23, 9 (2010), 3558-3594.
149
[123] USEEM, M. The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the
US and UK [electronic Resource]. Oxford University Press, 1984.
[124] VIDAL, J. B. I., DRACA, M., AND FONS-ROSEN, C. Revolving door lobbyists. The American
Economic Review 102, 7 (2012), 3731-3748.
150
